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SUMMARY 
The study of the bid-ask spreads of stocks is important since they constitute the 
mechanism through which trading costs are incorporated into prices and recovered by 
market-makers. Realized spreads are a measure of the trading costs which private and 
institutional investors have to cover whereas quoted spreads are important in 
revealing the price-generating mechanisms involved. A comprehensive trade-indicator 
model of the bid-ask spread of common stocks has been developed which, unlike 
previous research, has incorporated trading volume, the depth at the quoted prices, 
the waiting-time between trades, as well as the fixed-cost-of-trade into equations for 
the changes in the quoted-spread, the ask, the bid and the transaction prices. The 
parameters of the models have been estimated using intraday data of NYSE and 
NASDAQ stocks, split into deciles on the basis of their trading activity as measured 
by the number of shares traded. 
For both exchange mechanisms I find that a large adverse-selection cost, which 
depends on the trading volume and a smaller inventory-holding cost are present in the 
quoted spread and that the parameters of both of these vary with trading activity. 
These costs are asymmetric in the bid and ask sides of the quoted spread, a feature not 
analyzed in previous empirical work. Only a small part of these costs is recovered in 
the realized spread through trading. My estimates of the adverse-selection cost 
present in the realized spread are close to the values given by other researchers but the 
size of the inventory-holding cost is found to be much lower probably owing to the 
shorter time-horizon of the data employed. The depth at the quotes is found to be 
symmetric, to affect the size of the spread of both the NYSE and NASDAQ stocks 
and also to be present in the realized spread. The parameters of the above 
components, as well as the fixed-cost-of-trade, are estimated and their patterns for the 
two trading mechanisms examined are compared and contrasted. Weak evidence is 
found for the waiting-time between trades both in the quoted and the realized spread. 
The results of this thesis, apart from offering support for recent empirical evidence 
which indicates that information first enters the price-process through the depths of 
the quotes and not the spread, also contribute to the formation of a more theoretically 
sound explanation. Moreover, the finding in this thesis that the adverse-selection cost 
for NASDAQ is larger compared to that of NYSE stocks is in line with other recent 
empirical research. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Trading in real exchanges involves transaction costs which are necessary in order 
that market-makers, who are responsible for providing liquidity in the market, could 
cover certain expenses incurred as well as be compensated for their risks. Such risks 
are normally associated with the inventory they are obliged to hold so that trading can 
take place, the risks of the assets traded as well as the danger that the counter-party 
may be better informed in which case they are likely to enter into an unprofitable 
transaction. The means by which transaction costs, other than commissions, are 
recovered in the financial markets is through the bid-ask spread the mechanics of the 
formation of which have occupied a large amount of empirical as well as theoretical 
research. Such research has also attempted to investigate the factors which contribute 
to its formation through the price-generating process and the mechanisms of the 
exchanges and have referred to components of the spread as building blocks of the 
total difference between the bid and the ask price. The study of the bid-ask spread and 
its components is thus necessary for accurately estimating transaction costs which in 
turn is important in studies of market efficiency, asset pricing as well as market 
microstructure in general. 
Existing research has produced a number of models of the spread and its 
components using two approaches in modeling it. The first uses the covariance of 
transaction and/or quote returns whereas the second examines the data to classify 
trades as buyer- or seller- initiated and thus assign a trade-indicator variable to each 
trade when there is lack of more sophisticated data which could indicate the origin 
and nature of each trade. All of the above models are essentially models of the return- 
generating process in that they make assumptions about the mechanism by which 
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transaction prices arise through the interaction of the actions of market participants, 
their information and other characteristics which lead to these actions as well as the 
mechanisms imposed by the particular trading locale. 
Models of intraday price fon-nation describe the change in price in terms of a 
commonly perceived 'True Price' of the stock as well as innovations in information 
from public shocks and through the innovation which is implicit in the trade. These 
models capture many important characteristics of the trading process but in order that 
they are tractable they need to impose a number of simplifying assumptions and 
ignore effects associated with strategic trading, irregular time between trades, price 
discreetness and other microstructure imperfections. 
Some of the issues which have not been tackled in the existing literature are: 
9 Even though the price of each quote has been modeled as a factor affecting 
price formation little emphasis has been given to the size of the bid and ask 
quotes which are likely to affect the behavior of traders and thus the return- 
generating mechanism. 
9 Similarly, little attention has been paid to the possible imbalances between 
supply and demand, as evidenced by the schedules of orders over a period 
preceding each trade. Even though theoretical models have tackled this 
possibility empirical models have not. 
e The volume of each trade has an effect on the perception by traders of the 
true price affecting the adverse selection component of the spread, which is 
that part of the spread charged by the market-maker in his attempt to 
minimize his losses when trading with potentially informed traders. Some 
models have used ranges of sizes within which they estimate their 
3 
parameters but no detailed study has incorporated volume directly into the 
spread equation. 
* The time between trades is important and should be accounted for in the 
trading models since long periods lacking trades may signal the absence of 
private information whereas frequent trading may often carry the opposite 
information. 
9 The speed of assimilation of information could also be modeled by means of 
a time-adjustment factor which could in turn depend on volume. 
9 The behavior of the components of the spread could vary with the liquidity 
of the particular stock and therefore a thorough analysis should estimate 
these separately for varying levels of trading activity. 
* Apart from the quote-setting behaviour of the dealer a certain amount of 
infonnation could also probably be revealed by the quote-revision process 
and if so would affect the order-placement decisions of market participants. 
* The pricing strategy of dealers is likely to be affected by the size of the bid- 
ask spread and the probability of a trade inside the spread. However 
explicitly incorporating pricing strategies in empirical analysis is difficult. 
9 Apart from the exogenous factors which affect the order-arrival process, 
such as macroeconomic factors and traders' characteristics, certain 
endogenous factors may also affect this process since characteristics of the 
market may invoke a certain volume of trade irrespective of the usual 
demand / supply-initiated trading. 
9 Most models of the spread assume that the market is efficient which implies 
that new public information is accurately and promptly incorporated into 
prices. A consequence of this assumption is that there is a 'true price' of the 
4 
stock which is the same for all participants. However, this assumption may 
be unrealistic and one may not be always able to arrive at a full-information 
value. Therefore different results might be obtained if mathematical models 
of the spread adopted more than one 'true price'. 
9 The variance of return per unit volume of trade has not been investigated 
(this variable can be a proxy for order-arrival rates). 
1.2 Contribution of the Thesis 
In this thesis an attempt has been made to introduce some of the most important of 
the above features into existing models of the bid-ask formation. In particular, we 
have modeled explicitly the volume of each trade by incorporating its actual size 
directly into the bid-ask equation together with the sizes of the bid and ask quotes, as 
well as the waiting time between trades. While most research work has centered 
around one particular exchange we have extended our analysis on both the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), which operates under a double-auction specialist trading 
mechanism and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
(NASDAQ) System which is a quote driven multiple dealer system. These two 
systems are representative of the majority of the trading mechanisms under which 
shares around the world are traded and the parallel analysis contributes to highlighting 
the differences in our results which arise between the two types of exchange. 
Moreover our study breaks down our dataset into deciles of trading activity so as to 
gain an understanding of the differences in our results among f inns which have 
varying degrees of liquidity. 
Two models have been developed in this thesis. The first describes the change in 
the quoted bid-ask spread as a function of a number of variables related to its 
components while the second attempts to model the change in price after the trade has 
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occurred as a function of the same components. The aim has been to examine the 
differences in the components of the spread prior to and following each trade. 
Finally we have used the Generalized Method of Moments for estimating our 
models and have carried out specification tests, which scarcely appear in other work 
in finance which makes use of this method, in order to determine the significance of 
our results. 
The contribution of the research work in this thesis has been to show that: 
1. There is an adverse-selection component implicit in the quoted-spread 
which depends directly on the number of shares traded, unlike previous 
studies which only use dummy variables for ranges of size. It has also been 
shown that this effect is asymmetric for the bid and ask sides of the spread. 
Evidence has indicated that trading volume influences the adverse- 
selection component of the realized spread but the cost recovered through 
the trade is small. The results in this thesis show that adverse-selection 
costs in the realized spread are larger for NASDAQ stocks than for NYSE 
which is in line with recent evidence by Van Ness, Van Ness and Warr 
(2002). 
2. There is an inventory-holding component implicit in the quoted spread 
which varies with the trading activity of both NYSE and NASDAQ 
common stocks. It has been shown that this component, like the adverse- 
selection one, is not symmetric for the ask and bid sides of the spread. 
Evidence has also been found that this cost is recovered through the 
realized spread and thus the price but it is doubtful that such could be 
completely uncovered in the short horizon which our datasets span. 
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3. Even though the adverse-selection cost constitutes a large part of the 
quoted spread it appears to be a very small part of the realized spread. The 
results of this thesis for both the adverse-selection and the inventory- 
holding cost show that they are smaller compared to those estimated in 
other papers. 
4. The volume of shares quoted at the bid and ask (depth) plays a significant 
role in the fonnation of the quoted spread for both NYSE and NASDAQ 
common stocks, a feature not considered in earlier work. This effect is 
found to be symmetric for the ask and bid sides of the spread. Depth also 
affects the price-formation process of NYSE stocks its effect decreasing 
with increasing trading activity in the stock. The evidence in this thesis is 
in line with recent findings which indicate that new information first enters 
the price-process through the depths of the quotes and not the size of the 
spread, however a thorough analysis of this effect is provided in this thesis 
for two separate market mechanisms and also for stocks of varying trading 
activity. 
5. There is a significant fixed-cost-of-trade component in both NYSE and 
NASDAQ stocks which decreases as trading activity increases. 
6. The waiting-time between trades may account for a very small part of the 
quoted spread but may also play a significant role in the price-formation 
process of those NYSE stocks which have very high liquidity. 
7. The above analysis has been carried out for two different trading 
mechanisms, at both the pre-trade and post-trade stages, using deciles of 
trading activity which help determine the patterns of the parameters of the 
above components. 
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8. A thorough analysis of the components of the spread cannot be carried out 
without explicitly incorporating the effect of volume whether it is in the 
fonn of shares traded or shares quoted prior to a particular trade. 
9. The results in this thesis have demonstrated that, in spite of the competitive 
nature of the multiple-dealer market of NASDAQ, its dealers overreact to 
adverse information extracting higher rents from traders compared to what 
a specialist in NYSE would charge. This behaviour could lead to a 
liquidity crisis easier than under the specialist system of NYSE where the 
monopoly power of the specialist and his privileged position, owing to the 
consolidation of the order flow for a stock through him, could help him 
moderate his losses. Even though quotes in NASDAQ are competitive, the 
lack of a limit order book, as was the case in the period where our data 
originate from, leads to higher effective spreads. However, the ability of 
NASDAQ dealers to share the risks of inventory imbalances allows them 
to charge lower inventory costs as has been found by our analysis. 
The most relevant papers to our research are those of Huang and Stoll (1997) and 
Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997). Neither of these papers considers the 
effect of the quoted volume of shares on the spread. Moreover, the latter uses quotes 
only in order to determine the trade indicator variable and does not consider the 
inventory cost effect. The former model assumes that the spread is constant and 
estimates it using all the data. None of these studies incorporates the volume of shares 
traded explicitly like we have done and none attempts to study the behaviour of these 
components based on activity deciles. They also do not contrast the behaviour of the 
two exchanges in the two separate trading mechanisms. Therefore our results, 
especially those pertaining to the quoted spread, are not directly comparable to the 
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findings of the above papers since in our models a larger number of parameters is 
involved with fewer assumptions. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
Apart from the introduction this thesis consists of six more chapters a description 
of which is provided below. Chapters two and three review the existing literature on 
market microstructure, the return generating process and the bid-ask spread. In 
chapter two a presentation is made of the theoretical underpins and the research 
carried out regarding certain aspects of the return-generating process such as 
inventory and dealer models, specialist, single and multiple dealer models as well as 
pertinent empirical work. Reference is also made to differences between exchange 
mechanisms, types of market participants, types of orders as well as of the importance 
of volume in the return-generating process. 
In chapter three research on the intraday behavior of the bid-ask spread is 
presented together with the theories which have been put forward to explain it which 
are also those explaining the components of the spread to a certain extent. Existing 
models of the spread and its components are also discussed since they form the 
foundations upon which our models have been constructed. 
Chapter four discusses the design of our empirical approach, analyses the database 
employed and explains the procedure followed for selecting the data used for the 
estimation of the models together with the methodology for the classification of trades 
into buyer- and seller-initiated. Summary statistics, which are presented in Appendix 
D, are also discussed. 
Chapters five and six constitute our two empirical chapters. In chapter five the 
Quoted Spread Model is developed from first principles, based on the theories 
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discussed in chapters two and three as well as on our own assumptions. To refine our 
analysis and diagnose differences between the components pertaining to the quoted 
bid and the quoted ask two more equations are developed and estimated, the Offer- 
and the Bid-Change equations. Summary statistics of the variables used are discussed 
together with the results from the estimation of the parameters of the models. Some 
discussion of the estimation method is made but more details are provided in the 
appendices. Results of specification tests of the models are also discussed and 
conclusions are drawn. Tables of the summary statistics, the estimation as well as the 
specification test results are presented in Appendix G. 
A similar procedure has been followed for the presentation of the Price-Change 
model in chapter six. Based on principles discussed in chapter five the model is 
developed, summary statistics of its variables are discussed, estimation is carried out 
together with pertinent specification tests and finally results are discussed and 
conclusions are drawn. Tables of the summary statistics, the estimation as well as the 
specification test results of this model are also presented in Appendix G. 
Finally in chapter seven the conclusions of this thesis are presented, the limitations 
of our models and the database used are criticized, the policy implications of the 
results are discussed and ideas for further empirical research work in the future are 
proposed. 
A number of appendices have been included to clarify our methodology as well as 
explain the procedures used for extracting the data from our database. 
Appendix A presents an outline of the basic principles of the GMM methodology 
which has been used for estimating the parameters of our models. 
Appendix B discusses the principles behind the tests employed for the 
specification of the models in chapters five and six. 
10 
Appendix C outlines the computational procedure which has been followed in 
order to extract the data for our estimations from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database 
of NYSE used in this thesis. 
Appendix D presents tables and plots of the summary statistics of the variables in - 
the models for both the NYSE and NASDAQ datasets, split into deciles of trading 
activity so that their variation can be seen together with their differences from one 
exchange mechanism to the other. 
Appendix E presents some condition and correction codes from the TAQ manual 
which may be necessary so that the discussion presented in chapter four can be easily 
followed. 
Appendix F provides a literature survey on the various aspects of the mechanisms 
of limit-orders which are essential for a proper understanding of the price-formation 
process. 
Finally, Appendix G presents all the tables for the summary statistics, the results 
and the specification tests from the models in chapters five and six. 
II 
Chapter 2 
Literature Survey 
2.1 Market Microstructure and the Bid Ask Spread 
Early research on the operation of financial markets has assumed that the latter 
oPerate in a frictionless enviromnent, where no transaction costs' exist and where all 
participants share the same information. In such an environment orders transmitted to 
the market were assumed to be carried out at whatever price was established and there 
was no explanation as to how that equilibrium price had been arrived at. The 
availability of transaction data together with advances in theoretical concepts such as 
the capital asset pricing and the options pricing theories, as well as progress in the 
study of information economics have stimulated research into a number of aspects of 
market microstructure which has dealt with the price-formation, or return-generation 
process under the impact of transaction costs, asymmetric information and traders' 
risks. 
To construct models for the study of market microstructure issues, such as the 
price-formation process, researchers have employed the characteristics of actual 
trading mechanisms and in particular the rules which determine how trading takes 
place in conventional exchanges. 
Such exchanges are real markets where traders demand transactions, or liquidity 
and dealers supply it to them at a cost which compensates them for assuming 
unnecessary risks when adopting non-optimal inventory positions, for processing 
traders' orders and for the risk they face of losing to infon-ned traders, that is those 
traders who have superior infonnation. The way these costs are recovered by the 
' Transaction cost literature has been surveyed by Beebower (1989) and Harris (1990). 
Most of the pertinent studies focus on realized trades and as Perold (1988) notes, this ignores the cost 
of foregone trades. Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) focused on orders and imposed a cost on execution failure, in their attempt to remedy this effect. Dejong et al (1995) investigated the composition of 
trading costs in a limit order market and a dealer market. Kumar and Seppi (1994) modeled both 
market and limit orders based on an order-driven mechanism and showed that brokerage costs have important influence on the depth and composition of the limit order book. 
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dealers is by posting two prices instead of one, a price at which they are willing to 
buy, the bid and one at which they are willing to sell, the ask. 
This chapter together with chapter 3 present the theoretical foundations and 
pertinent literature on which a study of the bid-ask spread and its components should 
be based. Whereas chapter 3 presents the literature survey and technical details on 
some of the models of the bid-ask spread and its components this chapter discusses 
more general theoretical issues related to the elements of the return generating 
process. 
To facilitate the presentation first the factors affecting the process by which prices 
are formed are discussed followed by the types of market participants, the most 
common exchange mechanisms by which trading of stocks takes places and the types 
of orders available to traders. Particular emphasis then is given to the definition as 
well as the issues related to the liquidity in the market as well as to price volatility. 
The main directions which research, both theoretical and empirical, has followed are 
also presented and particularly those pertaining to the models of the trading behaviour 
of special types of participants such as dealers and specialists. Finally discussion 
concludes with the presentation of the issues related to trading volume which is one of 
the most important variables of the trading process since it is associated with 
information. 
2.2 The Return-Generation Process 
A great amount of research in finance in the past thirty five years has concentrated 
on the efficiency of the market and the predictability of stock returns with the aim of 
exploiting profit opportunities. This research has mainly focused on price patterns and 
the statistical analysis of the time-series of stock returns but has dealt only partially 
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with the factors which drive the trading process and lead to the fonnation of prices, 
the most important of which are the following: 
o The needs and characteristics of traders and dealers like profit, liquidity 
levels, portfolio re-balancing, wealth constraints, etc. 
o The amount and quality of information, and the way it is shared among 
pa icipan s. 
o The nature and frequency of demand as expressed by the type and the arrival 
rate of orders. 
o The trading mechanism employed like for example the continuous-auction 
market with, or without a specialist, the dealer market and the limit order 
market. 
o The transaction costs which can be explicit (commissions, clearing and 
processing costs or implicit, through the bid-ask spread. 
o The trading strategies of market participants which depend on the timing, 
type and number of the orders given, the pricing rules traders expect the 
dealer to use and the varying horizons of players in the market. 
o The risk and its sources (transactions rate, future value of the asset, 
information trading) and the participants' attitudes towards it. 
2.3 Types of Market Participants 
Market participants in real markets consist of private investors, institutional 
investors, dealers and specialists. Not all types of participants exist in every market 
however. In physical exchanges, such as the NYSE, AMEX and the Toronto Stock 
Exchange, trading is organized around specialists, that is market professionals who 
function both as principals (dealers) and agents (broker's broker) who are assigned a 
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particular stock. In decentralized, automated exchanges like NASDAQ and the 
International Stock Exchange (ISE) in London, where the physical presence of 
members is not necessary, dealers make a market in certain stocks they are assigned 
by posting bid and ask quotes at regular intervals. Since more than one dealer are 
allowed to make a market in a stock such exchanges are also called competitive-dealer 
trading systems. 2 
2.3.1 The Specialist 
The specialist in the NYSE has both responsibilities and restrictions set by the 
exchange which ensure that he does not take advantage of his dual capacity role, thus 
protecting the interests of the public. As an auctioneer he has to adhere to the order- 
execution regulations. He is also obliged to make a 'fair and orderly market' which 
implies that he helps to avoid excessively large and erratic price changes by buying 
and selling for his own account in his capacity as dealer. This has both the effect of 
reducing price volatility and making price transitions orderly whenever there is a 
trend, a process which is referred to as price-stabilization and gives the specialist the 
opportunity to exploit his information advantage. Moreover, by posting bid and ask 
prices before seeing the public order flow leads to continuity in prices since public 
traders can trade at any time with the dealer. As a broker, the specialist executes limit 
orders left to him by other brokers. 3 
2 In contrast to NASDAQ the London International Stock Exchange is characterized by the domination of its 
order flow by orders of large institutional investors (large, infrequent trades) since, unlike NASDAQ, the 
latter are allowed to bring their orders for the largest, most liquid (alpha) stocks directly to the market- 
makers for immediate filling, instead of having them negotiated in an 'upstairs' market as in the U. S. 3 Stoll (1985) has pointed out that during block trading in the NYSE the specialist remains a bystander even 
though he can trade some of the shares in a block either for his own account or for the account of limit orders in the book. 
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2.3.2 Dealers 
The NASDAQ market consists of a large number of dealers and member firms 
which are linked electronically. This market has simpler order-handling and trade- 
execution rules and relies more on competitive forces and less on explicit regulations 
in order to attain a fair and orderly market. Market in a stock is created by a large 
number of dealers (minimum is two) which helps keep spreads tight but makes the 
price-discovery process inaccurate. Dealers registered as market makers in a stock are 
obliged to continuously post firm quotes for at least one round lot at both quotes and 
honour them. 
2.3.3 Traders 
In real markets traders can be floor brokers, brokers and the public. Traders can be 
characterized according to the type of orders they place and the type of information 
they possess. Those requiring immediate execution can place market orders whereas 
those wishing to transact at a given price can place limit orders. Limit-order traders in 
the NYSE in a way compete with the specialist by offering other traders a narrower 
spread than the one a specialist would allow. The type of information may also 
determine the trading strategies of market participants. Usually uninformed traders are 
assumed to trade for liquidity reasons whereas informed traders are assumed to 
attempt to exploit their information advantage by concealing their presence using 
various techniques such as breaking down their large orders into smaller ones. 
Moreover liquidity traders can be split into discretionary and non-discretionary, the 
former being those who prefer to trade at certain times. 
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2.4 Differences between Exchange Mechanisms 
The two main institutional differences between the hybrid (call-auction / continuous 
double-auction) exchange mechanism of NYSE and the quote-driven mechanism of 
NASDAQ are the intraday market power of the specialist in NYSE and the different ways 
in which inventory is managed under the two exchange settings. These differences have a 
significant impact on the formation of the bid-ask spread and thus on transaction costs. 
Specialists have an informational advantage over other traders near the open and 
close of trading that is not shared by NASDAQ market makers. After the Opening 
Automated Report Service (OARS) of NYSE automatically matches buy and sell 
orders, the specialist offsets any remaining order imbalance from inventory, i. e. he 
uses knowledge of market and limit orders in setting the opening price. Stoll and 
Whaley (1990) conclude that the ability of the specialist to set a low (high) bid (ask) 
price when the opening order imbalance requires purchases (sales) from inventory 
results in monopoly profits and excess volatility. 
No formal opening procedure is available on NASDAQ where the search for an 
equilibrium price may force dealers to post wider intraday spreads near the open as 
protection against the expected losses from facing informed traders, and/or to trade in 
relatively small units until equilibrium prices are determined, a procedure often 
referred to as price-discovery. 
The specialist can also take advantage of the 'market-on-close' orders that are 
routed to him in order to learn about the desire of the market to trade and can thus 
widen his spreads (investors who manage portfolios may exhibit inelastic demand 
during the open and close; fund managers may prefer to trade near the close since 
closing prices are used to calculate net asset value for sales and redemptions). Thus if 
the increased width of inside spreads at the open and close in a specialist market 
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reflects the exploitation of inelastic demand of investors to trade, replacing the 
specialist with multiple market-makers would reduce the tendency of bid-ask spreads 
to widen near non-trading intervals (the opening and closing periods of the market). 
Inventory management considerations may also affect the width of spreads near 
the close. Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) attribute this to the desire of traders to 
hedge positions before the close whereas Amihud and Mendelson (1982) predict that 
the width of the bid-ask spread increases to discourage additional accumulation of 
inventory when its position deteriorates. 4 However, in NASDAQ dealers who 
accumulate excess inventory may post bid and ask quotes to attract orders which 
would otherwise go to competing dealers, thus narrowing the inside spread. 
Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) and Madhavan and Smidt (1993) suggest that 
although specialists' inventories are stationary, inventory imbalances are reversed 
over a number of trading days. Thus specialists appear to require more than a single 
trading day to control inventory through prices perhaps due to their obligation to 
maintain an orderly market, which forces them to accept trades on both sides of the 
spread. Thus the dealer market may provide market makers with a more effective 
mechanism to control inventory through prices than specialists enjoy on the organized 
exchanges, 
2.5 Types of Orders 
The two main types of orders available in organized exchanges, in particular 
market and limit orders, as well as their characteristics are discussed below. These 
are important in that they convey the traders' wishes to the market and constitute the 
main vehicle through which investors' strategies are materialized. 
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A more thorough discussion of limit orders, which even though more complicated 
are important for strategic trading, is given in Appendix F. 
2.5.1 Market and Limit Orders 
Orders are mainly characterized by the price at which they are executed and the 
time at which they are to be executed. There is a large number of orders allowed in 
various exchanges but the most common among the price orders are market and limit 
orders. ' Market orders are executed at the best available price (highest bid for seller 
and lowest offer for buyer). Due to their nature these orders demand immediacy of 
execution and for this reason they consume liquidity. Their placement guarantees 
execution (almost always) but not the price and for this reason they are preferred by 
the brokers since their commission is almost always guaranteed. However, in cases 
when the bid-ask spread is excessively high the cost of the order to the trader is also 
high. 
2.5.2 The Importance of Limit Orders 
Limit orders are one of the most important types of orders available in most 
exchanges and in particular the NYSE. Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) report that they 
67 constitute about 45 % of the orders submitted through SuperDOT . For the Paris 
Bourse, which operates as a limit order market, Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) report 
that order flow consists of 41.3 % limit orders and 47.2 % market orders. 
4 Harris and Hasbrouck (1992) provide an alternative explanation for the wider spreads near the close for 
NYSE based on the depth of the limit order book. 5 Other types of price orders include stop, stop-limit, on the opening, on the close, in-unediate or cancel, fill 
or kill, all or none and discretionary orders. Time orders include day and good till canceled orders. Other 
types of orders, characterized by the conditions attached to them, are also used. 6 SuperDOT is an electronic system which handles the bulk of individual market and limit orders 
submitted to the NYSE by routing approximately 85% of all orders entered to the trading posts. Its 
name derives from its predecessor system DOT which is an acronym for Designated Order Turnaround 
(system). 
7 The rest consist of 50 % market and 5% stop orders. 
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The importance of limit orders lies in their use as providers of liquidity in 
exchanges where market orders are allowed and which consume liquidity in order to 
satisfy the demand of investors for immediacy. Traders place limit orders in order to 
obtain prices better than if they had submitted a market order, in which case they 
would have paid a cost proportional to the spread. Moreover, these orders free the 
traders from watching the market. Their execution is not certain since for a limit order 
to execute, prices have to move to the direction of the limit price. Contrary to market, 
limit orders can guarantee a price but not a quantity since not all of the quantity of the 
limit order can be satisfied whereas market orders guarantee the quantity, in a 
sufficiently deep market, but not the price. However, limit orders provide liquidity to 
the market and help it move to the direction of the market orders. They may then 
compete with the market-maker who also serves this function. In a market which is 
not automated however the trader runs the risk of "missing the markef'! 
A more detailed discussion, which tackles the crucial questions concerning market 
microstructure research on limit orders and presents the most important findings, is 
given in Appendix F since it is believed that knowing the characteristics of limit 
orders is crucial for a deep understanding of the mechanisms involved in the price- 
generating process. 
2.6 Liquidity 
Liquidity is the ability to trade large size, quickly at low cost and is the most 
important characteristic of the markets. 
It is the result of a bilateral search process where buyers and sellers attempt to arrive 
at mutually acceptable terms so that a trade can take place. While patient traders can 
In contrast to the NYSE limit order book of a specialist who is assigned a particular stock exclusively, in 
NASDAQ there is no consolidated limit order book for each stock. Under the more recent NASD rules (IM- 
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supply liquidity by placing limit orders for anxious market-order traders, there exist 
large traders willing to offer it when asked in which case it is called latent liquidity. 
Liquidity comprises of three main dimensions: Immediacy, width and depth. 
Immediacy refers to how quickly trades of a given size can be carried out at a given 
cost. Width, also called market depth, is the cost of effecting a trade of a given size. 
For small trades it is equivalent to the bid-ask spread plus the brokerage fees. It 
essentially describes the cost per unit of liquidity. Finally depth refers to the size of a 
trade that can be arranged at a given cost and describes the units which are available 
at a given price of liquidity. Depth and width are closely related notions. Another 
dimension of liquidity, often encountered in the pertinent literature, is resiliency 
which refers to how quickly prices revert to former levels after they change in 
response to large order flow imbalances which are initiated by uninformed traders. 
Since liquidity is the ability to trade it can be characterized as a function that gives the 
probability of trading a given size at a given price, given the time available for search. 
This probability is influenced by the type of instrument traded, the types and the 
quality of traders in the market, the quality of information regarding fundamental 
values, imbalances between buy and sell orders, the actions of other market 
participants as well as the state of the market that is whether it is open or closed. 
The types of traders rather than the types of orders determine whether liquidity is 
supplied in the market. The main liquidity suppliers are the dealers making a market 
and the value traders, who both act as passive liquidity suppliers and the pre- 
committed liquidity suppliers who place limit orders so as to reduce their trading costs 
but can easily become liquidity demanders if their limit orders are not fulfilled. 
Another not so evident liquidity supplier is the arbitrageur who can increase the depth 
2110-2 and 2320), however, limit orders of customers which improve (reduce) the spread must take 
precedence to dealer's quotes. 
in a market by offering liquidity from another market and in this capacity he competes 
with dealers. 
One of the most important issues in the design of market mechanisms is the way in 
which various mechanisms differ in their provision of liquidity. 
Whereas when the aggregate order flow is considered the bid ask spread is an 
adequate measure of liquidity, when price varies with trade size large trades may 
involve larger spreads than small trades in the same market and the bid ask spread 
cannot be an accurate measure of liquidity. A more accurate measure may be derived 
from the fact that in liquid markets prices move after trades reflecting the costs of 
trading. This implies a time series dimension of liquidity which is based on the fact 
that traders willing to wait can obtain better prices compared to those who demand 
immediate execution. Grossman and Miller (1988) made use of this time dimension of 
liquidity to construct a model in which prices are determined by inventory imbalances 
and there is no private information. Prices change because of liquidity shocks. Market 
makers are assumed to act as speculators who take positions in the risky asset but they 
do not quote bid and ask prices. Liquidity in this market is provided by speculators 
and the price of this liquidity depends on the price movement, the total number of 
speculators in the market and the common risk-aversion coefficient. The equilibrium 
number of speculators in turn depends on the cost of being a speculator, the risk- 
aversion coefficient and the variances of the prices and the liquidity shocks. The 
greater the number of speculators willing to provide immediacy the greater the 
liquidity in the market. Since the return to speculation depends on the variance of 
prices, more volatile markets attract more speculators but require higher retums to 
compensate them for the risk they undertake. A consequence of this is that if 
speculator returns can be improved, or the speculators' risk-bearing ability increased, 
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liquidity would be enhanced. Since liquidity depends on the number of traders and the 
number of traders depends on liquidity there appears to be circularity which 
complicates this issue. 
Pagano (1989) has investigated whether the fact that the scale of trading affects 
liquidity is against the existence of multiple markets. In a model without asymmetric 
information he concluded that in the absence of transaction costs the larger market, in 
terms of which market the trader believes attracts more traders, will dominate trading. 
If transaction costs exist traders will base their decisions both on the level of 
transaction costs and the size of the market but the continued existence of the two 
markets cannot be guaranteed since it is likely that traders will eventually consolidate. 
In the absence of informed trading liquidity differences between markets can arise and 
persist as a result of differences in the portfolio of traders and the existence of 
exogenous transaction costs. 
2.7 Volatility 
Volatility is the tendency of prices to change unexpectedly. Volatility changes 
through time and can become very dangerous when large price changes appear in 
short intervals of time (episodic volatility). When there is excessive volatility markets 
do not function properly because the prices of the assets in the market do not 
accurately reflect their value and decisions based on these can be risky. Excessive 
volatility can also lead to market crashes and for this reason it is of great concern to 
regulators who attempt to design markets in such a way as to avoid it. 
Moreover, volatility is highly related with the risks and the profits in the market and is 
of great concern to option traders and technical traders. It is often correlated with 
trading volume but this relation is complicated. 
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There are two types of volatility. Fundamental volatility which is caused by 
unanticipated changes in the values of instruments and transitory volatility which is 
due to trading activity by uninformed traders. It is important for traders to be able to 
predict future volatility so that they can assess the profitability of different strategies 
and estimate their likely transaction costs. Moreover, regulators should be able to 
remedy transitory volatility using appropriate policies which they can incorporate into 
the trading mechanisms. 
Since prices are used in the economy to allocate resources it is important that they 
reflect fundamental values. These values change when factors which affect them, 
called fundamental factors, change. Such factors can be the quality of the 
management of a company, its resources and level of technology, supply and demand 
conditions for its resources and products as well as interest rates. Dealers try to infer 
infon-nation about fundamental values from the order flows of traders who they 
perceive to be informed. In this way they charge a higher price to compensate 
themselves for the risk of transacting with informed traders increasing the adverse 
selection component of the spread, which will be presented in the next chapter and 
contributing to fundamental volatility. When the number of traders having 
fundamental infort-nation is small they attempt to take advantage of their privileged 
position by trading in large quantities quickly thus increasing volatility. 
Fundamental volatility is unpredictable since it is caused by unexpected events. Other 
factors which lead to fundamental volatility is the uncertainty about fundamental 
factors, unexpected political action, uncertainties regarding the earnings of high price- 
earning stocks and the high leverage of firms which makes earnings risky. 
Contrary to fundamental, transitory volatility is usually brought about by the actions 
of impatient uninformed traders who cause prices to diverge from their fundamental 
values. Prices eventually revert to their fundamental values and their divergence, 
together with the subsequent price-reversal, contributes to this type of volatility. The 
simplest form of transitory volatility is due to the bid-ask bounce which arises when 
trades alternate between the bid and the ask quotes. The bid ask bounce is what causes 
part of the spread (the transitory cost component which is explained in the next 
chapter). Large orders and cumulative order imbalances also cause transitory volatility 
but these are eventually corrected by value traders or arbitrageurs. 
Transitory volatility is correlated with the transaction costs of uninformed traders. It is 
the result of their own impact on prices and is small in liquid markets. When 
transitory volatility is high markets become illiquid and regulators attempt to remedy 
this problem by taking appropriate actions. However they have to become certain that 
it is transitory volatility which causes these problems otherwise their efforts will be 
futile. 
It follows from the above discussion that to measure volatility in a market one has to 
estimate both transitory as well as fundamental volatility. For the transitory 
component this is usually accomplished by making use of successive price changes 
which in the case of uninformed liquidity demanders are negatively correlated since 
they reverse over time. The horizon during which this occurs may vary from short, in 
the case of the bid-ask bounce, to periods of minutes or even months for the case of 
large orders and large order imbalances. However, fundamental price changes may or 
may not be correlated with the order flows of informed traders owing to the 
multiplicity of trading strategies which they employ so that they may conceal their 
information advantage. Since fundamental price changes lead to revisions in beliefs 
regarding the value of assets they nonnally do not revert. 
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2.8 Avenues of Research 
There are two general directions along which research in the price-fonnation 
process has proceeded. One which has centered around the inventory position of the 
dealer / specialist and another dealing with the infonnation aspects of trading. This 
latter approach has produced models which have been called non-asymmetric in 
contrast with the former approach which has assumed that all market participants 
share the same information and has led to the formulation of symmetric models. All of 
the above classes of models depend on the presumed quote-setting behaviour of the 
dealer. 
A) In the inventory-related research there have been three main avenues: 
The first is based on the Walrasian9 auction paradigm of a trading mechanism 
where demand / supply schedules are submitted to an auctioneer who aggregates 
them, posts a tentative price in order to tempt traders to revise their orders, repeating 
the process until an equilibrium price is reached at which trading takes place. Even 
though this setting may seem unrealistic, it approximates some real markets. What it 
does not however do is to explain (i. e. it is agnostic) the way by which the factors 
described above lead to price-formation. Demsetz (1968) was the first to directly 
examine the factors affecting trading, even though he focused more on the trading 
costs' aspect of the process. In a study of the 'cost of transacting' he put forward the 
idea that liquidity has a cost which leads to the formation of the bid-ask spread. By 
showing how the non-synchronous arrival of buy and sell orders affects market prices 
he set the foundations of further work on the microstructure of the markets. 
9 Leon Walras (1834 - 1910), a French economist, first thought of buyers and sellers of a resource being brought together by an auctioneer who calls out tentative prices in a sequence of trials until a clearing price 
is reached at which buyers and sellers trade optimally (tatonnement process). 
The second avenue pays less emphasis on trading costs and is founded on 
Garman's (1976) pioneering paper which examined the nature of the order flow and 
its effect on security prices. Advancing beyond the Walrassian paradigm he attempted 
to study the factors behind the process, that is how the collective behaviour of agents 
in the market affects market behavior. He analyzed the position of a dealer when he is 
faced with the stochastic arrival of buy and sell orders which demand immediacy of 
execution while trying to keep his inventory within certain constraints so as to avoid 
bankruptcy. 
A third avenue of research, pioneered by Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb 
(1981), examined the reasons for the strategic choice of alternative types of orders on 
the liquidity of the market. 
All of the early inventory-control, or inventory models described above have 
focused on the attempt of agents to keep their inventories within certain constraints, 
thus minimizing the risk of bankruptcy. When the market-maker faces inventory 
carrying cost or is risk averse he will actively control his inventory by setting prices to 
induce movements towards his desired inventory level. Therefore, the effect of his 
behaviour on prices is temporary and reverts to the true price when order flow is 
balanced. In this way only the short-term characteristics of the process are given 
attention in contrast with the impact of information which has a more permanent, 
longer-term effect. These models focus on the problem that in the simple bid-ask 
model the dealer's inventories of stock and cash follow a random walk leading to 
large positive or negative positions. 10 This happens because the dealer is not allowed 
to have negative inventory and carrying costs (non-negativity constraints). They thus 
predict that the dealer will set quotes as an inventory-control mechanism, to induce an 
10 Garman (1976), Stoll (1976), Amihud and Mendelson (1980,1982), Zabel (1981), Ho and Stoll 
(1980,1981,1983), O'Hara and Oldfield (1986). 
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imbalance of buy and sell orders, in order to maintain his inventory around some 
optimal level. 
B) Apart from the inventory concern of the dealer information also affects his 
behaviour in a different manner leading to a distinct, permanent effect on prices. 
There have been two approaches in the early non-asymmetric-information 
microstructure literature : 
1) Research which assumes that the return-generation process is consistent 
with our general understanding of the market structure which, however, is 
not necessarily based on any principles of individual economic behaviour. 
This work defines the relationship between the observed distribution of 
returns and the 'true' underlying distribution 11 and 
2) Research that specifies the demand and supply for dealer services whose 
compensation is reflected in a transaction price different from the true 
price. " 
Asymmetric Information Models, emphasize the importance of asymmetric 
information in analyzing market-maker behaviour. In these models the perceived 
presence of informed traders with private information regarding fundamental asset 
values affects price dynamics and the size of the bid - ask spread. Based on an idea by 
Bagehot (1971), these models droP the assumPtion of uniform information and 
address the problem of an uninformed dealer who by offering to buy and sell at the 
11 Clark (1973), Blattberg and Gonedes (1974), Westerfield (1977), Oldfield, Rogalski and Jarrow (1977), 
Schwartz and Whitcomb (1977), and Goldman and Beja (1979). 12 A review is provided in Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1979); Demsetz (1968), Tinic (1972), 
Stoll (1978a) dealt with the supply side; Tinic and West (1972), Benston and Hagerman (1974), Stoll 
(1978b), Smidt (1979) carried out empirical studies; Copeland (1976), Epps (1976), Cohen, Maier, Schwartz 
and Whitcomb (1978a, b) and Goldman and Sosin (1979) dealt with the demand side and specified why 
investors trade and how trading affects prices. 
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quoted prices suffers exposure to informed traders. ' 3 The dealer views orders as 
originating from an infort-ned trader with some probability and thus convey 
information and motivate quote changes. Inventory considerations are usually 
ignored. 
The inventory control and the asymmetric information theories should not be 
considered as being mutually exclusive since they yield similar predictions about asset 
returns and volume. 
2.9 Inventory and Dealer Models 
To facilitate the presentation of the models discussed, a distinction is made below 
between models which deal directly with the inventory concerns of the dealer, be it a 
specialist or other type of dealer and those which deal exclusively with the specialist. 
2.9.1 Inventory Models 
The fundamental idea that immediacy has a price which anxious buyers and 
sellers should pay was introduced by Demsetz (1968) who first employed a supply / 
demand framework to show that immediacy has no price if buy and sell orders could 
arrive simultaneously at the market in which case no waiting is required. In his model 
the spread measures the price of immediacy in both buying and selling securities. 14 
The main force working to reduce the spread is thus the time rate of transactions since 
the greater the frequency of transacting the lower the cost of waiting and thus the 
spreads which traders are willing to submit. Potential waiting costs dominate security 
trading and together with the risk of adverse price changes they are relatively more 
13 Bagehot (1971), Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Glosten (1989), Easley and 
O'Hara (1987). Kyle (1985) presents a model of the strategic problem faced by the informed investor; also 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1989) 
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important than commissions 15 as far as exchange members are concerned. Due to 
competitive forces the spread should remain close to this waiting cost. 16 However he 
did not explain why anxious buyers can lead to a price increase or why there is not an 
infinite supply of the asset at the equilibrium price. 
In the models of Garman (1976) and Amihud and Mendelson (1980) results 
depend on the assumptions made regarding the arrival rates of buy and sell orders, the 
inventory as well as the pricing policy of the dealer. Therefore, since in both models 
the arrival of orders is stochastic it creates uncertainty due to potential imbalances 
(transactions uncertainty) and is not informative about future price movements. In 
both models the dealer attempts to control his inventory by setting bid and ask prices 
around the equilibrium price but whereas Garman's (1976) dealer runs the risk of 
becoming bankrupt (in the extreme case when buying and selling prices are equal to 
the equilibrium price), Amihud and Mendelson (1980) avoid this problem by 
imposing bounds on the upper and lower levels thus preventing the market-maker 
from failing. In Garman's (1976) model the inventory per se plays no role in the 
dealer's decision problem since it was assumed that prices are set at the beginning of 
trading in order to equate the order-arrival rates. Therefore, where prices are set 
depends on the profit-maximization objective of the dealer rather than inventory. In 
the second model, however, where the optimal pricing policy of the market maker 
depends on the inventory, it was shown that, consistent with the dynamic pricing 
policies described by Smidt (1971), Bamea and Logue (1975) and Stoll (1978a), the 
optimal bid and ask prices are monotone decreasing functions of the dealer's 
14 As he put it, "the bid-ask spread is the markup that is paid for predictable immediacy of exchange in 
organized markets". 
15 Commission brokerage fees are not determined by the same procedures. " The main types of competition were identified as: (1) rivalry for the specialist's job, (2) competing 
markets, (3) outsiders who submit limit rather than market orders, (4) floor traders who may bypass the 
specialist by crossing buy and sell orders themselves, and (5) other specialists. 
inventory position. The existence of positive costs of providing dealership services 
leads to a positive spread which straddles the market clearing price. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1980) showed that the preferred bid-ask spread is always greater than the 
corresponding spread set by Garman's (1976) monopolist (it also straddles the market 
clearing price at the intersection of demand and supply). It is not optimal for the 
prof it-maximizing market-maker to refrain from making buy or sell transactions, 
unless he reaches his limiting positions. Amihud and Mendelson (1980) also showed 
that relaxing Garman's (1976) constraints by expanding the allowed short or long 
positions strictly increases the market-maker's profits. 
Moreover, consistent with later evidence provided by Madhavan and Smidt (1993) 
and Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993), which is presented below, the market maker 
adopts a pricing policy which produces a preferred inventory position, located away 
from his limiting positions and he reduces the spread as he approaches the preferred 
inventory position. Any trading rule based on monitoring the behaviour of the market 
maker (i. e. knowing his current inventory position and his pricing policy) was shown 
to be useless and certain to produce a loss thus proving that the optimal pricing policy 
is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. 
Both the Garman (1976) and the Amihud and Mendelson (1980) models dealt with 
liquidity-motivated traders only since their assumptions precluded the existence of 
private information. 
By treating the collection of market agents as a statistical ensemble Garman 
(1976) ignored attributes of traders such as motivations, tastes, and endowments and 
since buy and sell orders were taken as given he did not use economic features which 
would allow him to model the behaviour of the dealer more realistically. He examined 
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both call and continuous markets 17 and his results on the auction market closely 
resembled the empirical findings of Niederhoffer and Osborne (1966), which had 
indicated that the double-auction microstructure might explain these early empirical 
findings. Garman (1976) did not however compare the outcome of his model to the 
real characteristics of prices nor did he consider the optimal dynamic strategies which 
market-makers should pursue to adjust their prices to their changing inventory 
positions and did not discuss how the price-probability functions he used depend on 
previous transaction prices in real world exchanges. 
Another important point to consider is that the spread in the Amihud and 
Mendelson (1980) model reflects the market power of the dealer and the transaction 
costs but plays no role in the viability of the market. The preferred inventory position 
arises because of the nature of the order-arrival process whereas the underlying asset 
value is irrelevant. Finally, to gain additional insight into the price-setting problem 
would require greater emphasis to be placed on the nature of the dealer's decision 
problem and this would make it necessary to depart from the simple stochastic process 
approach of Garman (1976) and Amihud and Mendelson (1980). 
2.9.2 Empirical Research 
Due to the non-availability of databases which distinguish market-maker 
transactions from those of the other participants very few of the earlY studies were 
based on actual trading records of market-makers in any financial markets. 18 
Moreover, asymmetric-information was ignored and the entire dynamic relation 
between trades and prices was attributed to inventory-control. The infonnation effect 
17 He noted that, as exchange transaction volume increases, markets tend to evolve from 'call markets' 
(trading synchronously at pre-established discrete times) to 'continuous markets' (trading 
asynchronously during continuous intervals of time) and for this reason he examined two cases: one 
where the market maker was assumed to be a monopolist and the other where an auction market exists. 
was usually modeled as a static component of the bid-ask spread, which is 
unsatisfactory because in the short-run both effects can have a similar impact on 
prices. Other studies that recognised both effects19 found only weak evidence of short- 
run inventory effects but strong infonnation effects and suggested that inventory 
behaviour over longer horizons should be examined. 
Madhavan and Smidt (1993) analyzed, both theoretically and empirically, the 
trading behaviour of a market-maker (or specialist) on the NewYork Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) who, in order to perform his dealership function, must bear unwanted 
20 inventones. In a transactional-level study Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) analyzed 
empirically inventory-adjustment, price determination, and trading profits of the 
NYSE specialists using both inventory and asymmetric information concepts, even 
though they relied more on the former. 21 
In their model Madhavan and Smidt (1993) showed that as a dealer, the specialist 
quotes prices that induce mean reversion towards a target inventory level but as an 
investor, he chooses a desired long-term inventory based on portfolio considerations, 
and may periodically revise this target. They found that specialist inventories exhibit 
mean reversion, but the adjustment process is slow if his desired inventories are 
assumed constant. 22 Shifts in desired inventories could account for the apparent 
slowness of the inventory-adjustment process and the apparently weak inventory 
effects found in the literature. Strong support was also found for the hypothesis that 
18 Smidt (1971), Stoll (1985), Stoll (1976) and Ho and Macris (1984). 19 Hasbrouck (1988), Madhavan and Smidt (1991,1993), Stoll (1989) and Neuberger (1992), Foster 
and Viswanathan (1993). 
2' Their intertemporal model of market-maker trades and quotes incorporated the effects of both 
asymmetric information and inventory control. 21 In the literature, the dealer's inventory control problem becomes a pricing problem because active 
price control is necessary to keep inventories stationary. Amihud and Mendelson (1980) solve this 
pricing problem of the monopolistic dealer, Ho and Stoll (1983) solve the problem for multiple dealers 
and O'Hara and Oldfield (1986) consider the effects of day boundaries on the dealer's pricing problem. 
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quote revisions are negatively related to specialist trades and positively related to the 
information conveyed by unanticipated (non-block) order imbalances. Large-block 
trades appeared to convey little information to the specialist who appeared to possess 
market information unavailable to most traders. Future order imbalances were also 
found to affect current price quotations. 
The adjustments in inventory found by Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) were also 
slow and inventory autocorrelations were positive and persistent over long lags (in 
some cases weeks). Since specialists are capable of rapid inventory adjustments, the 
observed long-term fluctuations in inventory were considered to be the result of 
changes in long-term investment positions, a conclusion similar to that reached by 
Madhavan and Smidt (1993). Adjustment was shown to be faster for frequently traded 
stocks and inventory levels in at least some stocks contained long-term (weekly or 
longer) components which were attributed to shifts in the desired level of holdings 
(speculative positions). Adjustment towards a target level was shown to take place at 
a slow rate and to be faster after exogenous shocks. Specialist profits were found to be 
almost statistically indistinguishable from zero in the long term. The short- and 
medium-ten-n components of trading profits, however, were strongly positive and 
often statistically significant which confirms that specialist trading profits are due to 
short- and medium-tenn trading activity. They found evidence that unexpected shocks 
to the specialist's inventory affect quotes and, since inventory shocks are inversely 
correlated with the signed trade variables, this finding was consistent with asymmetric 
information effects. 23 
2' It takes, on average, over 49 trading days for an imbalance in inventory to be reduced by 50% but if a 
correction is made for periodic, unobserved shifts in desired inventory holdings, half life drops to 7.3 
trading days. 
23 No evidence of transient quote overshooting or reversion, as predicted by the classic inventory 
control mechanism, was found. 
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Using VAR modeIS24 Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) found that trades in which 
the specialist participates are associated with larger quote revisions which according 
to the authors may reflect institutional constraints requiring participation in high- 
impact trades, or that specialist participation may serve as a proxy variable for the 
direction of trades that occur at the midpoint of the quotes and cannot thus be signed. 
Using data from the Institute for the Study of Security Markets (ISSM) and a 
NYSE specialist finn Madhavan and Smidt (1991) found strong support for the 
existence of information asymmetries as perceived by the specialist and evidence that 
he provides liquidity by absorbing transitory order imbalances. His participation was 
shown to increase with the degree of information asymmetry, which is a major 
detenninant of this activity, possibly because trades excluding the specialist are easier 
to arrange when traders agree about asset value. They also found a weak inventory 
effect, that trades in active stocks have smaller price impact than those in less active 
ones and that buyer-initiated and seller- initiated trades have an asymmetric price 
impact. 
2.9.3 Dealer Models 
The literature on dealer models has developed from the early analysis of the 
position of a single dealer to the more complicated case of a number of dealers 
operating in the same market for a stock. In this section specialist models, which are a 
special case of single-dealer models, are also presented. 
24 Hasbrouck (1991a, 1991b, 1993) discussed microstructure applications of VARs. They analyzed the 
differential effect of specialist participation in transactions: the asymmetric information cffect suggests 
that a trade will have an impact on the price irrespective of the counterparty's identity whereas an 
inventory control effect should be evident only in those instances in which the specialist participates. 
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2.9.3.1 Single-Dealer Models 
Single dealer models have been developed by Demsetz (1968), Tinic (1972), 
Garman (1976), Stoll (1978a), Arnihud and Mendelson (1980,1982), Copeland and 
Galai (1983), and Ho and Stoll (1981). However, early empirical work which 
attempted to assess the efficiency of different market organizations and regulatory 
constraints and to detennine the factors underlying dealer costs 25 had not been based 
on very explicit theoretical foundations. 
Stoll (1978a) has dealt with the supply of dealer services 26 whereas Ho and Stoll 
(1981) with the demand side. In both models the spread does not depend on the 
dealer's inventory position but its placement affects the pricing policy and its size 
remains constant. Moreover, no assumptions were made about equilibrium asset 
prices. 
According to Stoll (1978a), the technical details of which are presented in chapter 
3, the cost of immediacy to the dealer is the sum of a) holding costs (increasing with 
decreasing order costs) which arise from holding a suboptimal portfolio position and 
thus reflect his degree of risk exposure, b) order-processing costs (a constant dollar 
amount per transaction), which depend on the type of trading mechanism employed 
and c) information costs arising from asymmetric information (adverse selection, 
assumed independent of transaction size). Holding costs depend on dealer 
characteristics such as initial wealth and relative risk aversion, the size of the 
transaction in the stock, characteristics of the stock like variance of return and 
covariance of return with the return on the initial trading-account portfolio, and finally 
on the size of the initial position in the trading account. 27 When the cost function is 
25 Demsetz: (1968), Institutional Investor Study Ch. 12 (197 1), Tinic (1972), Tinic and West (1972) and 
Benston and Hagerman (1974). 26 Copeland (1976) and Epps (1976) also attempted to specify the demand for dealer services. 27 Easley and O'Hara (1987a) assumed adverse selection costs to increase in trade size. 
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symmetric, i. e. a sale of a given size costs the dealer the same amount as a purchase of 
this size, the spread (but not the bid or ask price) is independent of the initial 
inventory. The cost of dealer services is also affected by the organization of dealers 
and the equilibrium number of dealers is that number that demand can support if all 
are operating at minimum average cost. Stoll's (1978a) inventory affects the 
placement of the spread but not its size, a hypothesis which was later tested by 
Hasbrouck (1988) and his spread is based on the market-maker's risk aversion, 
contrary to the model of Amihud and Mendelson (1980) in which it was based on the 
market power of the specialist and that of Garman (1976) in which it was based on the 
dealer's effort to avoid bankruptcy. 
When transactions uncertainty (stochastic transactions as in Garman (1976)) is 
added to the above model, as was done inHo and Stoll (1981) the dealer is faced with 
two types of risk: uncertainty about when future transactions will occur and 
uncertainty about the return on his inventory and the rest of his portfolio. Then based 
on his opinion of the 'true' price, which is exogenously determined by his information 
set (the public's opinion of the true price influences arrival rates of buy/sell orders 
together with the pricing strategy of the dealer), the optimal bid and ask prices are set 
by the dealer in such a way as to maximize the expected utility of his terminal 
wealth. 28 
The bankruptcy problem of Garman (1976) can be avoided when the true price is 
assumed to remain constant for a sufficiently short time horizon. Then the spread, as 
in Stoll (1978a), does not depend on the dealer's inventory position, but price 
28 Unlike the risk neutral models of Garman (1976), Amihud and Mendelson (1980) and Mildenstein 
and Schleef (1983) the Ho and Stoll (1981) model did not require the dealer to maximize expected 
profits. The key concern was the risk he faces and how this affects his willingness to supply dealer 
services. In their model however, the risk attitude of the dealer affects the solution. Garman (1976) was 
more concerned with the equilibrium price of securities (rather than with the equilibrium price of 
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adjustment does depend on inventory (the dealer affects the order arrival process by 
changing the placement of the spread relative to the true price rather than increasing / 
decreasing the spread itself). The dealer's risk is greater than that implied by Stoll 
(1978a) because uncertainty of the demand to trade with the dealer is not totally 
eliminated or offset by the dealer's pricing strategy. 
The validity of the above models is limited by the unrealistic assumptions 
regarding liquidation of the stock at some known point in time (this reduces the 
underlying inventory risk), the fixed 'true' price of the stock and the exclusion of 
informed traders (due to the assumption that the order flow follows a specific 
stochastic process) who would affect the order flow differently. 
In Amihud and Mendelson (1982) only liquidity traders are considered and traders 
who think they are informed but are in fact not informed and the market maker is only 
a trader, not an investor. His optimal pricing policy consists of all the prices he will 
quote at all possible inventory positions . 
29 The bid-ask spread is positive and the 
change in prices is a gradual and monotone function of the market maker's 
inventory. 30 The model's results also supported the suggestion of other researchers 
like Smidt (1971) , Logue (1975), Barnea and Logue (1975) and Stoll(1978a) of a 
preferred inventory position which implies negative serial correlation in the 
transaction by transaction returns at this position and positive when he is away from 
the preferred level until the preferred position is restored. The model showed that if 
the market-maker is allowed to take a greater long or short position, the spread will 
decrease which may indicate that encouragement of market-makers to take larger 
services) and with the necessary behaviour of transaction prices to meet an exogenous inventory 
objective of the dealer and avoid bankruptcy. 29 Explicit expressions for the market-maker optimal policy are given in Amihud and Mendelson 
(1980). 
30 This analysis assumed that demand and supply are stationary. When demand and supply shift, price 
adjustment may follow a different pattern. 
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positions by exchange authorities can reduce spreads. For a given inventory constraint 
and for linear demand and supply functions, the spread is narrowest at the preferred 
posi ion. 31 
When the assumption of a specific stochastic order-flow process or an 'intrinsic 
value' of the stock is dropped as in OHara and Oldfield (1986) the market-maker 
faces order-flow and future-value (inventory) uncertainty. A risk-averse market- 
maker's spread can be decomposed into three parts: one for the known limit-orders, 
a risk-neutral adjustment for the expected market orders and a risk adjustment for 
market-order and inventory-value uncertainty. Under more realistic assumptions, in a 
32 - market which is a combination between a call and a continuous auction, since two 
types of uncertainty are considered, a risk-averse market maker may set a smaller 
spread than a risk-neutral specialist and may thus not be always driven out of the 
market. O'Hara and Oldfield (1986) also showed that, contrary to the finding of Ho 
33 and Stoll (1981), Zabel (1981) and Bradfield (1982), the market maker's inventory 
34 affects both the placement and the size of the spread. With both types of uncertainty 
the inventory was shown to affect both the placement and the magnitude of the 
spread. The pricing policy changed to reflect this dual uncertainty and the spread size 
was allowed to vary for more flexibility. This complexity had not been introduced in 
earlier work. 
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The size of the optimal spread depends on the parameters of the supply and 
demand functions. With market order variability these functions are not known, as 
31 The Amihud and Mendelson (1982) model, together with Mendelson (1982), may be useful in 
comparing various methods of trading and exchange. 32 As discussed in Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1981) the traders' optimal order strategies 
may differ between call and continuous markets. 33 Zabel (198 1) and Bradfield (1982) also developed discrete-time models of dealer behaviour. 34 The spread equation had no explicit inventory terms but included the marginal utility ten-n which 
implicitly contains the inventory variables. 
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they are in Demsetz (1968) and the risk-averse market-maker adjusts the spread to 
compensate for what could be large divergences in either supply or demand. The 
placement of the spread was shown to depend on both today's supply and demand and 
on the future expected value of the security. If the latter is variable, the market maker 
adjusts bid and ask prices to compensate for what could be large movements in 
tomorrow's security prices. 36 
All of the models described above have the common feature that inventory 
imposes some cost on the dealer and this is reflected in market bid and ask prices. It is 
also assumed that the dealer acts as the sole provider of liquidity, an assumption 
which is dropped in later models. 
2.9.3.2 Multiple-Dealer Models 
The following discussion distinguishes between theoretical and empirical work. 
Theoretical models of dealer behaviour under competitive conditions like Ho and 
Stoll (1980,1983) have attempted to analyze the problem of determining the market 
bid-ask spread. Earlier research like Garbade and Silber (1979a, b) or Cohen, Maier, 
Schwartz and Whitcomb (1978a, b and 1979) have either tackled isolated issues of this 
process or have not attempted to fully specify the determinants of the market spread. 
The transition from individual spreads to the market spread is not a simple 
aggregation process (like from individual to aggregate market demand and supply 
functions). The market spread is the outcome of a dynamic interaction involving many 
market participants. Thus market-spread models assume that the action of each dealer 
35 Inventory imposes two types of risk on the dealer: variability in market orders i. e. the size of 
inventory at day-end is uncertain, and price is a random variable i. e. the value of the inventory is also 
unknown. 
in each period depends not only on his own characteristics and inventory position but 
also on the inventory position of his competitors as well as his competitor's other 
characteristics and attempt to determine optimal reservation selling and buying fees 37 
for each dealer. However, due to the complexity of this analysis only two dealers have 
been considered. They also derive equations for the market spread and the market 
reservation spread (the minimum spread that could exist without either dealer being 
worse ofo. 
Another issue that arises in multiple-dealer markets is that of inter-dealer trading 
which arises if a dealer would rather trade at the existing market bid or ask price than 
remain with his own bid or ask and take a chance on trading with an incoming market 
order. 
Using the very restrictive assumption about homogeneous expectations, Ho and 
Stoll (1980) showed that when there is no inter-dealer trading and dealers have 
identical inventory positions, the less risk averse dealer can offer the lower buying or 
selling fee. Because inventory positions may differ, the better (less risk averse) dealer 
does not always quote the better buying and selling fee. The dealer with the lower 
reservation fee has no incentive to quote that fee but will instead quote his 
competitor's reservation fee (less a small amount). As a result the market spread is not 
the inside quote of the reservation prices but the outside quote of the reservation 
prices. While the reservation spread can be negative, the market spread is always 
positive. The lower bound on the market spread in the two dealer case is the 
reservation spread of the 'worst' dealer (the one who is the most risk averse). 
36 Zabel (198 1) and Bradf leld (1982) have shown that in the absence of price variability the placement 
of the spread depends on the specialist's book and the time of the day but the latter effect has not been 
considered in the O'Hara and Oldfield (1986) model. 37 The reservation fee is the minimum fee such that the dealer's expected utility of terminal wealth 
would not be lowered were he to trade at that fee i. e. it represents the cost to the dealer of entering into 
a transaction that makes his overall portfolio non-optimal and/or moves him to a less desirable level of 
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Ho and Stoll (1980) also showed that in a multi-dealer environment, there is a 
gravitational pull effect, similar to that of Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb 
(1981) that limits the divergence of inventories and thereby limits the divergence of 
reservation prices of dealers. 
In Ho and Stoll (1983)38 where heterogeneous expectations are used (but 
homogeneous opinions about the true value of each stock) two sources of uncertainty 
were assumed: the random arrival of transactions and the random returns. 39 
The position of the market-spread depended on the spreads quoted by each dealer 
and in particular it was shown to be determined by the second best dealers. An 
equilibrium market- spread was defined to exist when the distribution of inventories 
across dealers is such that no dealer wishes (at that moment) to trade with any other 
dealer. The equilibrium market spread must be non-negative. 
All dealers were shown to have the same reservation spread under heterogeneous 
as well as homogeneous opinions. The reservation spread of each dealer was 
independent of his inventory and therefore there is a tendency, in both cases, for the 
observed market spread to be the reservation spread of any dealer. An interesting 
insight of the model was that inventory should affect the placement of the spread 
differentially among dealers, however its drawback was that it did not include limit 
orders per se but allowed the dealers to trade either directly with the public or among 
themselves in an inter-dealer market. There was also a trade-off between trading with 
the public (uncertain execution but higher prices) versus trading with other market- 
risk (bid price is true price minus reservation buying fee; ask price is true price plus reservation selling 
fee). 
3' The model is similar to those of Stoll (1978a) and Ho and Stoll (1981) in that the dealer cares about 
his overall portfolio and not about his trading activity only. 39 It is important to note that the pricing and spread equations did not include expectations of the other 
dealers' actions or even the size of the other dealers' inventories. Pagano (1989) and Biais (1993) have 
addressed these effects in more detail. 
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makers (certain execution but lower prices). Thus the dealer's price may reflect more 
than the simple order-balancing issues analyzed in earlier models. 40 
The main difficulty encountered by early empirical researchers has been the non- 
availability of appropriate databases from multiple-dealer markets. Early empirical 
literature, which has dealt with inventories or dealership markets, 41 had not tested the 
central implications of inventory models of competitive dealership markets. 42 Other 
papers which tested some of the implications of inventory models of dealership 
marketS43 lacked more detailed data and consequently they could not explore the 
relationships between quote placement and individual dealer inventories which is the 
main idea behind the inventory model of dealership markets. Moreover, the nature of 
the NASDAQ database precluded the identification of the inventory positions of 
dealers and did not allow direct tests of the inventory model of dealership markets by 
the early researcherS44 of the quote-setting behaviour of NASDAQ dealers. 
Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan (1998) conducted direct tests of the Ho and Stoll 
(1983) model, using data from the London Stock Exchange and presented the first set 
of empirical results on inter-dealer trading and the relationships between inter-dealer 
45 trading and dealer inventory levels. Their dataset allowed them to clearly identify 
the origin and nature (whether transactor was trading on his own account or as an 
agent) of each transaction, to construct market makers' inventory positions and, unlike 
40 Pagano (1989) showed that, since the depth and liquidity of a market depend on the entry decisions 
of all potential participants, each trader assesses them according to conjectures about entry by others. If 
trade is equally costly across markets it will eventually concentrate on one market. If not, some trade 
will concentrate on one market and large traders may resort to a separate market. 41 Ho and Macris (1984) for the AMEX options market, Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) and Madhavan 
and Smidt (1993) for NYSE. 
42 Most available databases came from the NYSE the nature of which does not allow the analysis of 
either the inventory models of dealership markets or the inventory model of a monopolistic dealership 
market (Garman (1976) and Amihud and Mendelson (1980)). 43 Stoll (1976) and Neuberger (1992), Lyons (1995), Manaster and Mann (1996). 44 Chan et al (1995), Christie and Schultz (1994a, b), Christie, Harris and Schultz (1994). 45 Recent work on interdealer trading has been presented by Reiss and Werner (1998) and Naik and 
Yadav (1996a). 
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the indirect tests of market maker behaviour, 46 to test directly the predictions of 
inventory models of competitive dealership markets. 
Analyzing inter-dealer trading they found that market-makers posting competitive 
quotes execute a significantly larger proportion of the public trades and their relative 
inventory position is significantly related to their ability to execute large trades. 
Changes in quotes and inventories were shown to be strongly correlated and 
standardized and relative inventories (with respect to the median inventory) were 
mean reverting with a mean reversion coefficient increasing in the inventory level, 
which supports inventory models. 47 
They found that inter-dealer trading is an important mechanism for managing 
inventory risks in dealership markets, especially when inventories diverge a lot48 and 
this mechanism allows dealers to take large inventory positions that they would not be 
willing to take in an auction-type market where they could only unwound their 
positions against the public order flow. Moreover, because of order-flow preferencing 
it was argued that posting competitive quotes may have little value in dealership 
markets. 
2.9.3.3 Specialist Models 
Even though most models of the dealer are essentially models of the specialist, 
early research has dealt directly with the effect of the specialist's behaviour on prices. 
46 Glosten and Harris (1988), Hasbrouck (1988), and Chan et. al. (1995). 47 The mean half-life from the mean reversion estimates is 2.5 trading days (in contrast to that obtained 
by Madhavan and Smidt (1993) of 7.3 days) which indicates that dealership markets like the LSE differ 
considerably from markets with specialists like NYSE. 48 This finding is consistent with Ho and Stoll (1983), Naik, Neuberger and Viswanathan (1996) and 
Lyons(1996). 
45 
In the NYSE the specialist's income comes from his dual role as a broker49 (earns 
his income by managing orders) and a dealer (assumes risk). In order that he takes the 
opposite side of transactions the specialist charges a fee, the bid-ask spread. He can 
also cam trading profits on his inventory while he trades market orders as well as 
brokerage fees from limit orders. 50 However, early researcherS51 either assumed that 
his only decision variable was the spread and for this reason focused on its 
determinants, or maintained that the specialist changes the underlying price of the 
security (midpoint of the spread) in response to temporary trading imbalances which 
cause his actual inventory position to fall outside his preferred range of inventory 
holding, 52 a behaviour which may be independent of the bid-ask spread (i. e. the 
spread may remain constant around a highly variable mid-point). Others researchers 
examined his behavior as an intcr-temporal arbitrager who buys when there is a 
temporary excess supply of shares and sells when there is a temporary excess 
demand. 53 
Madhavan and Sofianos (1998) have found evidence that specialists participate 
more in less active stocks and those where there is less competition. Rather than 
controlling their inventories by adjusting their quotes their evidence suggested that 
they do so through the timing and direction of their trades. They were found to 
participate more when the bid-ask spreads are wide, and when previous price 
movements have been significant. Their participation decreases with trade size in 
individual stocks. 
49 An examination of the Stock Exchange specialist system of the NYSE has been made by Stoll (1985) 
who diagnosed a historical decline in the participation of the specialist as broker. He also analyzed his 
role as price stabilizer and has distinguished between ex-post and ex-ante stabilization. so Baumol (1965) first described the specialist's role. 51 Demsetz (1968), Tinic (1972), West and Tinic (1971), Bagehot (1971), and Bamea and Logue 
(1975). 
52 Smidt (197 1), the S. E. C. (197 1), and Barnea (1974). 53 Friedman (1953), Baumol (1957), Telser (1959), Farrell (1966) and Mandelbrot (1971). 
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Even early theories of the market maker's behaviour presented by Barnea and 
Logue (1975) showed that the spread imposed by the specialist was determined either 
due to: 
a) his provision of liquidity54 , which relates to the market and ownership 
characteristics of the stock as well as to the amount of competition (a passive role in 
that he reacts by simply adjusting his spread), 
b) inventory risk which could be broken down into new information 55 and 
marketability risk (his ability to make inventory adjustments when the market for an 
issue is thin) and 
c) inventory adjustment56 since according to perceived changes in inventory he 
will determine the equilibrium price (defined as the average of the bid and ask prices) 
so as to reduce his exposure risk to the stock. 
Under liquidity trading, Bradfield (1979) had showed that when the specialist 
approaches his target level of inventory variability around the equilibrium price is 
reduced and if he holds the target level variability will be reduced relative to a clerk 
system 57 but he may at times aggravate price variability compared to what it would 
be if he did not trade, owing to inventory considerations plus access to the book. His 
impact on price variability also depends on the time of day since his emphasis early in 
the day will be on exploiting shifts in the book while later in the day it is on moving 
toward the target level" in order to avoid overnight costs. This analysis supported 
Barnea (1974) in that prices should be more volatile toward the end of the day. 
54 The liquidity theory, first developed by Demsetz (1968) and modified and refined by Tinic (1972). 33 First introduced by Bagehot (197 1 
56 Presented by Smidt (197 1). 
57 In Logue's words "the specialist reduces trading costs by increasing depth in the neighbourhood of 
the equilibrium price". 58 A measure of market efficiency is the size and variability of the difference between transaction prices 
and the equilibrium price. 
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While he can increase the rapidity of exchange, when bid-ask quotations are too 
far apart, by offering a narrower bid-ask spread the specialist also needs to follow the 
rules of the exchange by offering a fair and orderly market for the stock. The stronger 
the competitive conditions in the market, 59 the closer will be the bid-ask spread or 
markup to the cost of waiting and carrying inventory in which case the spread will 
measure the cost of making transactions without delay. 60 
The efficiency of the specialist can be evaluated by whether transactions can take 
place at low cost and whether there are opportunities for systematic profit as a result 
of serial correlation in price series, or market imperfections which prevent price from 
fully and immediately reflecting new information. 61 These criteria however contrast 
with those used by the NYSE and the SEC which focus on price continuity and 
stability and may in fact tend to cause inefficiency by leading to price dependencies. 62 
For this reason Logue (1975) argued in favour of 1) allowing the specialist to solicit 
business or search for the other side of the market for large block transactions, 2) 
eliminate the criterion of price continuity and stability in his performance, 3) allow 
direct competition among market makers by reducing barriers to entry (a more 
competitive market may minimize the need of the above rules of price continuity and 
stability). 63 He therefore concluded that in markets with liquidity only or with both 
liquidity and information trading a competitive market-maker will perform more 
59 As perceived by a particular market-maker, competition is affected by factors such as: 1) the 
existence of close substitutes for the securities in which the market maker makes a market, 2) the 
presence of alternative trading markets for the asset, 3) the existence of limit orders, 4) a high volume 
of autonomous trading which could increase the likelihood of offsetting competing market orders and 
5) the level of commission rates (which act as barriers to entry for competing market makers). 60 Commission brokerage fees are not determined by the same procedures. 61 At any time period, the difference between the asset's current price and its equilibrium value can 
reflect either (a) the impact of new information on the relative price of the security or (b) a trading impact i. e. a temporary imbalance between supply and demand for the security at the equilibrium price 
as a result of random arrival of buy and sell orders. 62 The'Stabilization Percentage Test' ffick Test'), 'Twice Total Volume Test', and 'On Balance 
Test'. 
63 Black (197 1 a, b) and Smidt (197 1) made such proposals. 
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satisfactorily than a monopolistic market-maker and that regulatory criteria are 
unnecessary. 6465 
Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb (1981) showed that transaction costs 
cause investors to use order-placement strategies which result in a non-trivial market 
bid-ask spread. They defined an equilibrium market spread and demonstrated that it is 
greater for thinner securities and argued that there exists a gravitational pull effect of 
limit orders as traders place them close to market orders. This eventually tempts them 
to accept the market price which implies certainty of execution. Thus they showed 
that the size of the spread depends on the movement of trades between limit and 
market orders and this movement depends on the execution probability of a limit 
order. 
2.10 The Role of Volume 
The efficient markets hypothesis which has produced voluminous research has 
assumed that current price impounds all information which is relevant to the valuation 
of a security and contrasts with the beliefs of technical analysts as well as with the 
empirical evidence which indicates that some price-based strategies may yield 
66 positive returns. Volume can only be informative when adjustment of prices to 
information is not immediate in which case other statistics related to the trading 
process could be used to extract information about it. 
64 In information trading markets the types of information that could cause an individual to trade are: 1) 
price dependencies, 2) divergence of the arbitraged price from the unchanging equilibrium price, and 3) 
the true equilibrium price of the asset (may be the principal motivation for information trading). 
65 Like Bamea (1974), Logue (1975) argued that the chief cost of dealing with a market-makcr is the 
difference between the theoretical, but unobservable, equilibrium price and the transaction price, rather 
than the bid-ask spread. 66 Fama (1970,199 1) has provided reviews of the Eff icient Market Hypothesis literature. Nef1ci (199 1) 
and Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992) have carried out empirical tests of technical trading rules. 
A succinct definition of Efficiency has been given by Tobin (1989). 
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The behaviour of trading volume is closely linked to the heterogeneity among the 
traders in a market. Different proportions of various types of traders give rise to 
different volume behaviour and rcturn-volume dynamics. 
After investors receive private information they trade many rounds so that current 
volume is related to contemporaneous information flow as well as to existing private 
information which was received previously. Therefore volume lags behind 
information flow and may reach its peak many periods after traders first receive their 
private information and therefore volume is serially correlated even when information 
flow is independent over time. As informed investors continue to trade prices reveal 
more of their private information so their expected gains from speculation decrease. 
Volume is also related to the volatility of prices. When information, exogenous to 
the trading process, arrives at the market trading takes place which changes the price 
of the stock because new information changes both the expectations and the 
uncertainty about the value of the stock. High volume is thus generated which causes 
volatility in prices. Volume which is generated by new information is accompanied by 
significant price changes which are much higher than when volume is generated by 
existing private information. 
Even though the relation between volume and prices has been studied empirically 
in detail, the process by which these two variables are linked together is not known 
because it is not clear what kind of information volume brings into the trading 
process. In general there are two lines of research, which, based on rational 
expectations approaches attempt to study the informational role of volume: a) those 
which examine how volume arises when traders with differential information trade 
and b) those which study how and what traders can learn by observing volume. 
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Through the first approach, Wang (1994) has shown that volume is positively 
correlated with absolute price changes and dividends and this correlation increases 
with information asymmetry. 67 Moreover, different dynamic relations arise between 
trading volume and stock returns when informational as opposed to non-informational 
trading occurs which is an indication that volume conveys important information 
about how assets are priced in the market. Using a similar framework, He and Wang 
(1995) have shown that the pattern of volume is related to the flow and nature of 
information and that current volume is not only related to contemporaneous 
information but also to existing private information received previously. Therefore it 
can reach its peak many periods after investors first receive private information and it 
is serially correlated even when information flow is independent over time. 
In the second line of theoretical research Blume, Easley and O'Hara (1994) have 
investigated how the statistical properties of volume relate to the underlying value of 
the asset and to the behaviour of prices. They showed that volume is important in that 
it provides information relating to the quality of traders' infon-nation which cannot be 
extracted by observing prices which only give information about direction. 68 
Moreover, sequences of prices and volume can be infortnative and traders who use 
such information could do better that those not using it, providing a justification for 
the use of volume in technical analysiS. 69 
Conrad, Hameed and Niden (1994) used a form of contrarian strategy to measure 
the strength of the relation between lagged volume and returns and found strong 
67 Bamber, Barron and Stobcr (1999) have confirmed Bachelicr's (1900) intuition that differential 
interpretations are an important stimulus for trading, have supported Kandel and Pearson's (1995) 
argument that trading coincident with small price changes reflects investors' differential interpretation 
of information and have also found that differential interpretations explain a significant amount of the 
trading occurring when volume is higher than the non-announcement period average. 68 Volume picks up signal quality independent from price because it is not normally distributed. Only if 
its statistical properties are known can traders use it to update their beliefs during their learning 
process. 
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correlation between lagged changes in trading activity and returns patterns in 
individual securities. They also found negative autocovariances in returns for actively 
traded stocks and positive for less frequently traded ones. They concluded that volume 
is a valuable source of information and should be included in any model of short- 
horizon, time-varying returns processes. 
Jones, Kaul and Lipson (1994) have shown that information pertinent to the 
pricing of securities is contained in the transactions data and not in those of the size of 
the tmnsactions. 
Models which have investigated factors such as heterogeneous agents and 
incomplete markets have been used to model volume but they do not confront the data 
in its full complexity and have not evolved to a level at which they could furnish an 
empirical model of stock market data like, for example, a model with dynamically 
optimising heterogeneous agents which could jointly account for major stylized facts 
like serially correlated volatility, contemporaneous volume-volatility correlation and 
excess kurtosis of price changes. 70 
Major reviews of the literature on volume have been presented by Tauchen and 
Pitts (1983) and Karpoff (1987). While early research7l, using weekly data, found no 
correlation between price changes and volume, a number of researchers like Ying 
(1966) later documented a significant correlation between price changes, per se and 
absolute price changes with volume, using daily data. Using transactions and daily 
data on common stocks Epps (1977) found that volume changes are larger for 
69 A prerequisite for obtaining these results has been the assumption that traders know aggregate supply 
b observing volume which leads to a price which is 'fully-revealing'. 77 Some of the most important models in this area include those of. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988,1989) which comprise of informed and liquidity traders to explore the 
implications for within-day and weekend volume and price movements; Huffman(1987) who developed a 
capital growth model with overlapping generations to obtain a contemporaneous volurnc-price relationship 
and Huffman(1988) and Kettere and Marcct (1989) who examined trading volume and welfare issues in 
various economies comprised of heterogeneous infinitely lived agents facing limited trading opportunities. 71 Granger and Morgenstern (1963) and Godfrey, Granger and Morgenstern (1964) 
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increases in the absolute price change, compared to decreases, regardless of the 
general movement in prices. 72 Rogalski (1978) argued that the relation is only 
contemporaneous. Harris (1986) showed that the positive correlation between volume 
and absolute price change varies across securities and Richardson, Sefcik and 
Thompson (1986) found that volume increases in proportion to abnormal returns 
around announcements of dividend changes. 
Karpoff (1987) presented a model of the price-volume relation, based on previous 
empirical observations, which shows that when price-changes are positive (negative) 
the correlation is positive (negative), that is the relation is different for positive and 
negative price changes (this is essentially an asymmetric price-volume hypothesis). 
73 
He also argued that the relation can be traced to their common ties to information 
flows. 
Jain and Joh (1988) analyzed the lead and lag relations between volume and the 
absolute value of returns using a long time series of hourly data and showed that there 
is a strong positive correlation between contemporaneous trading volume and the 
absolute value of returns (or square of returns) which is consistent with the mixture of 
distributions hypothesis of Clark(1973), Epps and Epps(1976) and Tauchen and Pitts 
(1983)74 . Trading volume was found to be positively correlated with returns laggcd up 
to four hours. They also found evidence of an asymmetric relation (Le that the 
volume-returns relation is different for positive and non-positive price changes) which 
72 Wood, Mclnish and Ord (1985) and Smirlock and Starks (1985) documented the same relation . The 
latter, however, argue that it holds only in periods when the arrival of information can be distinguished ex- 
ante. 
73 This hypothesis also has the following implications: a) Tests using data on volume and the absolute value 
of price changes will yield positive correlations and heteroscedastic error terms. b) Tests using data on 
volume and price changes (not absolute) will yield positive correlations (ranked by the price change. the 
residuals from a linear regression of volume on price changes will be autocorrelated). 74 The mixture of distributions hypothesis states that when no information is available, trading is slow and 
the price process evolves slowly. When new information violates old expectations trading is fast with the 
price process evolving even faster. Thus contemporaneous absolute returns and volume should be positively 
correlated. 
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is consistent with the behavioural model of Epps (1975) and the one of Karpoff 
(1985) and Karpoff (1987) which is bascd on institutional rulcs. 
Jain and Joh (1988) also found that average volume follows a U- pattern during 
the da)ý 5 and an inverse U-pattem during the week. 76 Although some evidence was 
found of volume causing returns, it was weak compared to that of returns affecting 
volume which is to be expected in an informationally efficient market. 77 
Using a very large data-set Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen (1992) documented the 
positive price-volume relation but showed that it is non-linear and that changes in 
price lead to a symmetric movement in volume. 
73 For the London Stock Exchange Abhyankar, Ghosh, Levin and Limmack (1997) have documented a 
two-humped pattern which they attributed to the differential trading patterns among stocks with 
different liquidities. High activity stocks however, showed a more derinite U-shaped pattern. 76 Average volume was found to differ significantly during the day, being highest during the fust hour, 
declining monotonically until the fourth hour but increasing again on the fifth and sixth. During the week, 
average volume was also found to differ being lowest on Monday, increasing monotonically till Wednesday 
and then declining on Thursday and Friday. 77 Smirlock and Starks (1985 ) found evidence of a similar relation using a smaller time series. 
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Chapter 3 
The Bid-Ask Spread 
3.1 Introduction 
Existing literature on a number of areas pertinent to the bid-ask spread is presented 
in this chapter. The main issues discussed include the behavior of the bid-ask spread, 
the influences of the spread itself on the price-formation process, the distinction 
between the posted (quoted) and the effective spread and finally the models which 
attempt to determine the types, sizes and the behavior of the components of the bid- 
ask spread. 
3.2 Behaviour of the Bid-Ask Spread 
The intraday behavior of the spread is first discussed in this section, followed by 
the theories which attempt to explain this behavior. Finally research on the seasonality 
of the spread is presented. 
3.2.1 Intraday Behaviour 
The pattern followed by the bid-ask spreads of NYSE stocks has been 
documented by Brock and Kleidon (1992), McInish and Wood (1992), and Lee, 
Mucklow and Ready (1993)78. According to these papers, intraday spreads follow a 
U-shaped pattern. McInish and Wood (1992) found that the spread, as a percentage of 
price, has a U-shape during the day with particularly high values in the first minutes 
of trading, declining for the next 15 minutes to a level which lasts until the last few 
minutes of the day and rising again immediately preceding the close. Brock and 
Kleidon (1992) provided additional evidence showing that the U-shaped pattern is not 
restricted to one subset of stocks when these are grouped into price (bid-ask average), 
market value of equity and beta quintiles. In their study of the relationship between 
79 Several other authors like Porter (1988), Jaffe and Patcl (undated) and Brown, Clinch and Foster 
(199 1) also found similar evidence. 
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spreads and depths Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) documented a similar pattern but 
with a smaller sample of NYSE stocks. 
The intraday pattern of bid-ask spreads for NASDAQ stocks has been 
investigated by Chan, Christie and Schultz (1995) who also related the results to the 
institutional features of the dealer market. 79 They found that the bid-ask spread for 
NASDAQ stocks is relatively stable throughout the day but narrows significantly 
during the final hour of trading. Kleidon and Werner (1993) found a similar pattern 
for London stocks during mandatory trading hours. The London stock market, like 
NASDAQ, is structured as a multiple-dealer system and therefore the difference in the 
intraday patterns between NYSE and NASDAQ (or London) market seems to support 
the idea that the institutional features of markets can exert an influence on the 
determination of spreads over the day. 
In contrast to NASDAQ spreads, which remain relatively constant during the first 
hour of trading, NYSE spreads decline. However, the most striking difference 
between the spreads in the two markets found by Chan, Christie and Schultz (1995) 
was that they widen near the close for NYSE while those of NASDAQ narrow during 
the final 30 minutes of trading. 80 The authors used individual-dealer trade and quote 
revisions for NASDAQ stocks. The stocks selected were large enough for NYSE 
listing so that meaningful comparisons could be made. 81 
79 Papers that focus on transaction costs differences across markets are those of Blume and Goldstein 
(1992), Christie and Huang (1994), Christie and Schultz (1994a, b), Goldstein (1993), Lee (1993), Neal 
(1992), and Petersen and Fialkowski (1992). 80 This cannot be explained by the Brock and Klcidon (1992) model. 81 The approach followed by the authors was that used by Foster and Viswanathan (1993) in their study 
of intraday volume, volatility and trading costs for NYSE securities, i. e. they tested for intraday 
variations in spreads, volume and volatility and other variables using Hansen's (1982) GMM 
procedure. 
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Even though the average dealer spread showed practically no intraday variation, 
the inside spread 82 declined, gradually during the day and sharply at close, reflecting 
changes in the location, rather than in the width of individual dealer quotes. The 
authors tested whether the intraday patterns in volume and volatility for NASDAQ 
stocks were similar to the intraday pattern of the spread for the same stocks. They 
found that even though they follow a U-shape, similar to that of NYSE stocks, they do 
not follow the pattern of NASDAQ spreads. Thus the difference in bid-ask spreads for 
NASDAQ vs. NYSE stocks near the close cannot be attributed to differences in the 
intraday pattern of return variability or volume. 
For the London Stock Exchange which is a multiple-dealer market (known as ISE 
or International Stock Exchange, London) Abhyankar, Ghosh, Levin and Limmack 
(1997) have shown that average bid-ask spreads follow a U-shaped pattern during the 
trading period which is similar across deciles of stocks partitioned on the basis of 
liquidity. This behavior is similar to that of NYSE and unlike that of NASDAQ 
stocks. In contrast to the latter, the trading session in the London Stock Exchange 
consists of a Mandatory Quote-Period (MQP) before and after which dealers are not 
obliged to quote prices and the high values of the U-shape pattern of the spread 
corresponds to those periods (that is outside the MQP). The ISE and the NASDAQ 
markets are not directly comparable for a number of reasons the most important of 
which is that most of the trading in the ISE is done by institutional traders thus 
making the order-flow to consist of large, infrequent trades whereas NASDAQ is 
mainly a retail market. 
McInish and Van Ness (2002) have shown that for the NYSE, variables which 
explain the intraday behavior of bid-ask spreads, such as activity, competition, risk 
82 The inside spread is the difference between the inside ask and the inside bid price. The average 
spread is dcf ined as the difference between the average ask and the average bid price. The latter bracket 
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and information also determine its intraday components and in particular the 
inventory-holding and the asymmetric-information components which are discussed 
in section 3.4. 
To appreciate the potential explanations given for the intraday behaviour of the 
bid-ask spread it is important to gain an understanding of the various models which 
have been used in the attempt to explain it. These fall under three main classes: 
inventory, specialist market power and information models and are presented in the 
next section. 
3.2.2 Theories of the Behavior of the Spread 
Microstructure Models which have been proposed in order to explain the intraday 
behavior of bid-ask spreads of stocks are founded on the theories presented in Chapter 
two and in particular the inventory and information models of dealer behavior. Other 
researchers have also investigated the market power of the specialist as a factor 
affecting the behavior of the spread. 
3.2.2.1 Inventory Models 
Stoll (1978a), Arnihud and Mendelson (1980) and Ho and Stoll (1981) have 
argued that the spread exists to compensate the market maker for bearing the risk of 
undesired inventory. Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993), Hasbrouck and Sofianos 
(1993), and Madhavan and Smidt (1993) all found evidence on the relation of Bid- 
Ask spreads to dealer inventory control costs. In particular, the former found that for 
a sample of NYSE stocks, spreads became wider in response to higher trading 
volume. Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) found that trades in which the NYSE 
specialist participates tend to have a bigger and more rapid impact on the spreads 
the inside spread. 
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than trades with no specialist participation. Madhavan and Smidt (1993) reported that 
bid-ask quote revisions are positively related to order imbalances. Consequently 
during the open and the close of the market, when volume tends to be higher, the 
magnitude of order imbalances and therefore the spreads would be greater than 
during the rest of the day. 
3.2.2.2 Specialist Market Power Model 
Based on an extension of Merton (1971), Brock and Kleidon (1992) developed a 
model of intraday spreads where the market-maker possesses monopolistic power and 
showed that transactions demand at the open and close is greater and less elastic than 
at other times of the trading day due to overnight accumulation of information, 
changes due to the imminent non-trading period near the close and the fact that fund 
managers tend to trade near the close in order that they achieve optimal portfolio 
Positions or transfer overnight risk. Heavy and inelastic demand causes the specialist 
to price-discriminate by charging a higher price for trading at those times. The Brock 
and Kleidon (1992) model predicts periodic demand with high volume at the open 
and close and concurrent wide spreads which is consistent with the observed patterns 
for NYSE stocks. It also implies spill-over effects with optimal increases in both 
transactions demand and spreads in intervals immediately after the open and prior to 
the close. 
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Stoll and Whaley (1990) also supported the hypothesis that the wider spreads at 
the open reflect the specialists' ability to profit from their privileged knowledge of the 
order imbalances. Even though specialists are responsible for maintaining a 
83 Therefore one would not expect spreads in other markets (e. g. for CBOE options) to display a U-shaped 
intraday pattern if specialist market power is the key for observed pattern in NYSE stocks. 
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continuous presence in the market, they can often give quotes inferior to those of the 
limit order book, especially when the latter is thick. 
3.2.2.3 Information Models 
Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), Easley and 
O'Hara (1987), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Hasbrouck (1988), Foster and 
Viswanathan (1990), (1994), and Madhavan (1992) all focused on the adverse 
selection faced by the market maker, which was first proposed by Bagehot (1971) 
and assumed different types of agents like informed traders, liquidity traders (must 
trade at a given time during the day regardless of the cost), and in some models 
discretionary liquidity traders. In these models the specialist, being at an 
informational disadvantage, must keep spreads wide enough so that the gains from 
trading with the uninformed compensate for the losses to the informed. These 
models predict that higher volume is associated with lower spreads given the optimal 
equilibrium behaviour of the models' traders. In particular: 84 
Foster and Viswanathan (1994) developed a model where strategic trading with 
two asymmetrically informed traders is analyzed. This model of competition between 
two informed traders predicts high volume, variances and spreads at the start of 
trading, a result that is not explained by earlier information models of intraday 
trading. 
Madhavan (1992) developed a model in which information asymmetry is 
gradually resolved during the trading day by observing trading prices. He considered 
traders with diverse information regarding the value of the asset at the beginning of 
trading. As trading continues, private information is impounded into prices, and 
94 This prediction should normally be valid for NASDAQ stocks or low-volume ones where there are few 
limit orders. 
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specialists narrow their spreads as their informational handicap declines. Hence, the 
bid-ask spread declines through the day. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) modeled the strategic decisions of liquidity traders 
who have discretion over the timing of their trades. By concentrating their trades on 
specific periods, discretionary liquidity traders minimize the adverse selection costs 
facing specialists, leading to the simultaneous occurrence of heavy trading volume 
and narrow spreads at specific times during the day. 85 
It is evident from the above discussion that two broad classes of factors could be 
thought responsible for the pattern of the bid-ask spread intraday. Those pertaining to 
the structural characteristics of the market and those related to information. 
The relative importance of market-structure versus information-based factors in 
determining the intraday pattern of bid-ask spreads can be measured by comparing the 
results for NYSE versus NASDAQ stocks. The distinction between these spread 
determinants is that the flow of information may be similar for NYSE and NASDAQ 
stocks, but the institutional structures of the markets are dissimilar. 
The primary institutional differenceS86 between markets are : 
oA single specialist for a stock on the organized exchanges versus 
multiple dealers on NASDAQ. 
oA call-auction market at the open on the organized exchanges versus a 
quote-driven system that searches for equilibrium prices in a dealer 
market and 
'S In both the Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) as well as the Madhavan (1992) model intraday spreads are 
attributed to the variation in the costs of adverse selection. 
" Early papers focusing on the transaction characteristics of alternative market structures have been those of 
Grossman and Miller (1988) and Glosten (1989) which show that a specialist can enhance liquidity when 
trading volume is low or when adverse selection problems are large. Also Kamara (1988), Stoll and Whaley 
(1990) and Vijh (1990) documented important differences between call-auction and specialist markets, 
between organised exchanges and OTC markets and between the liquidity of stock and options markets. 
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o The consolidation of order flow through the specialist versus the 
fragmentation of order flow across dealers. Since the structural 
differences across markets are most pronounced around market closures 
it is important that one focuses on open and close trading periods in 
order to study difference in the bid-ask spread patterns. 
Three other important studies of the spreads of securities, other than stocks, are 
those of Chang, Chung and Johnson (1995), George and Longstaff (1993) and Neal 
(1992). 
Chan, Chung and Johnson (1995) studied the intraday behaviour of bid - ask 
spreads for actively traded CBOE options and compared them with their NYSE - 
traded underlying stocks in order to distinguish among the above three classes of 
competing hypotheses regarding variations in spreads for these two related securities. 
They found high spread for both options and stocks at the open which reflects market 
makers' desire to protect themselves from greater uncertainty at the open and high 
stock spread but lower option spread at the close which they attributed to the 
difference in market making structure. They concluded that both the degree of 
competition in market making and the extent of informed trading are important for 
understanding the intraday behaviour of spreads. 87 
George and Longstaff (1993) examined the cross-sectional distribution of bid-ask 
spreads in the S&P 100 index options market. The advantage of this cross-sectional 
approach was that the market structure and underlying sources of risk were held fixed 
across options, so that differences in bid-ask spreads could be directly related to 
Evidence that transaction costs are related to market structure has been considered by the SEC in bringing 
about rule changes. 
differences in the costs faced by market makers across options. It also allowed the 
direct examination of the interrelation between bid-ask spreads and trading activity. 
The important conclusions of this analysis were that most of the variation in bid-ask 
spreads can be explained by the exchange rules and the market structure and that bid- 
ask spreads in such a dealer market are larger than those in specialist markets. 
Neal (1992) provided additional evidence on the relation between market structure 
and transaction costs by comparing the bid-ask spread and some properties of 
transaction prices for equity call options in two market structures: the American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX) specialist structure and the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE) competitive market maker structure. He found that at low trading 
volumes the specialist structure has lower bid-ask spreads than competitive market 
structures and that this difference diminishes as volume rises, consistent with 
Grossman and Miller (1988). Moreover, he found that the distributions of trade size 
and transaction prices differ between the two structures. The competitive market 
maker structure is associated with a greater fraction of trades at the ask which are of a 
smaller size (consistent with Vijh (1990)). 
3.2.3 Seasonality 
Clark, McConneli, and Singh (1992) found that there is a distinct seasonal pattern 
for bid-ask spreads in NYSE stocks (which was more pronounced among low-priced 
stocks where the January seasonal was also most pronounced) in which both absolute 
and relative spreads decline from the end of December to the end of the following 
January but found little evidence of significant correlation between changes in spreads 
at the turn of the year and January stock returns. 
87 These results were consistent with papers which investigated non-NYSE securities like those of 
Chan, Christie and Schultz (1995) for NASDAQ and Kleidon and Werner (1993) for London but did 
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Stoll and Whaley (1983) have argued that excess returns on small stocks are a result 
of higher proportional bid-ask spreads in low-priced stocks. In their view, the bid-ask 
spread itself is the 'cause' of the higher returns on small stocks. That is, because of 
the higher proportional cost of transacting in small stocks, investors demand a higher 
rate of retum. 
Keim (1983) and Schultz (1983) have pointed out that small stock excess returns 
are concentrated in January and a seasonal in stock returns cannot be explained by the 
bid-ask spread unless there is a seasonal in the bid-ask spread as well. 
Schultz (1983) compared bid-ask spreads in December with those in June but found 
no significant differences in bid-ask spreads between the two dates. He thus 
concluded that high transaction costs in December cannot explain the larger excess 
returns earned by small firms in January. 
3.3 Spread Influences on The Price Process 
Apart from the influence of other factors on the fonnation of the bid-ask spread 
research has investigated the spread's influence on factors related to the price process 
such as asset pricing and the price itself. 
Arnihud and Mendelson (1986) studied the effect of the bid-ask spread on asset 
pricing by analyzing a model in which investors with different expected holding 
periods trade assets with different relative spreads. They confinned their hypothesis 
that market-observed expected return is an increasing and concave function of the 
spread. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1987) examined the effects of the mechanism by which 
securities are traded on their price behaviour by comparing the behaviour of open-to- 
open and close-to-close returns on NYSE stocks, given the differences in execution 
not compare different market making structures like Chan, Chung and Johnson (1995). 
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methods applied in the opening and closing transactions. Opening returns were found 
to exhibit greater dispersion, greater deviations from normality and a more negative 
and significant autocorrelation pattern than closing returns. They studied the effects of 
the bid-ask spread and the price-adjustment process on the estimated return variances 
and covariances and discussed the associated biases. They concluded that the trading 
mechanism has a significant effect on stock price behaviour. 
Ho and Macris (1984), utilizing dealer's 'trading book' infonnation, showed that 
much of the variation in transaction prices may be explained by the specialist's 
optimal determination of his bid and ask quotes and demonstrated that the dealer's 
bid-ask spread is an important explanatory variable in the observed transaction return. 
They also indicated that the dealer's inventory level may affect his quotes and thus 
the transaction prices and order arrivals. 
3.4 Posted and Effective Spreads 
Unlike the simple securities markets described in standard financial models, where 
trades take place at the prices posted by the specialist and market orders pay the whole 
spread between the bid and the ask, in the U. S. equity markets trades inside the spread 
are quite frequent. Market orders may transact inside the spread if specialists do not 
always display the best public limit orders or when they are matched with other 
market orders. In such cases, the posted spread overstates an investor's expected 
trading costs. Since investors can expect to buy at prices lower than the ask and sell at 
prices higher than the bid, the effective spread is the relevant measure of trading 
CoStS. 88 Accurate estimation of transaction costs is important for tests of market 
88 It is not possible to directly estimate the effective spread and compare it to the posted spread without 
using quotes or orders. Glosten and Harris (1988) have estimated it indirectly using transaction prices. 
Lee (1993) and Blume and Goldstein (1992) compare transaction prices to the midpoint of the quoted 
spread but this method accurately estimates the effective spread only when market orders are matched 
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efficiency, asset pricing models as well as tests of the theories which explain how the 
spread should vary with characteristics of the stock such as trading activity and the 
size of the order (large vs. small). However, the usefulness of the effective spread as a 
measure of such costs depends on the accuracy of the methods which are employed 
for the classification of trades as originating from buy or sell orders. These methods 
are discussed in section 4.3. 
Using two samples of market orders, one based on orders submitted by retail 
brokers and one based on orders submitted electronically to the NYSE, Petersen and 
Fialkovski (1994) documented a significant difference between the posted spread and 
the effective spread paid by investors. By matching each order's execution price to the 
quote at the time the order was submitted, they measured how far inside the posted 
quotes each order was executed. This measure is called "price improvement" and it 
allows the estimation of the effective spread. 
In the US equity markets price improvement can arise when : 1) the specialist 
intervenes to stop or match a market order, 2) market orders execute against hidden 
limit orders or against orders from floor traders and 3) buy and sell orders arrive 
simultaneously (a rare case). Then price improvement can be defined as: 
Price improvement (relative to the exchanges' own quotes) = 
Ask price - Transaction price (buy orders) = 
Transaction price - Bid price (sell orders) 
Price improvement (relative to the best bid or offer (BBO)) = 
Min (ask price) - Transaction price (buy orders) = 
Transaction price - Max (Bid price) (sell orders) 
solely with limit orders (the specialist or a public limit order). If they are matched with each other the 
method will overestimate the spread actually paid. 
67 
The difference between the two price improvements is a measure of the quality of 
an exchange's quotes. The effective spread can be defined as: 
Effective spread = Posted spread -2x Price improvement 
since a trader may receive price improvement both buying and selling and assuming 
that it is the same on both sides. 
Petersen and Fialkovski (1994) found a systematic difference between the two 
types of spread and similar to that of Branch and Freed (1977) that more-actively 
traded stocks have smaller posted spreads. The effective spread also declined with 
trading activity but the magnitude of the decline was much smaller. 
It was found that the posted spread provides most of the explanatory power for the 
expected price improvement and once it is known other firm-specific factors have 
only a slight marginal effect. Petersen and Fialkovski (1994) also found that not only 
do the sizes of the posted and the effective spreads differ in magnitude but their 
correlation is also small. They also provided evidence that the posted spread is a poor 
measure of the costs of liquidity and that the effective spread on the regional 
exchanges is significantly larger than on the NYSE. Results suggested that the posted 
spread cannot be used to forecast the effective spread. Orders sent to the regional 
exchanges were found to receive significantly less price improvement whereas those 
sent to the NYSE receive better than average execution prices. The above results were 
not consistent with the notion that the US equity markets are integrated since in an 
integrated equity market the execution price of an order does not depend on where the 
order was sent. 
3.5 Models of the Bid-Ask Spread and its Components 
To set the foundations for a discussion of the models of the bid-ask spread and its 
components we first present below two basic models of the spread which are based on 
68 
economic principles and describe the decision rules followed by dealers in setting 
their bid and ask prices. The first is the Stoll (1978) model, already described in the 
previous chapter, which assumes no informed trading and bases the decision of the 
dealer on inventory considerations. The second is the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
model which considers both informed as well as uninformed trading affecting the 
dealer's behaviour. We then proceed with the presentation of the rest of the models 
distinguishing between the two categories which attempt to measure spread 
components, namely covariance spread models, which make use of the serial 
covariance of transaction price changes and trade indicator models which use an 
indicator variable which characterizes trades as buyer- or seller-initiated. Both 
covariance spread as well as trade indicator models, even though they are based on 
economic principles like the Stoll (1978) and the Glosten and Milrom (1985) ones, 
they are less theoretic in nature since they attempt to derive tools which could be used 
for the empirical analysis of spreads and their components. 
3.5.1 The Stoll (1978) Model 
According to Stoll the dealer attempts to maximize the expected utility of his ten-ninal 
wealth which consists of his initial wealth JVO, representing his initial position in the 
optimal efficient portfolio, plus the true value of his position in his trading account 
QP and any other funds he may posses. He is assumed to have an exogenous and 
unchanging belief regarding the 'true' price of the asset as well as a 'true' rate of 
return for it. 
In this two-period model the dealer's decision problem consists of setting prices for 
the next transaction in such a way that his utility after the trade will be at least as good 
69 
as before it. Then following a trade of a true value Q, on the asset his terminal wealth, 
TV is given by: 
JV = JVO(l +R+ 
(I 
+ Rj)Qj - 
(I + Rf XQI - Cl) 
where R* is the rate of return on his initial portfolio 
is the rate of return on stock i, and 
Rf is the risk-free rate at which the dealer can borrow to finance his 
inventory or at which he can lend excess funds. 
Ci is the cost of trading amount Qj which is positive or negative 
depending on whether he buys or sells the asset. 
C, represents the dealer's exposure cost of holding a sub-optimal 
inventory. 
Within the short time-period considered and since there are no limits on his ability to 
borrow, his risk of becoming bankrupt is zero. 
The dealer will enter any transaction which will leave his expected utility unchanged 
according to: 
E[U JVO 
(I 
+R E[U(JV)] (3.2) 
Using Rf =0 since the time horizon considered is short: 
ci =EI- =Z O-ipQp +1Z Ui2 Qi (3.3) Q, TVO 2 Wo 
where 
Ci is the percentage cost that the dealer requires in order that he takes 
position Q, in stock i, that is his cost of providing immediacy, 
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is the dealer's coefficient of relative risk aversion, 
0-1p is the correlation between the rate of return of stock i and that of the 
optimal efficient portfolio, and 
cr, ' is the variance of the return of stock i. 
From the above equation it is evident that: 
o The larger the dealer's initial wealth the lower the percentage cost 
o The larger his risk aversion the larger this cost 
o The larger the dealer's inventory position the larger this cost since it becomes 
more risky to increase his inventory. 
o The size of the trade also affects this cost since a larger value will remove him 
away from his optimal position. 
o The characteristics of the stock as well as its relation to other stocks in the 
market also affect the dealer's decision. 
The dealer then will set his bid and ask prices in such a way as to compensate himself 
for this cost. For the bid, its proportional distance below the true price, expressed as a 
percentage of it, will be set according to: 
(P" 
- P") C 1) and = C, (Qa plo I 
(Qi 
pi* 
where Pj* is the true price of stock i before the transaction takes place 
Pb is the bid price, P. the ask price and 
is the true value of a sale to the dealer. 
Qi is the true value of a purchase from the dealer. 
(3.4) 
Thus the bid-ask spread relative to the true price (percentage spread) is given by: 
=Ci(Qb)_Ci(Qia)= 
Z 
0.12 
pi* WO 
(3.5) 
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3.5.2 The Glosten and Milgrom (1985) Model 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) modeled the behaviour of a dealer who can revise his bid 
and ask quotes after each trade assuming unit trades take place and only market orders 
are available. They modeled two types of investors: informed and pure liquidity 
traders who all start with the same information regarding the random value V of an 
asset. Informed traders trade on the basis of their private information whereas the 
uninfon-ned are assumed to participate due to the disparity of preferences or 
endowments which is their main motive for trading. All market participants are 
assumed to be risk-neutral. 
Each trader is assigned a time preference parameter which determines how much he is 
willing to pay to buy or accept to sell a unit of stock. He assigns random utility to 
shares of stock, x, and current consumption, c. as follows: 
, OIXV + cc 
(3.6) 
where p, is a 'liquidity parameter' which represents the differential subjective 
assessments regarding the distribution of the random variable V and is independent of 
V as well as any other information about V. It is a parameter of the individual 
investor's utility function and represents his personal trade-off between current and 
future consumption derived from owning the asset. The higher the value of p, the 
higher the desire to invest for the future. Its value for the dealer is assumed to be equal 
to one. 
The risk-neutrality assumption implies that for trade to take place the value of the 
parameter must vary across the participants otherwise a 'no-trade' situation will be 
reached and the market will collapse. 
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Investors are assumed to arrive one-by-one, randomly and anonymously and the 
dealer has knowledge of the probability structure of the arrival process which implies 
that he can extract correct inferences from observing the data. Investors also wish to 
maximize their expected utility using their existing information. Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) distinguish between the public information. set H, available at time t which 
comprises of all past transaction prices, the current bid and ask quotes and all 
available public information and the informed traders' private information set J, - An 
informed trader arriving at the process will have an information set F, which includes 
J, v H, and the infonnation furnished by the quoted bid and ask prices. 
The optimal decision rule of an investor is formulated in terms ofi. 
Buy if Z, )A 
Sell if Zg (B 
where 
Z, =, oE[VIF, ]=, ol, (1-U, )E[VIHjA, B]+, oUE[VIHA, B] 
U, =I if trader arriving at time t is uninformed and 
Ut =0 otherwise. 
(3.7) 
The dealer, knowing the behaviour of the traders chooses bid and ask prices on the 
basis of his own information set S, in such a way that his expected profit from a 
trader arriving at time t is: 
E[(A-; 7)'(Z, )A)]+(; 7-B)Itz, (B) I St 
(3.8) 
The indicator functions of these events: 
IIZI)A 
I == 1 ifIZ, )A land =O otherwise, and 
IIZ, 
(B )=I 
ifIZ, (B I and =0 otherwise 
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The above equations assume that 1) there are zero costs associated with all short 
positions in cash or stock, 2) there are no transaction and inventory costs (since the 
dealer is assumed to be risk-neutral), 3) all participants are risk-neutral and 
competitive and 4) trades take place only at the ask and bid prices. Therefore it is only 
information that affects the spread. 
Prices are assumed to be set in such a way that the expected profit is equal to zero on 
every trade the reasoning being that competition and risk neutrality would remove any 
rents the specialist might earn because of the actions of competing dealers (if the 
market maker was risk averse he would have inventory concerns). 
prices. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) also assumed that at equilibrium the prices set by 
the market maker are ex-post regret-free, that is following the trade the dealer knows 
that while the ask has been exceeded or the transaction price has been below the bid 
and updates his information set according to this and his assessment of the trader's 
information. Thus the ask and bid prices are reservation prices which are arrived at 
because of competition and the ask (bid) is what the revised expectation of the value 
of the asset would be if a trader buys (sells). Then the bid and ask prices will be equal 
to the conditional mean of V given the specialist's information set as: 
At = E[V I S,, Z, ) A, ] 
B, =E[V I S,, Z, (B, ] (3.9) 
A useful contribution of this model is that unlike Copeland and Galai (1983) where all 
information is revealed at one trade, Glosten and Milgrom. (1985) incorporate the 
effect that information is not revealed instantly but only through a series of trades and 
thus the behaviour of prices is affected. 
The price-decision problem of the market maker is affected by the sequential arrival 
of informed traders who force him to continually upgrade his expectation of the price 
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of the asset and eventually new infonnation is incorporated into this price (a learning 
problem). It is thus the opposite of previous inventory theoretic models which 
assumed that the order flow as well as the uncertainty about the value of the asset was 
exogenous to the market maker's decision problem (Bayesian Learning Model). 
The model is incomplete since it does not capture the interaction between the adverse 
information and the need of the market maker to account for other risks such as 
inventorylbankruptcy/risk-neutrality etc. 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) also proved that: 
9 under these conditions the ask is always higher than the bid 
9 that price changes follow a martingale relative to the dealers and the public 
information which indicates that spreads due to the adverse selection effect are 
quantitatively different from those due to transaction cost, risk-aversion or 
monopoly power which, contrary to adverse selection, lead to negative serial 
correlation. 
0 The spread consists of both transitory as well as adverse selection components 
(explained in section 3.5.3) and the latter is given by: 
cov(g) =-I CA - C, 
(3.10) 
2 
where c is the per trade cost of the dealer. 
9 Spreads decline as the number of trades increases which indicates that the 
insiders' information is assimilated as trading proceeds leading to an 
approximate consensus expectation value, V of the asset in the market. 
3.5.3 Covariance Spread Models 
Covariance Spread models, which use the serial covariance of transaction price 
75 
changes, are based on the work of Roll (1984) which is presented below. The most 
important of these models are those of Stoll (1989), Choi, Salandro and Shastri (1988) 
and George, Kaul, and Nimalendran. (199 1). 
The detennination of the relative sizes of the spread components is crucial to 
gaining an understanding of the return-generating mechanism since these components 
arise from the different trading behaviour of market participants reflecting their 
varying interests and actions. To the extent that the size of the components could be 
determined in every trading situation would allow researchers to gain a better insight 
of the retum-generating process. 
Early research has distinguished between three types of components of the spread, 
the order-processing, the inventory holding and the adverse selection cost 
components. The first two constitute what has been termed the transitory cost 
component which has a transient effect on price, because its effect on the time series 
of prices is not related to the underlying value of the security. The adverse-selection 
component, which allows market-makers to earn from uninformed traders what they 
risk losing from trading with informed ones, has a permanent effect on prices and 
does not cause serial correlation. The different time series behaviour of the two 
components has been used to separate them. 
The bid-ask spread plays a very important role in the formation of the price and 
has been shown to affect the time series properties of returns. 89 The fact that the 
random arrival of buy and sell orders can make prices fluctuate from the bid to the ask 
(bid-ask bounce) can cause spurious volatility and serial correlation in returns even 
when there is no change in the fundamental value of the asset. In his seminal paper 
Roll (1984) showed that in a frictionless market (without transaction costs) when 
89 Blume and Stambaugh(1983), Keim (1989) and Philips and Smith (1980). 
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there is no change in the fundamental value of the security, the spread can induce 
negative serial correlation in transaction price changes and one can infer the spread 
from the observed pattern of prices. Choi, Salandro and Shastri (1988) have shown 
that this is true even when the types of orders arriving (order flow) are serially 
correlated which will only affect the magnitude of the correlation. " 
Roll (1984) derived an equation for the realized spread, S, in terms of the serial 
covariance of transaction price changes, when the market is informationally efficient 
and the probability distribution of the observed price changes is stationary. He 
denoted the change in price between times t and t- I as APt, and showed that the spread 
is given by: 
S= 24- cov[AP, -1, 
Since this spread is inferred by the transactions data it is equivalent to the 
effective (realized) spread which differs from the quoted spread since trades often 
occur within the quoted spread for reasons related to the particular characteristics of 
the trading situation and mechanism (for example broker discounts). This spread 
equation also accounts for the time-series properties of asset returns. 
Stoll (1989) has developed a model where the covariance of transaction returns 
and the covariance of quote (bid and ask) returns are related to the probability of a 
price reversal and the size of a price reversal and estimated the last two. The model 
also distinguishes among the three components of the quoted spread (order 
processing, inventory holding and adverse selection) but assumes that the effective 
spread consists of the inventory and the order processing components only. it also 
assumes that the quoted spread, SQ, is constant and relates it to stock characteristics: 
[5 2 (1 
4 cov(API, 
Apt-, ) = SQ' c-2; r) - ; r2(l -25, 
(3.12) 
90 Lucas (1978) and Leroy (1973) have suggested that this need not be true. 
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cov(AM,, AM, -, 
) = t5, SQ'(1 - 2; r) 
where Mt : is the mid-point between the bid and ask prices at time t, equal to: 
+ 
7c : is the probability of a price reversal, that is the probability that a trade 
at the ask (bid) will be followed by a trade at the bid (ask) 
5,; : is the magnitude of a price continuation as a proportion of the quoted 
spread, where a price continuation occurs when a trade at the ask (bid) is 
followed by a trade at the ask (bid). Its value lies in the range between 
0 and I assuming the value 0 for the case when the spread is solely 
due to order-processing costs and 0.5 for the case when it is due to 
adverse or inventory-holding costs. 
SQ : the quoted spread assumed to be constant 
The adverse selection cost arises as the difference between the quoted and the 
realized spread. The realized spread is defined as the expected price change after a 
dealer purchase less the expected price change after a dealer sale and is given by: 
cF,, )s (3.14) 
Then the holding cost component is calculated from the above equation for the 
realized spread using 8c = 0.5 and the estimated value of 7c from the regressions. These 
calculations are based in the author's arbitrary assumptions that in the order 
processing cost model n=0.5 and 8c =0 whereas under the inventory holding cost 
model 7c > 0.5 and k=0.5. 
This model was tested using only a limited set of intraday trade and quote data for 
NASDAQ/NMS stocks from three months in 1984 and estimated the three 
components using OLS estimation. His results showed that the quoted spread for his 
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sample consisted of 43% adverse, 10% inventory and 47% order-processing cost. The 
average realized spread was found to be 57% of the quoted spread. However, his use 
of data at the close of the trading session may have biased his results due to the 
different trading behaviour of the participants at those times as discussed in section 
3.1. 
Using the Stoll (1989) model for estimating the components of the realized spread 
but with complete intraday data, instead of the prices near the end of the trading 
session which Stoll(1979) had used, Menyah and Paudyal (2000) estimated the 
components of the quoted spread for the London Stock Exchange stocks as being 
47%, 30% and 23% for the adverse, order-processing and inventory-holding costs 
respectively. 
Choi, Salandro and Shastri (1988) allowed for serial dependence in transaction 
type which can occur when large orders are broken down in smaller orders so that 
informed traders can disguise themselves. Aged (stale) orders in the book also have 
the same effect. The authors related the serial covariance of transaction price changes 
with the realized spread as : 
cov(A. P , &P _; r2S2 _1) = 
(3.15) 
tt 
They also did not assume inventory adjustment of dealers but merely extended 
Roll's (1984) model. 91 
Chen and Blenman (2003) have extended the single-period Stoll (1989) model into 
a two-period one and have incorporated the serial correlation in successive trades 
which allows for the accommodation of price-reversal effects which can be caused by 
asymmetric-information and inventory-holding costs. In this way they derived a 
spread estimator that is always positive. 
91 In Roll's (1984) model 7r is equal to 1/2. 
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George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991) argued that previous estimators of the bid- 
ask spread and its components, which are based on autocovariances of transaction 
returns, are biased and inefficient. They are biased because these returns contain 
positively autocorrelated components as a result of time-variation in expected returns 
which leads to a downward bias in the estimation of the realized spread. They are 
inefficient because transaction returns contain a large 'unexpected' component. To 
correct for this bias they used the difference between transaction returns and returns 
based on bid-to-bid quotes which are unaffected by positive covariance generated by 
time-varying expected returns. The model they developed assumed time-varying 
expectations, no inventory adjustment and no serial dependence in order flow so that 
the probability of a price reversal was 0.5 and arrived at: 
2 
cov(9, g-j = -(I - a) 4 
(3.16) 
where I-a is the order processing component. They used daily data for their 
estimation. It is doubtful however whether changing expectations are important at the 
microstructure level. 
Kim and Ogden (1996) showed that this estimator is also biased since George, 
Kaul and Nimalendran (199 1) also assumed that the spread is constant over time. The 
size of this bias has been estimated by Affleck-Graves, Hegde and Miller (1994) to be 
around 4 percent while Brooks and Masson (1996) argued that it is only present in 
short time-series and small sample cross-section estimates. 
3.5.4 Trade-Indicator Models 
Trade-indicator models use an indicator variable to categorize trades as originating 
from a buy or a sell order. The most important models in this category are those of 
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Glosten (1987), Glosten and Harris (1988), Huang and Stoll (1994), Lin, Sanger and 
Booth (1995), Hasbrouck (1988,1991), Huang and Stoll (1997) and Madhavan, 
Richardson and Roomans (1997). 
A basic simple asymmetric-information model has been presented by Glosten 
(1987) which is based on the same economic principles as the Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) model. He developed a two-component theoretical model of the spread which 
incorporated the correlation between the price of the security and the direction of the 
trade. This characteristic was'used to distinguish between the different effects of the 
two components on the behaviour of transaction prices. His model starts with a basic 
equation for the fonnation of the bid and ask prices which is based on the true value 
of the security. This value is the price which would be realizable in the market, that is 
the price at which agents would all agree to exchange the asset, in the absence of 
frictions (trading costs) and provided all participants had the same information, that is 
no private information existed in the market. 
Glosten distinguishes between this common (public) information value P from the 
full information value P-. The former is the expected value of the latter given the 
common infon-nation set fl according to: 
P= E[P* In] (3.17) 
The public information value, P, is assumed to remain constant as long as no new 
information regarding the particular security arrives which could lead to a different 
valuation of the security by the market participants. On this value all costs are 
subtracted (added)92 to arrive at the bid, Pb (ask, Pa) price set by the dealer. Glosten 
(1987) distinguished between the adverse selection costs at the bid, Ab and the ask, Aa 
92 Flood et al. (1998) have shown that search costs which arise when dealers search for quotes in the 
large exchanges also affect trading costs and should be incorporated into the bid-ask spread since their 
size can be around one-third of the effective spread. 
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and between costs Cb at the bid and Ca at the ask, which account for all other costs 
such as those of market-making, inventory costs and a normal rate of return for 
operating as a market-maker. All of these costs were collectively called the gross- 
profit component. When a purchase occurs at the ask, market participants are assumed 
to revise their estimate of the true price from P to (P + C,, ) and when a sale occurs at 
the bid they revise their estimate of the true price from P to (P - Cb)- 
The adverse selection costs A,, and Ab are given as the difference between the true 
price and the revised expectation of P* conditioning also upon the latest trade (that is 
whether an investor buys at the ask or sells at the bid): 
Ab= E[P*IQ u B] 
Aa 
= E[P* IQ u A] (3.19) 
where A and B stand for the events: 
A: investor buys at ask 
B: investor sells at bid 
Following the above discussion the bid and ask prices are fonned according to: 
R =P-A -Cb 
(3.20) 
bb 
p =P+A + (3.21) aaC. 
The asymmetric information model, which is also a hypothesis about the way in 
which private infonnation is incorporated into prices has been introduced by Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985) who incorporated the anticipation in the revision in expectations, 
conditional on the type of order submitted, into the bid and ask prices of the dealer. 
This hypothesis has subsequently been validated by the empirical work of Glosten and 
Harris (1988) who could not reject the hypothesis that a significant part of the spread 
of NYSE common stocks is due to asymmetric information. 
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Glosten's model of the spread explains the difference between the quoted and the 
realized spread. If the price at time t, Pt, either occurs at the bid or the ask then: 
R=P+Cq tIt 
(3.22) 
where qt is the buy-sell indicator (or trade-indicator) variable for the trade 
occurring at time t which takes the values of : 
+1 if the trade is buyer-initiated (purchase from the dealer) and 
-I if the trade is seller-initiated (sale to the dealer) 
and Ct is the gross profit component at time t and is: 
C. if the trade is buyer-initiated and 
Cb if the trade is seller-initiated 
Moreover, unless the adverse selection cost at time t, At, is zero, Pt will be 
correlated with qt since the possibility that a buyer (seller) initiated trade is 
information based will cause P to be revised upwards (downwards): 
cov[P,, q, I P] = E[A, I P] 
where At: is equal to A,, if q, =I and 
equal to Ab if qt = -I 
Arrival of new public information will revise Pt according to: 
R=R +e+Aql I t-I t 
(3.23) 
(3.24) 
where ct is the revision in the true price due to the passage of time and the arrival 
of public information between trades at times t and t-1. It is assumed to be an 
independently and identically distributed random variable. The assumed serial 
independence implies rationality on behalf of the market-makers because if there was 
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serial correlation in the location of the spread a market-maker entering the market 
could profit by incorporating this information into his own quotes. 
Therefore the change in price APt, between trades at t and t- 1 will be given by: 
I -, =Aq, +e, +(Cqt-C, -Iqt-, 
) 9=R-Rt (3.25) 
that is the adverse selection component, Atqt, is permanent whereas the gross- 
profit component, (Ct qt - Ct qt), can reverse leading to serial correlation in returns. 
Assuming that: a) continuously compounded returns are uncorrelated, b) the 
spread is symmetric around the true price and c) that the gross-profit component does 
not cause conditional drift in prices, then the serial covariance of continuously 
compounded returns is approximately given by: 
cov =-0.25 7c 8sp2 
(3.26) 
where ag : is the proportion of the spread due to factors other than adverse 
selection (gross profit) 
and sp: is the proportional spread which is defined as: 93 
2(C + A) (3.27) 
P. + Pb 
where Ca ý-- Cb =C and Aa=Ab= A 
Based on the same economic principles as the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model, 
Glosten and Harris (1988) extended Glosten's (1987) model and develoPed an 
econometric model of the spread attempting to estimate the two components (the 
information or adverse-selection component and the order-processing plus inventory 
component which together are referred to as transitory) by exploiting their different 
time-series behaviour as explained in the previous section. They allowed the adverse 
selection component and the gross profit component to depend on order size but 
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assumed that there is no inventory cost. They also assumed that the components do 
not change with time. This idea has been introduced in the theoretical models of 
Easley and O'Hara (1987) and Kyle (1985) suggesting that the adverse-selection cost 
should increase with the quantity traded since informed traders wishing to maximize 
the return from their private information will want to trade in large quantities before 
94 their information becomes common knowledge (public). Moreover, they allowed the 
error term in equation (3.25) to depend on the elapsed time between trades. Since they 
did not have information about quotes and thus could not infer the trade indicator 
variable, they estimated the adverse and transitory components conditioning on the 
observed volume at time t. Using fourteen months of NYSE common stock price 
changes in the years 1981-1983 and maximum likelihood estimation they were unable 
to reject the hypothesis that the adverse selection component is positive. They 
estimated the model9s 
g= CO(q, -q, -, 
)+CI(q, V, -q, -, 
V, 
-, 
)+Aoqi +AlqV, +e, +r, -r, -, 
(3.28) 
where CO, C, : are the intercept and slope of the gross-profit (or transitory) spread 
component equation Ct = CO + C1 Vt, assumed to be linear in 
the volume of trade at time t, Vt 
A0, A, : are the intercept and slope of the linear adverse selection 
spread component equation At = Ao + A, Vt, assumed to be linear 
in the volume of trade at time t, Vt 
Ct : public information innovation between trades at times t and W, 
assumed to be an independently, identically distributed normal 
93 This way Glosten has shown that the part of the spread due to the gross profit component induces 
biases in the measurement of mean (simple) returns and the variance of returns and also induces 
negative serial correlation in measured returns. 94 This idea is equivalent to the permanent effect of block trades on prices in Holthausen, Leftwich and 
Mayers (1987). 
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random variable with mean and variance dependent on the time 
between trades at t and t-1, denoted as Tt, that is 
ct-iidN 
(fl(Tt )lf2(Tt)lTt) 
Apt : change in observed prices from time t- I to t 
qt buy - sell indicator variable for the trade at time t 
rt round-off error (drift between observed discrete price and 
unobserved price when no discrete prices are used), assumed 
to be a zero mean, asymptotically uniformly distributed random 
variable. 
Vt number of shares traded at time t 
The conditional normality assumption for the public information innovation term, 
et, has been suggested by the mixture of distributions hypothesis of Clark (1973) 
and Harris (1987) already discussed in section 2.10. 
Glosten and Harris (1988) found that Ao and C, should be equal to zero. 
Using the Glosten and Harris (1988) model Neuberger (1992) was not able to 
decompose the realized spread into inventory and asymmetric information. 
Apart from the work of Glosten and Harris (1988) referred to above, which is a 
trade indicator model, even though trade direction could not be observed directly due 
to the lack of quote data, Huang and Stoll (1997) and Madhavan, Richardson and 
Roomans (1997) have also developed similar models. 
Huang and Stoll (1997) developed a regression model to estimate all three 
components of the spread. They exploited the behaviour of trade and quote prices 
after a trade to distinguish between the adverse selection component and the other 
95 This model is similar to the inventory-theoretic model of Ho and Macris (1984) the main difference 
being that in the latter volume has a lagged effect on the bid-ask prices. 
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components since quote adjustments for inventory reasons tend to be reversed over 
time while quote adjustments for adverse information are not. They also used the idea 
in the inventory models, like that of Ho and Stoll (1981), according to which changes 
in quotes affect trade flow because after a sale at the bid the dealer lowers his bid to 
invoke purchases and vice versa thus increasing the probability of an opposite 
transaction and creating negative serial correlation in quote changes and trades. This 
is distinct from that of price changes described by Roll (1984) and attributed to the 
bid-ask bounce. Using this principle, the fundamental value of the security should be 
updated only by the unexpected part (innovation) of the information furnished by the 
trade flow which is given by: 
E(ql-l I q, 
-2 
) 
ý--(l - 2; r)q, -2 
(3.29) 
Where 7r reflects the probability that a trade at time t is opposite in sign to the trade at 
time t- 1. 
The model estimated was: 
AP, =sq, +(A+IV-1) 
s 
q, -, -As 
(I - 2"T')qt-2 + et (3.30) 222 
Where A is the adverse selection and IV the inventory cost component of the 
spreaa96 and S the traded (realized) spread which is assumed to be constant (estimated 
from the data). The error term, et, which as in the previous models accounts for the 
public information innovation, is assumed to be an independently, identically 
distributed random variable. Their model ignored mid-quote trades. 
Huang and Stoll (1997) used an ISSM sample of 20 of the largest and most 
actively traded NYSE stocks utilizing their trades and quotes for all trading days in 
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1992, without as well as with clustering trades, that is grouping trades at one price 
into one order (when no adjustment in quotes occurs). Their analysis was confined to 
transactions which were BBO (Best Bid Offered), coded as regular trades. Without 
clustering the average adverse selection was found to be negative around 3.1 % of the 
spread whereas the inventory component 18.7%. With clustering the average adverse 
selection component was found to be 9.6% whereas the average inventory 28.65% of 
the traded spread. They also found that the adverse-selection cost is smaller for larger 
trade size categories. 
Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) also attempted a two-component 
decomposition of the spread in which the order flow was serially correlated and was 
expressed as a function of the probability of a continuation and the probability of 
midquote execution. They also assumed that the revision in beliefs is positively 
correlated with the innovation in the order flow as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
who however assumed that the latter is uncorrelated. In their model quotes were only 
used to derive the trade indicator variable and they did not explicitly model the 
inventory effect like Huang and Stoll (1997). The model estimated was: 
(9 + O)qt - 
(9 +p&-l + ý, - ý, -1 
(3.31) 
Where 4t : is independently, identically distributed with zero mean and models 
the effect of rounding errors due to price discreteness or time-varying 
retums 
p: is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of the trade indicator 
variable 
y: transitory effect per share which covers the dealer's compensation 
96 Bollen, Smith and Whaley (2002) have presented a model of the inventory-holding and the adverse- 
selection cost components of the spread as an option with a stochastic time to expiration and showed 
that it performs well for NASDAQ stocks. 
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for providing liquidity, the inventory holding cost and risk bearing 
0: the permanent impact of order flow innovation in the true price 
equivalent to adverse selection 
captures the effect of public infonnation on the true price of the stock, 
that is it represents the innovation in beliefs regarding the true price 
of the stock between trades at times t and t-1 and is an independently, 
identically distributed random variable with zero mean. 
The assumption of uncorrelated errors is reasonable since the rounding error for 
NYSE stocks is on average one sixteenth of a dollar which is half the minimum 
variation and thus unlikely to have a significant impact on the results. 
The above equation is based on the assumption that the bid and ask prices set by 
the dealer are ex-post rational conditional upon the next trade type under the rational 
expectations hypothesis. The resulting prices are regret-free. 
The model was estimated using the first 750 stocks in the ISSM database for 1990 
for NYSE-listed common stocks of which only 274 were eventually considered. The 
variation of the components of the spread was studied over five intraday intervals. 
The adverse selection cost was found to vary from 4.2 to 2.7 cents and to follow a U- 
shaped pattern over the day whereas the transitory cost was found to range from 3.4 
to 4.6 cents and to increase progressively during the day. 
The model was also used to explain known patterns of the behaviour of transaction 
variables like bid-ask spreads, execution costs, price and quote volatility etc. 
To avoid estimating more complicated models previous researchers like Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985), Roll(1984), Stoll (1989), Choi, Salandro and Shastri (1988) and 
George, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991) have assumed that the size of each order is 
fixed and usually assign it a unit measure. Other authors, however, like Kyle (1985), 
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Easley and O'Hara (1987) and Glosten (1989) have developed models in which the 
adverse selection component increases with the order size. In the Easley and O'Hara 
(1987) model trade size causes adverse selection because given that they wish to 
trade, informed traders prefer to trade in large amounts at a given price. Therefore 
large trades convey more information and move quoted prices more than small trades. 
Moreover, Glosten and Harris (1988) have used trade size in their empirical analysis 
like Madhavan and Smidt (1991). The last two papers have modeled the revision in 
beliefs as a function of the net order imbalance for a particular period. In a similar 
fashion and according to the inventory models of the spread, the order processing 
costs should decrease with trade size. 97 
Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) have examined empirically the relationship between 
the two components of the spread (adverse selection and order processing) and found 
that the adverse selection component increases significantly and monotonically with 
trade size, increasing the average effective spread whereas the order processing 
component decreases monotonically for all but the largest percentile of the relative 
trade size distribution reflecting the extra cost associated with negotiating large trades. 
Using a one-period horizon model and thus not being able to capture longer-tenn 
inventory rebalancing effects, they derived three equations, one for each change in 
quote midpoint, transaction price and effective half spread respectively. Trading 
volume was not entered directly into their equations but their dataset was split into 
seven size categories. They used ISSM transaction data for 150 NYSE stocks in 1988 
and estimated each equation separately using OLS. 
They estimated the following two equations: 
97 Copeland and Stoll (1990) have argued that order-processing costs are fixed for a particular 
transaction so that average order-processing costs per share should decrease as the number of stocks 
traded in a transaction increases. 
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AM, +, = Az, + e,,, 
(3.32) 
A. Pt+l -, z -, Yz, + u, +, 
(3.33) 
where 
z, is the effective spread 
7, is the order-processing cost component of the effective spread, and 
A, is the adverse-selection cost component of the effective spread 
Their results showed that the adverse-selection component of the effective spread 
increases monotonically with trade size from 19.8 to 62.6% of the effective spread. 
The order-processing cost was found to lie in the range between 46 to 22.4% of the 
effective spread and to decrease in trade size for all but the largest (99th percentile) 
trades. 
91 
Chapter 4 
Research Design and 
Preliminary Data 
Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
The way in which the empirical research of this thesis has been designed is 
presented in this chapter followed by an analysis of the database used and the way 
data has been extracted. Finally summary statistics of the data employed are presented 
and discussed. 
4.2 Research Design 
This section presents the aims of the empirical work carried out for this thesis and 
briefly outlines the methodology followed as well as the models developed. 
The main aim of this thesis has been the investigation of the influence of both the 
trading volume and the volume of the quotes upon the formation of the bid-ask spread 
in a market. The second, minor, aim has been to research the influence of the waiting 
time between trades on the same variable, the bid-ask spread. 
The analysis of the influence of volume on the spread is carried out through the 
analysis of the measurable variables of the trading process. These are the volume 
(number of shares) of the particular trade, the price at which the exchange of shares is 
effected, the bid and ask prices quoted, the volume at the bid and ask prices quoted 
prior to a particular trade, the number of trades, the number of quotes and quote 
revisions, the size of the spread and the time elapsing between two successive trades. 
Following the existing literature, the influence of all these variables on the spread 
and subsequently the price of a given share is a function of their influence on the 
components of which the spread is composed, namely the adverse selection, the 
inventory holding and the order processing cost components. To this end we develop 
models of the change in the bid-ask spread through the change in the bid and the ask 
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prices and then a model of the change in price. The first model, which has been 
named the "Quoted Spread Model", describes the change in the spread in terms of the 
three components of the spread as well as the waiting time between trades. The 
second model, called the "Price-Change Model" contains the same variables but 
describes the change in price in terms of the three components of the spread, however, 
the sizes of the parameters in these two equations could be different before and after a 
trade takes place. 
Therefore, the use of these two models aids in the analysis of the components of 
the spread before and after a trade has taken place. 
Since in order to derive the Quoted Spread Model we use equations describing the 
change in the bid and the ask, some information is lost through the differencing 
process. To gain more insight into the mechanism of the formation of the ask and bid 
prices we estimate those components separately. 
Thus the aim of our analysis is manifold. First we wish to estimate the components 
of the bid-ask spread when the volume of trade and the volume of the quotes are 
included into the analysis directly. Second we wish to investigate how these 
components differ before and after a trade occurs. Third, we examine the difference 
between the sizes of these components under two different trading mechanisms, 
namely the NYSE and the NASDAQ. Finally, we investigate the impact which the 
waiting time between trades has on the formation of the spread and eventually on the 
prices of common stocks. 
With the above aims in mind we use transactions data from the NYSE and 
NASDAQ for a particular period of time (one month) and following a procedure 
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which is described below we randomly select two hundred stocks from NYSE and six 
hundred stocks from NASDAQ 98. 
To account for the possibility that the parameters of the models vary with the 
trading activity in the stock, we split the stocks in each sub-sample into ten deciles, 
each of equal number of stocks, according to the level of trading activity in each 
stock, as measured by the number of shares traded in the month considered. Thus we 
end up with ten sub-samples from each exchange and carry out our analysis on these. 
Since our models are trade-indicator models, that is they depend on whether the 
particular trade considered has originated from a buy or a sell order we follow certain 
procedures for the classification of trades into these two categories. We discuss and 
contrast all these procedures below outlining their merits and drawbacks. 
The estimation of the models is carried out through the Generalized Method of 
Moments estimation procedure which does not require particular distributional 
assumptions for the variables involved and which does not force one into using Linear 
Regression or Maximum Likelihood estimation. All estimation is carried out using the 
SHAZAM econometrics package and the models are tested for specification errors 
using techniques based on the current literature on GMM-testing. 
4.3 Data Analysis 
The various databases available for the NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges are 
presented and discussed in this section. Particular emphasis is given to the Trade and 
Quote (TAQ) database of NYSE which is used for our empirical work. The procedure 
which has been followed in order that data for analysis is selected is critically 
9' A larger number of NASDAQ stocks, compared to NYSE, has been selected since the database used 
does not report all quotes for NASDAQ but only those at the bid-ask spread. 
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discussed together with current literature on the methods used to classify trades as 
buyer- or seller-initiated. 
4.3.1 Database Used 
A number of transaction-level databases have been used to carry out empirical 
analysis of intraday data for the NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges. Of these the most 
frequently utilized have been the TAQ, the TORQ and the ISSM databases. 
The Trades, Orders, Reports and Quotes (TORQ) database is available from the 
NYSE and covers a period, starting from November 1990. It consists of detailed 
information on transactions, quotes, the NYSE audit trail and contains information 
about the parties to each side of a transaction as well as a record of all orders au 
submitted to the floor of the NYSE through the SuperDOT system. 99 It comprises of 
four files: 1) the consolidated trade file, 2) the consolidated quote file, 3) the system 
order database (SOD) file and 4) the consolidated audit file. The first two are similar 
to the respective files in TAQ. The database also contains limit orders providing a 
thorough picture of the limit order book. 
Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) report that the SuperDOT (DOT stands for 
Designated Order Turnaround System) accounts for 53% of participants in all 
transactions and for only 30% of total buy and sell volume. Of these orders 50% are 
market, 45% limit, 2% stop and 2% market-at-close orders. The fact that larger orders 
and those requiring special handling are submitted directly to the NYSE specialist by 
the floor brokers constitutes a major drawback of the database since it is not 
representative of the whole population of orders. The TORQ has been used in many 
studies like Hasbrouck (1996), Sias and Starks (1997), Koski and Scruggs (1998), 
Angel (1998), Chung et al (1999) and Ready(1998) among others. 
99 Hasbrouck, Sofianos and Sosebee (1993) as well as Hasbrouck (1992) discuss the TORQ database. 
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Another widely used database has been the one from the Institute for the Study of 
Security Markets (ISSM) the main components of which are distributed by SIAC 
(Securities Industry Automation Corporation) in real time over a high speed line. It 
consists of time-stamped trades, trade size and bid-ask quotes from NYSE and AMEX 
and consolidated regional US exchanges which belong to the National Market 
System (NMS) and covers various periods starting from January 4h 1988. This 
database is very large and for this reason only a sample of it has been used in 
experimental analysis. It does not indicate whether orders are buyer or seller-initiated. 
Available to us for this thesis has been the Trade and Quote data (TAQ) from U. S. 
exchanges for the month of October 1994. This dataset, which is published by the 
NYSE, includes all trades and quotes of stocks traded in the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), The American Exchange (AMEX) and the National Association 
of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation system (NASDAQ). It consists of a 
number of files which provide detailed trade and quote data together with information 
about the stocks, whether they have paid dividend or split and a includes a number of 
condition and correction codes from which one can infer the eligibility of the trades 
and quotes for one's analysis. However, it does not identify trades as buyer- or seller- 
initiated and does not give infonnation concerning the identity of the parties involved 
in each transaction. An attempt is made to overcome the first problem by appropriate 
trade identification methods which are given in the relevant literature. Even though 
the use of data which identify traders could provide more information on the trading 
mechanism and would be necessary in more sophisticated models, such is beyond the 
aims of this thesis. 
97 
4.3.2 Data Selection Procedure 
The Trade and Quote data in TAQ constitute a huge database which makes the 
task of analyzing all available data onerous. To select smaller subsets of data one 
needs to be careful about the possibility of 'data-snooping' biases. Therefore a 
random selection procedure has to be followed. 
The most likely sources of trouble from the data, most of which follow from the 
discussion in chapter 3, are the following: 
m Large splits cause large changes in the price level which in turn affect the 
impact of price-discreetness on the results of the model. 
n Samples from different time periods entail the risk of selection bias due to 
temporal dependence. 
w Data from opening and closing periods have different statistical properties 
from intra-day data reflecting the different institutional features involved. For 
example, in NYSE the opening price is determined by following a call-auction 
mechanism whereas the rest of trading is a double continuous auction market. 
Moreover, overnight accumulation of information may lead market participants 
to wish to alter their inventory positions immediately at the opening of trading. 
Therefore opening prices for NYSE stocks should be discarded. A similar 
problem occurs with closing prices even though there is no change in the 
trading mechanism. Nevertheless the strategies of various types of traders may 
lead to different trading behaviour close to the end of the trading session. For 
example, to avoid the build up of undesired inventory dealers may be willing 
to accept less-than optimum prices at that period. Therefore it is preferable to 
discard closing prices as well. Brock and Kleidon (1992) have examined such 
trading behaviour in the NYSE. 
98 
n Stocks with a large number of trades are likely to yield more accurate 
parameter estimates than infrequently traded ones. 
Since our aim is to study the effect of volume on the behaviour of the bid-ask 
spread components under the two different trading mechanisms, the huge amount of 
available data is split according to: 
1) The exchange where stocks were traded. Two different sets of stocks are 
selected, one for each type of exchange mechanism (hybrid like the NYSE 
versus quote-driven like the NASDAQ). 
2) The total trading volume in the month considered. Deciles of trading volume are 
formed from the trade-files for each category of exchange. 
To verify that data used are as pure as possible from errors we follow a procedure by 
which available data is filtered so that only correct data are allowed to enter our 
estimation procedure. To this end a number of checks is carried out on the data. A 
brief description of the data selection procedure is given below whereas details on the 
programming procedures used are described in some detail in Appendix C for both 
NYSE and NASDAQ stocks. For convenience we will only refer to the NYSE stock- 
selection procedure which is similar to that for NASDAQ. 
All common stock symbols traded in NYSE100 (or traded in NASDAQ as a primary 
market) which have a positive number of outstanding shares are extracted from the 
Master Table file of TAQ. Off-NYSE trades of NYSE-listed stocks are included in the 
sample since they constitute a large portion of the trading activity. Bessembinder and 
Kaufman (1997) argue that this is more than 50% of small trades in large firms. The 
dividend file is examined so that only stocks which have not paid dividend in a month 
or have not split are selected. The reason for the exclusion of such stocks is that we 
100 A good description of the trading systems and procedures of the New York Stock Exchange has been provided by Hasbrouck, Sofianos and Sosebee (1993). 
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focus our study on periods where there is little possibility that an information event 
would occur which would influence normal trading behaviour and would require an 
event study methodology for analysis. Eventually 1,829 stocks are selected from 
NYSE (5,850 from NASDAQ). 
Selected stock symbols are then used to extract Trade data from the pertinent 
consolidated file of the TAQ database. The total volume in the month considered, as 
measured by the total number of shares traded, as well as the total turnover in the 
month, expressed in USD is calculated for each selected stock. The stocks are then 
sorted in ascending order according to the total number of shares traded in the month. 
NYSE stocks with no trades in the month considered are excluded whereas NASDAQ 
stocks with less than 10,000 shares traded in the month considered are left out. The 
higher minimum number of trades for NASDAQ against NYSE stocks aims to make 
the data for the empirical analysis more comparable. The above procedure reduces the 
number of NYSE stocks to 1,815 and those of NASDAQ to 5,032. Remaining stocks 
of each exchange and then split into equally-numbered deciles. Twenty stocks are 
then selected randomly from each NYSE and sixty stocks from each NASDAQ decile 
leaving a total of two hundred stocks for NYSE and six hundred for NASDAQ for 
subsequent analysis. The larger number of NASDAQ stocks is necessary in order to 
obtain a satisfactory number of observations because, as already mentioned, fewer 
quotes are reported for NASDAQ trades in the TAQ database. Moreover this 
procedure results in obtaining equivalent deciles where the total number of trades of 
one decile in a month is close to that of the equivalent decile of the other exchange so 
that comparison is made easier. The symbols of these randomly selected stocks are 
used to extract both Trade and Quote data from the respective consolidated files of the 
database. To avoid errors resulting from reporting delays trades and quotes for each 
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symbol in a particular day are sorted first alphabetically and then by time. Filtering 
also takes place at this stage so that more errors are removed as described below. 
Even though a complete description of condition and correction codes, according to 
which filtering has taken place, is provided in the TAQ manual of the New York 
Stock Exchange, details have also been provided in Appendix E so as to facilitate the 
presentation of the data-selection methodology. 
For trades, the consolidated trade file is checked so as to make sure that the 
condition code indicates that no out-of-sequence trades are included when other trades 
have taken place in the mean time (condition code 'Z'). Moreover, trades with 
correction codes indicating that a trade has been cancelled, or there is an error, are 
excluded (only good trades that is those with correction codes 0,1 and 2 are 
accepted). Finally trades whose price is zero or negative or their size is zero or 
negative are left out. 
Regarding quotes, we leave out those for which the bid or the ask price are zero or 
negative as well as those with zero or negative sizes at the bid or the ask. We also 
make sure that asks are larger than bids. The condition codes in the consolidated quote 
file are also examined so as to exclude trades with codes indicating that there has been 
a regulatory or non-regulatory trading halt due to a number of reasons such as news 
dissemination, high activity, pending news for the particular stock or for others 
affecting it and due to severe order influx (that is quotes with condition codes 0,4,7, 
9,11,13,14 and 15). The filtering procedure for NYSE data results in curtailing the 
original database of 345,114 trades and 809,996 quotes down to 325,501 trades and 
766,908 quotes. For NASDAQ data, trades are reduced to 389,155 from 434,998 and 
quotes to 55,526 from 72,643. 
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Subsequently a matching procedure is followed for the stocks in the sample according 
to which trades are matched with quotes which precede them by at least five seconds. 
This method, which is explained in more detail below, derives from Lee and Ready 
(1991) who used a fivelo' second cut-off condition to allow for non-synchronous 
reporting. The first and last trade in a particular stock in a day is discarded since, as 
explained above, opening-period data are expected to have different statistical 
properties compared to those during the day. Then each trade is examined trying to 
identify a qualifying quote which precedes it by at least five seconds. Only the quote 
immediately preceding the particular trade is considered whereas quote revisions 
preceding a particular trade are ignored. 102 Unmatched trades are also discarded. 
During this process all the necessary variables for the models developed are 
calculated from the data. 
To enable us to estimate the adverse-selection component of the spread properly and 
to avoid obtaining negative values we aggregate half of the trades which occur in- 
sequence at the same price while quotes remain unchanged. This problem, also 
discussed in Huang and Stoll (1997), is encountered if trades are not aggregated 
(clustered) since an order may be broken down into a number of consecutive, 
individual trades thus inducing positive autocorrelation in trade flow. The effect of 
this is to yield a negative adverse selection effect which is theoretically unacceptable. 
We do not cluster all such trades, but only half, since a number of these may be 
executed on behalf of other traders who may have private information which would 
cause adverse-selection by the dealer. Therefore our decision is a compromise 
101 This interval depends on the particular data set even though most researchers are content with the 
five second period. Bessembinder (2002) argued that trade direction is best assessed when no 
adjustment is made for trade report lags. 102 Such quote revisions are not used in the development of our model but they could have been 
included had further analysis been pursued. 
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between obtaining a theoretically acceptable adverse selection cost and the danger of 
clustering trades from different traders. 
The trade classification method used in our empirical work is based on that proposed 
by Lee and Ready (1991) and described in the next section. This method has been 
found to be either superior or close to the performance of the best alternative methods 
for both NYSE and NASDAQ stocks as suggested by empirical research which is 
presented in the next section as well. As in Lee and Ready (1991) our program for 
matching trades with quotes also employs a five second cut-off condition to allow for 
non-synchronous reporting of trades. According to this method the quote rule is used 
first, that is the price is compared to the mid-point of the prevailing quotes and a trade 
is classified as buy if the price is above it and as a sell if it lies below the midpoint. 
Mid-point trades are then classified using the tick test (or tick rule) which compares 
the transaction price to the previous price as explained below. Unmatched trades are 
also classified using the tick rule. If the tick rule cannot lead to definite conclusions 
the trade is classified as indeterminate and discarded from the sample. 
Finally the data are split into activity volume sub-samples (deciles) to be used in the 
estimation of the models. At the end of the procedure the number of matched trade- 
quotes pairs for NYSE stocks was 92,330 and that for NASDAQ 4,262. 
It is worth noting at this point that the various data filters which have been employed 
during the data selection procedure have led to the removal of a very large number of 
trades or quotes which have been wrongly reported and included in the database used. 
Even though those data could not have been used because the information contained 
in them is wrong they result in the rejection of a large number of trades from the 
sequence affecting the robustness of the results. This comment also refers to trades 
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around trading halts or severe information inflows. The large number of trades which 
were ignored because they could not be matched also has the same effect. 
4.3.3 Trade Classification Methods 
Transactions databases, like the NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) database, which 
are widely available, do not provide information on trade direction necessitating the 
use of trade classification algorithms in order to classify trades as buyer- or seller- 
initiated. There are three rules reported in the literature for identifying trade direction: 
the quote rule, the tick test (or tick rule) and that proposed by Lee and Ready (1991) 
which we will denote by LR in the rest of the text. 
The quote rule compares the trade price to the bid-ask prices at the prevailing 
quote and classifies as buyer-initiated those trades which occur above the mid-point 
of the quotes at the bid and ask, as seller-initiated those trades which occur below the 
mid-point and does not classify trades which occur at the mid-point. 
The tick classification rule (or tick-test as it is usually called) examines the price 
movement relative to the previous trade and classifies a trade as buyer-initiated if the 
transaction price is above the previous price or if the previous tick-change was up. It 
classifies a trade as seller-initiated if the transaction price is below the previous price 
or if the previous tick-change was down. A variant of the tick test is the reverse tick 
test which is similar to the former, the main difference being that the next transaction 
price is used to classify the current trade. If the next trade occurs at a price higher than 
the current one (uptick) or at the same price which has followed a price increase (zero 
uptick) the current trade is classified as a sell whereas if it occurs at a price lower than 
the current one (downtick) or at the same price which has followed a price decrease 
(downtick) the current trade is classified as a buy. 
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The LR rule combines the above two rules by classifying each trade according to 
the quote rule first, then if a trade occurs at the mid-point the tick test is used. Lee 
and Ready (1991) noted that the tick test and the reverse tick test give the same 
classification when the current trade is bracketed by a price-reversal (i. e. when the 
price change before the trade is the opposite of the price-change after the trade) but do 
not give the same results when the trade is bracketed by a price continuation. In the 
latter case the tick test performs better than the reverse tick test if quotes are changed 
in the direction of the order-imbalance and the reverse tick test performs better if the 
quote change is in a direction opposite to that of the preceding trade. They also showed 
that the tick test outperforms the quote-based method. 
To avoid the problem arising when quotes are reported ahead of the trades which 
triggered them they employed a method according to which they compared the trade 
to the quotes prevailing a few seconds before the trade. 103 They also considered a 
number of factors which lead to certain trades being ignored: 
" Trades not preceded by a quote were ignored (opening trades) 
" The simultaneous arrival of market buy and sell orders was not considered since 
it is an extremely rare occasion in the NYSE according to Hasbrouck (1988). 
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" Trades transacted under unusual settlement conditions, as well as those reported 
out of sequence, were excluded (these are identified with special condition 
codes) as explained above. Details for the codes are provided in appendix E. 
A number of studies have examined the accuracy of trade classification algorithms 
indirectly or directly. 105 Studies by Peterson and Fialkowski (1994), Harris and 
103 The time interval depends on the particular exchange and is period-specific. It can be derived using 
the analysis in Lee and Ready (199 1). 1 04 Hasbrouck (1988) argues that roughly 85 % of the transactions can be classified on the basis of their 
proximity to the current quotes. The rest of them, which consist of transactions occurring at the 
midpoint of the current quotes were classified according to three methods presented in his paper. 
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Hasbrouck (1996), Knez and Ready (1996) and Lightfoot et. al. (1999) have found 
that occasionally, buy orders are executed below the quote mid-point and sell orders 
above it. Lightfoot et. al. (1999) in particular have shown that the LR rule can lead to 
biased estimates of effective spreads and price improvement. Aitken and Frino (1996) 
have tested the tick rule on Australian data and found a 75% success rate. 
Lee and Radhakrishna (1999) have used a TORQ sample of NYSE stocks smaller 
than that of Finucane (2000), to check the accuracy of LR and found that 93% of all 
trades are classified correctly using the LR rule. They also examined one factor that 
affects the accuracy of the trade classification algorithms, in particular the trade 
location relative to the quoted spread. 
Odders-White (2000) used NYSE data from the TORQ database to test the 
accuracy of the three methods and found that LR performs better than the tick test 
(successful in 85% of the trades) and also examined the impact of trade location 
relative to the posted quotes, the trade size and the transactions in large and 
frequently traded stocks on the accuracy of the LR. She also showed that eliminating 
midpoint trades when using the LR may increase the accuracy and that the LR 
overestimates the order-processing costs and over-(under-) estimates the number of 
buys (sells) for small trades. 
Finucane (2000) compared the LR rule, the tick test and the reverse tick test using 
NYSE data which identified trade direction and showed that for NYSE trades the LR 
and the tick test showed approximately the same performance whereas the reverse tick 
test performed consistently worse than the other methods. The finding that the 
performance of LR, relative to the tick test, is similar and not superior to the tick-test, 
as found by the studies of Ellis, Michaely and O'Hara (2000) for NASDAQ and 
105 Finucane (2000) talks about studies in which these algorithms are used in particular applications. 
Odders-White (2000) for the TORQ database, can be explained by the presence of 
orders which are more likely to receive price improvement. 106 Such orders are crossed 
market orders, market orders stopped by the specialist and trades involving multiple 
parties on the same side of the trade. He also showed that trading volume, trade size, 
spread size and frequency of trades and quotes all affect the accuracy of the 
algorithms. In particular, trades resulting from market orders which allow price- 
improvement, larger times between trades and shorter times between quotes are 
associated with higher classification errors. 
Finucane (2000) found no significant improvement in his results when adjusting 
for delays in reporting quotes and also showed that the tick test gives estimates closer 
to the true effective spread and both methods provide estimates of signed volume 
biased towards zero 107 but the biases for the tick test are smaller than those using the 
LR. Moreover, attempting to improve the accuracy by systematically eliminating 
certain types of trades can introduce additional biases. 
Ellis, Michaely and O'Hara (2000) examined the validity and accuracy of trade 
classification methods using NASDAQ data. In particular they compared the quote 
rule, the tick rule and the Lee and Ready (1991) rule (LR) using a unique data set 
from NASDAQ from which they were able to identify trade direction and found that 
the success rates for the quote rule, the tick test and the LR rule were 76.4%, 77-66 
and 81.05% respectively. 108 They also found that standard classification rules for 
sorting trades as buys or sells are as accurate for NASDAQ as for NYSE trades. 
106 Lee and Ready (1991) predicted that the tick rule would classify correctly at least 85% of midpoint 
and 90% of bid/ask trades but their predictions were based on a model which assumed constant quoted 
prices and independent Poisson processes for the arrival of market buy and sell orders. When these 
assumptions are not valid the precision of the tick test cannot be accurately predicted by their method. 107 The effective spread can be calculated as being equal to twice the difference between the transaction 
price and the midpoint price times a trade indicator variable which takes the value of one (minus one) 
when the trade is a buy (sell). An alternative definition is that the effective spread is twice the absolute 
difference between the transaction price and the midpoint. The midpoint is the average of the bid and 
ask prices. 
Classification success rate for trades inside the quotes was significantly lower, 
dropping to only 60% for mid-point trades and 55% for other trades inside the quotes. 
They also found that small trades are easier to classify which is opposite to the results 
of Odders-White (2000). They concluded that trades outside the quotes are difficult to 
classify, that better classification is achieved during periods of slow trading due to the 
higher incidence of trades at the quotes and that the substantial delay in the reporting 
of NASDAQ trades on the TAQ database does not affect the ability of the algorithms 
to classify trades. 
The authors proposed an alternative trade classification rule that relies more on 
ticks than quotes. According to this rule trades at the ask (bid) are classified as buys 
(sells) and all other trades are classified according to the tick rule. This rule was 
shown to increase the classification accuracy for trades inside the quotes from 55 to 
61% and a slight improvement for out-of-quote trades (81.9% against LR's 81%). 
However the algorithm performs significantly better when calculating effective 
spreads. Another important result was that the use of LR in NASDAQ overstates the 
size of the effective spread (a result which was also found by Finucane (2000) for 
NYSE stocks) whereas their algorithm improves this estimate by 10%. This method 
has been shown by Bessembinder (2002) to lead to smaller, albeit more accurate, 
estimates of trading costs, as compared to the Lee and Ready (1991) method. 
Their investigation has also showed that trade classification rules have similar 
success in nonnal trading and Initial Public Offering (IPO) periods, that excluding 
Electronic Communications Networks (ECN) trades does not change classification 
accuracy and that reporting delays into the algorithms does not improve accuracy for 
NASDAQ data which implies that one can use TAQ data with no delay for 
Odders-White (2000) respective figures for NYSE were 75,79 and 85%. 
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classification of NASDAQ trades from TAQ data. 109 
4.4 Summary Statistics 
Tables AD. 4.1 and AD. 4.2 in Appendix D present summary statistics, split in 
deciles of trading activity, for the trades of the NYSE and NASDAQ sub-samples of 
the stocks selected randomly from the TAQ database for the month of October 1994. 
Tables AD. 4.3 and AD. 4.4, also in Appendix D, present summary statistics for the 
quotes of the same sub-samples. To facilitate the discussion of these statistics, these 
data have also been plotted in Appendix D. 
The average daily volumes as measured in number of shares traded in a day for all 
stocks in a decile, which have been plotted in Figure AD. 1, are only slightly higher 
for most NADAQ compared to NYSE deciles of the same category ranging from 70 
thousand to sixteen million for NYSE and from 84 thousand to 20.7 million for 
NASDAQ. These volumes are a result of our data selection procedure during which 
an effort has been made so as to obtain same category deciles in both exchanges with 
stocks which have an approximately equal number of trades. This would make 
comparison easier and would allow more correct inferences to be made. The pattern in 
both sub-samples increases smoothly in the first nine deciles, then sharply till the 
tenth decile. 
The average daily turnover of all stocks in a decile, measured in thousands of USD 
and plotted in Figure AD. 2, follows the same pattern but figures are higher for NYSE 
stocks in all deciles, even though NASDAQ deciles contain 60 as opposed to 20 
stocks for the NYSE deciles. This difference may be an indication that on average 
NYSE stocks are much higher-priced compared to those of NASDAQ. Differences 
109 For the London Stock Exchange Berhhardt, Dvoracek, Hughson and Werner (1999) have reported 
that large trades receive better execution than small trades. 
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become progressively larger as one moves from the low towards the high activity 
deciles except for the last one. The value of this variable ranges from I to 653 million 
USD for NYSE and from 0.8 to 614 million USD for NASDAQ stocks but the overall 
average for NYSE is approximately 37% higher compared to the NASDAQ figure. 
The average change in price, as can be seen in Figure AD. 3, is very close to zero 
for all deciles of both sub-samples and is negative for all but the first three of NYSE 
and four of the NASDAQ deciles. Overall maximum values are higher (minimum 
values are lower) for NASDAQ stocks and the absolute average value for this 
exchange is 4-5 times higher. A possible explanation for this observation may lie in 
the fact that the NYSE trading mechanism involves a larger number of participants 
which allows the price change process to proceed in smaller steps considering the 
ability to trade within the quotes. 
The average time between trades, which is measured in seconds and has been 
plotted in Figure ADA, follows a steeply decreasing pattern as one moves from low 
to higher activity deciles in both sub-samples and values are very close for the first 
and last NYSE and NASDAQ activity deciles. However, the pattern for NYSE is 
convex and that of NASDAQ concave leading to larger differences in the medium 
activity deciles. This difference in the two patterns could be attributed to the quicker 
matching of orders in NYSE due to inter-quote transactions and also to the fact that 
NASDASQ dealers place quotes, firm for a period of time during which they wait for 
traders to place orders and this may cause extra delay. For NYSE this time ranges 
from approximately 2,500 seconds (41.6 minutes) from the lowest to 59 seconds in 
the highest activity decile and for NASDAQ from 2,368 seconds (39.5 minutes) to 
107 seconds respectively. On average it is approximately 891 seconds (14.9 minutes) 
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for NYSE and 1,469 seconds (24.5 minutes) for NASDAQ. Maximum times can be 
very long and reflect the cases when a stock has not transacted for a few hours. 
The average number of trades in a stock in a day, plotted in Figure AD. 5, 
increases, as expected, smoothly till the ninth decile for both sub-samples and then 
steeply. Figures for NYSE are higher in most deciles compared to those in NASDAQ 
of the same activity category and range from 83 to 7,240 and from 75 to 11,250 for 
NASDAQ. However, in the last NASDAQ decile this value is much higher than that 
for NYSE and the overall average for NASDAQ is above that for NYSE by almost 
20%. Maximum values as high as 9.4 thousand for NYSE and 16.8 thousand for 
NASDAQ are observed. The fact that the number of trades in a decile for NASDAQ 
can be higher than that for the equivalent NYSE decile reflects the fact already 
discussed, namely that NASDAQ deciles contain more stocks which in the highest 
activity deciles can have trading activity comparable to that of NYSE stocks. 
Caution should be exercised when examining the quote statistics and attempt to 
make comparisons between those of NYSE and NASDAQ. The TAQ database does 
not report the full sizes of quotes for NASDAQ-traded stocks but only the Best Bid 
Offered (BBO). For issues with more than one market-maker only the size of the first 
market-maker to quote at that price is shown. Moreover, NASDAQ market-makers 
are obliged to quote for only a fixed number of shares. Therefore the sizes of the 
quotes, unlike in NYSE data, are not representative of the market size and this 
constitutes a major drawback of the database. 
The average volume of the ask (offer), measured as the average number of shares 
offered in a day for all stocks in the decile, plotted in Figure AD. 6, follows an upward 
pattern for NYSE but with increasing variation in the high-activity deciles and 
increases steeply from the seventh towards the last decile. Its value ranges from 288 
thousand to 54 million in the highest decile. The same pattern, with a similar degree 
of variability, can be observed for the average daily volume of the bid, plotted in 
Figure AD. 7, its range for NYSE being between 280 thousand and 53 million shares. 
This pattern in the low activity deciles may be caused by the fact that traders, 
including the specialist, are reluctant to commit to larger trades in low activity stocks 
since they will be unable to reverse their positions should unfavourable information 
arrives. The average figures for the total NASDAQ sample are much lower than those 
of NYSE for both the average daily volume of the ask (9.7 million for NYSE; 229 
thousand for NASDAQ) and the bid (9.5 million for NYSE; 231 thousand for 
NASDAQ) owing to the fact that NASDAQ quotes in the TAQ database are only 
reported for the Best Bid Offered (BBO) whereas all quotes are reported for NYSE. 
The average daily number of quotes has been plotted in Figure AD. 15 and follows 
a rising pattern for NYSE (steeper from decile 6 towards the largest decile) ranging 
from 321 to 12,300 (average 3,445). These figures are significantly higher than those 
for NASDAQ which range from 89 to 864 (average 250). Overall, the average ask per 
quote and the average bid per quote are much higher for NYSE as compared to 
NASDAQ deciles, the difference increasing with increasing activity. 
The average change in the ask (Figure AD. 8) and bid (Figure AD. 9) prices, which 
follow similar pattems, is close to zero for all NYSE deciles but varies a lot for 
NASDAQ deciles where it starts negative in the first decile, increases till the fifth, 
decreases abruptly in the sixth and then increases for the rest of the deciles. This 
erratic behaviour in the lower activity deciles probably indicates the greater 
uncertainty of the dealers who may attempt to adjust faster to new information or their 
tendency to overreact. 
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The average time between quotes, plotted in Figure AD. 10, drops steeply as one 
moves from the low to the high activity NYSE deciles. As with the time between 
trades the pattern is concave for NASDAQ where inter-quote time is almost constant 
in the first six deciles and then decreases. However, this pattern arises from the fact 
that not all quotes are reported for NASDAQ stocks. For NYSE it is convex. NYSE 
times are much smaller than NASDAQ and range from 1,244 to 41 seconds for NYSE 
with an average of 373 and from 3,118 to 1,168 seconds for NASDAQ with an 
average of 2,754. As already mentioned, the larger number of participants and the 
ability to trade within the quotes may explain the pattern for NYSE. 
The average change in the spread, as shown in Figure AD. 11, is very close to zero 
for both sub-samples and the average change in the proportional spread, as shown in 
Figure AD. 12, which is the spread expressed as a percentage of the midpoint price 
(bid plus ask divided by two), is also close to zero for both NYSE and NASDAQ. 
The average spread, which has been plotted in Figure AD. 13, decreases smoothly 
for NYSE and more steeply for NASDAQ as one progresses from the low towards the 
high activity deciles, probably owing to the higher uncertainty of NASDAQ dealers 
when trading in less liquid stocks and ranges from 0.46 to 0.31 USD for NYSE 
(average 0.4 USD) and from 0.68 to 0.30 USD for NASDAQ stocks (average 0.42 
USD), both averages being close to 3/8ths. NASDAQ values are higher in all deciles 
the difference being higher in the low activity deciles which is in accordance with the 
remarks made earlier concerning the uncertainty of dealers. 
The proportional spread, plotted in Figure AD. 14, follows a similar, decreasing 
pattern with NASDAQ values being higher and ranging from 12.6 to 1.8 percent. 
NYSE values range from 4.45 to 0.84 % and their average value (2.21%) is much 
lower than that for NASDAQ (7.14%). 
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Chapter 5 
The Quoted-Spread Model 
5.1 Introduction 
Based on the work of previous researchers, presented in chapter 3, we develop 
here a model of the quoted bid-ask spread from first principles but with two crucial 
modifications. The first is that we incorporate the volume factor explicitly into our 
equations both in the form of the volume of a particular trade as well as in the form of 
the volume of shares offered or bid prior to a particular trade. The second major 
difference between this model and the rest in the literature is the incorporation of the 
time factor between two successive trades, that is the waiting time between the two 
trades, through a more analytic equation for the Order Processing cost which 
incorporates both the time between trades and the volume at the bid or the ask 
(depending on the side of the spread considered) apart from the constant term which 
represents the fixed cost of a trade. 
To arrive at the quoted spread equation we first develop the equations for the 
change in the bid and the ask separately and finally combine these two in the former. 
However, since certain terms, and thus some of the information in the data is lost 
during this procedure we estimate the bid- and ask-change equations separately so as 
to investigate the possibility of a difference in the behaviour of the parameters from 
one equation to the other. 
Our discussion in this chapter follows the steps outlined below: 
* First we develop the models for the Quoted Spread as well as the Ask- and 
Bid-Change Models from principles already presented in chapter 3. 
9 Next we provide summary statistics for the variables used in the estimation 
of the models. 
* Results of the estimations are presented and discussed. 
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The specification tests of the models and their results are provided and 
commented and 
Finally conclusions, based on the estimation and specification results for 
the above models, are discussed. 
5.2 Development of the Models 
The timing convention followed in the models is as follows: We denote by Pt the 
price at which the transaction at time t takes place. Prior to the transaction at time t it 
is assumed that, as in Glosten (1987), there exists a 'true', or common-information 
price of the asset at t-1, mt-I which has been based on the trade preceding that time. 
Let us denote by ic and 7, two very short intervals of time preceding transaction time t 
where ic >%. We assume that, based on mt-I and the trade at t-I as well as on new 
public information which has arrived in the market from time t- 1 till Wc, market 
Trade Takes Place 
t-I X \. 
Participants have 
common-information 
price m,., prior to this 
trade. 
Participants arrive at new 
common - information 
price n-4 
Wc 
New Public 
Information 
Arrives 
t3 
Trade Takes Place 
t 
Dealers and / or 
Limit Order 
Traders Place 
their quotes 
Figure 5.1 : Time Scale of Assumed Events for the Bid-Ask Spread 
Models 
participants arrive at a new 'true' price mt according to 
mt = mt-, +A -Iq, -, +ct 
(5.1) 
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where m, is the true price of the stock at time t, At-I is the adverse-selection 
component at time t-1, qt-I is the trade indicator variable (=+l for trades which are 
buyer-initiated and -1 for seller-initiated) for the trade which occurred with price Pt-I 
at time t-I and et is a term which accounts for the public information signal which 
affects the fundamental value of the stock and is assumed to be an independent, 
identically distributed random variable. Based on this new price, dealers (and limit 
order traders) place their quotes (and limit prices) at time t-% just before a trade occurs 
which leads to the new transaction price at t, Pt . 
Equation (5.1) is identical to that used in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Huang 
and Stoll (1997) among others. There is a slight difference in the timing conventions 
used in the models of Huang and Stoll (1997) and Madhavan, Richardson and 
Roomans (1997) which is worth pointing out. In the latter, the 'true' price is formed 
after the trade and is the expected value of the stock following the trade at t. In the 
former paper, as well as in our model, the 'true' price is fon-ned before the transaction 
at t. Even though both conventions are right when considered under the right 
perspective we believe that the pre-trade convention is more realistic since traders and 
/ or dealers should base their quotes on the most recent common-information price 
before a trade takes place. 
The tenn Atqt accounts for the effect of adverse selection, "O or infonnation 
asymmetry or the permanent impact from the information furnished by the order flow 
as explained above. The adverse selection component is assumed to be equal for both 
sides of the spread (bid and ask) since it is assumed to depend only on the size and 
direction of the previous trade in anticipation of the unexpected infonnation 
component of that trade. Models analyzing the spread and the intraday price formation 
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describe the term At in equation (5.1) as the innovation in trade now either as a 
deviation between the observed and the expected change in trade flow like 
Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997), or as a fraction of the half spread like 
Huang and Stoll (1997). We follow the former which is based on Glosten (1987) in 
that At represents the total size of the adverse selection component which is 
equivalent to the pen-nanent effect of the previous trade on the price. However we 
extend the model to incorporate the effect of volume in the above equation, as in 
Glosten and Harris (1988) and Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) since the size of a 
particular order executed probably signals to the dealer the degree of the information 
carried by the trade flow. Assuming that the adverse-selection cost is symmetric 
around the mid-point of the spread, so that this cost for the ask, Ata, is equal to the 
same cost for the bid, At b, expressing this component as the product of an adverse 
selection parameter, 0, and the volume of the previous trade, leads to: 
b= OVt_l A't= At 
where 0 indicates the change in the commonly accepted price per unit volume of 
shares traded and Vt., is the volume of the trade at t- I expressed as number of shares 
traded. Trading volume is assumed to be distributed"' according to 
v 
-, 
CY2 tv 
and uncorrelated with the trade indicator variable, i. e. 
cov(q t+k ý vt+l 
) 
ý- 
for all k and I where k, I = 0,1,2, ... 
"' Information asymmetry is assumed to depend upon the volume of the previous trade, the volume 
difference between the bid and ask quotes and the difference between supply and demand as expressed 
by the difference between buy and sell volumes over a given period. 111 We avoid the assumption that volume is normally distributed since research cited in section 2.8 has 
indicated that it is not (for example Blume, Easley and O'Hara (1994)). 
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To distinguish between the inventory and the adverse selection effects one needs 
to include relations which describe the probability of a particular type of trade 
(purchase or sale) occurring and this is usually accomplished by modeling the serial 
correlation in trade flows because the dealer is tempted to revise his quote to the 
opposite direction of the last trade in order to balance his inventory. This has the 
effect of introducing negative serial correlation in trades. This effect is different from 
the negative serial correlation in transaction price changes owing to the bid-ask 
bounce as described in Roll (1984). Moreover we subtract the anticipated effect of the 
trade to include in the adverse selection component only the innovation in the trade 
flow which is that part of the new information likely to influence the price. As already 
discussed above we use the relationship for the conditional expectation of the trade 
indicator variable qt developed by Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) 
E(q, Iq t-I 
)= pq t-I 
where p is the first order autocorrelation coefficient of the trade-indicator variable, qt. 
Therefore, the unanticipated effect of the trade on the 'true' price of the stock which is 
not known until after the trade at time t has taken place and which is to be substituted 
in equation (5.1) is given by 
Oq, 
-, 
V, 
-, -E(Oqt-, 
V, 
-, 
I qt-2)=O(qt-, Vt-l -pVqt-2 
and equation (5.1) becomes 
mt = mt-, + O(qt-, Vt-l -pVqt-2 + at (5.3) 
where &t is an i. i. d random variable. 
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Therefore, whereas actual trades affect quote adjustment which is motivated by 
inventory-holding concerns, it is innovations in trades which affect adverse selection 
and this principle is used to separate the two effects. 
Based on the expected 'true' price following the trade at time t-I and prior to the trade 
at time t the dealer sets his bid, bt and ask, at quotes by adding (subtracting) the 
inventory holding cost at time t, IVt, and the order-processing cost at time t, Ot, to 
(from) the expected true price of the stock which will be arrived at by traders after the 
trade at time t has taken place and this expected true price is conditional upon the 
direction of trade (whether buyer- or seller-initiated) as shown below: 
oa at= E(mt,, I q, = +1)+ IV, + t +ilt 
(5.4) 
= _1)_lVt _ob +Vt (5.5) bt = E(m t+l I qt t 
where 
+0 V(l - pq, -, 
) (5.4a) 
E(m,,, 1q, =---I)=m, -OV(I+pq, -, 
) (5.5a) 
In the above two equations ý, and vt account for the effect of price discreteness and 
are assumed to be asymptotically uniformly distributed random variables with a zero 
mean, as in the Glosten and Harris (1988) model described in section 3.4 and 
uncorrelated with each other. Price discreteness arises from the fact that transactions 
occur at prices rounded to the nearest 1/16h whereas the true price is a real number. 
The terms Ot' and 0tb carry into the model the effect of risk bearing of the market 
maker as well as the cost of providing immediacy and order processing. Following 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997), 
equations (5.4) and (5-5) assume that the bid and ask prices quoted are ex-post 
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rational in the sense that they are set in such a way so that the dealer is compensated 
conditional on whether a trade occurs on the bid or ask, that is they are regret-free. 
For this reason, in the above two equations we use the expected value of mt+i which 
is the expected 'true' price of the stock given that a transaction occurs at the bid or ask 
at time t. In this way, the unanticipated part of the innovation in trade flow, equivalent 
to the adverse selection component, is incorporated into our model. 
The order-processing costs Ot" and 0tb are usually taken to be a constant proportion of 
the spread but in our model we assume they are different for the bid and the ask sides 
of the spread. It is further assumed that this component depends on a constant factor 
a, which accounts for a minimum fixed cost charged by the provider of immediacy, 
the time which has elapsed between the last two trades at times t-2 and t-1, denoted as 
T,., and the volumes (depth) of the existing quotes at the bid, Vtb and the ask, Vt", at 
time t (the standing quotes) according to the following equations: 
a+ PT t-I + YV, 
' (5.6) 
It =a+ P-C ,t 
(5.7) +YVI 
V' and Vb are the number of shares quoted at the ask and bid respectively and a and P 
are parameters. Glosten and Harris(1988) also model this cost as a linear function of 
the size of the trade and their specification search has shown them that y is equal to 
zero. 112 Since in markets like the NYSE certain participants like the specialist have 
access to the book of orders and are aware of the price schedule of buy and sell orders 
we assume that quotes are set based on the volumes at the bid or the ask. That is the 
dependence of the order-processing cost on the number of shares quoted is likely to be 
due to the response of the specialist to what appears to be an information event. This 
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can also be justified by the fact that if a long period elapses since the last trade and the 
depth of quotes builds up it is more likely that a trade will consume more shares than 
before. In his analysis of the stock-exchange specialist system Stoll (1985) also adopts 
a linear formulation for the order processing costs which includes a constant term, a 
term which varies with the number of transactions and one which varies with the size 
of transactions. 
The intuition behind the use of the time between trades, Tý comes from real trading 
situations where the absence of trading may itself add to the information set. Glosten 
and Harris (1988) have also used it to describe the process of public infonnation 
innovation by expressing the mean and variance of et as functions of it. We 
incorporate time between transactions into the equation since we wish to model this 
effect separately and not consider it merely as part of the public information 
innovation. Moreover, it is natural to assume that it is an additional factor affecting 
the placing of quotes, directly associated with the cost of waiting of the dealer. For 
this reason only the latest quotes, the ones closest in time to the transaction should be 
used in the analysis. It is worth noting that according to our interpretation the likely 
time-effect on the spread may serve both as a compensation of the dealer for the extra 
waiting time as well as an information event. 
As in Huang and Stoll (1997) the inventory effect at time t, IVt is modeled as : 
t-I 
IVt = 8y qiVi (5.8) 
where the summation sign shows the net inventory accumulation in a stock since the 
beginning of trading in a particular day. When substituted into equations (5.4) and 
(5.5) parameter 6 indicates the effect of this inventory accumulation on the quoted ask 
112 Only 20 firms were used in this study for specification search and only 800 successive price changes 
for each stock. The dataset used was much smaller than the one used in this thesis and only for NYSE 
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and bid prices respectively. Inventory models of the spread, like Stoll (1978) and Ho 
and Stoll (1981), assume that the inventory effect affects the midpoint of the bid ask 
spread in the sense that the dealer adds it on the true price of the stock to arrive at the 
midpoint, that is the dealer adjusts the midpoint between the bid and ask in such a 
way as to compensate for a deviation from his desired inventory level, based on the 
inventory imbalance from previous trades. Such theories however also assume that the 
spread set by dealers is constant in the sense that they change its position and not its 
size whenever they react to changes in their inventory with the aim of maintaining a 
balanced fixed inventory at least within a certain time horizon. Since we attempt to 
model the asymmetry around the. true price we add or subtract the inventory holding 
cost component directly on the expected true price of the stock after the trade in the 
ask and bid quote equations (5.4) and (5.5) respectively. The effect of the inventory 
component in these equations will therefore depend on the nature of the inventory 
imbalance up to and including time t-l. If the dealer has a positive inventory, a 
surplus which has probably resulted from a dominance of seller-initiated trades which 
have a negative trade-indicator variable, qt, he will wish to lower his ask and his bid 
so as to discourage sales to him due to his low bid and at the same time encourage 
purchases from him due to his low ask. If the dealer's inventory accumulation is 
negative due to a dominance of buyer-initiated trades the dealer will wish to increase 
both his ask and bid prices so as to encourage sales to him by traders due to his high 
bid and at the same time discourage purchases from him due to his high ask. It follows 
that in both of the above cases the inventory parameter, 8, in equation (5.4) should be 
negative whereas that in equation (5.5) should be positive. 
stocks. 
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Taking the first differences of equations (5.4) and (5.5), substituting for 0ta frorn 
equation (5.6) into equation (5.4) , substituting for 0tb from equations (5.7) 
into 
equation (5.5) and substituting for Amt from equation (5.3) we obtain: 
Aat = Oq, -, 
V, 
-, -OVpq, _j+8q, _, 
V, 
_, +PAT, -, +yAV, 
" +Ail, +&, (5.9) 
Ab, = Oqý-, Vý-, -OVpq, -1-8q, -IV, -, -ßärt_I -yAV tb+äVt+ 
ig 
t 
(5.10) 
where 
AVt' = Vta - V,, and AV, 
b=Vtb-VtbI 
and Aýt and Avt are assumed to be , uniformly distributed random variables with a 
zero mean. The inventory term in equations (5.9) and (5.10) is the difference between 
the cumulated inventories at times t- I and t-2. 
Since the quoted spread is expressed as the difference between the bid and ask quotes: 
SQ = at -b tt 
the expression for the change in the quoted spread becomes: 
ASQý = Aat - Abt = 25q, -, 
Vt-, + 2ßA-r, 
-I 
+y (Avta +AV tb 
)+ gt (5 . 
11 ) 
where 
A4t = Aq, - Avt 
is assumed to be a uniformly distributed random variable with a zero mean. 
There is a large number of stocks used in this study which, apart from the fact that 
they trade at different exchanges, which implies that the different mechanisms will 
probably have a different impact on the behavior of both quotes and prices, they also 
have prices and spreads which exhibit large variation. For this reason, in order to be 
able to compare the parameters of the components of the spread as well as the other 
parameters, it is more meaningful to study them relative to some other variable such 
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as the quoted spread. Therefore by dividing the left-hand side of equation (5.11) by 
the quoted spread at time t-1 we obtain the change in the quoted spread between times 
t and t-I relative to the quoted spread at time t-1 which implies that since the same 
variables are used for estimation in the right-hand side the parameters of the 
components of the spread, that is 6, P and y will now be given relative to the quoted 
spread at time t-1. Thus equation (5.11) becomes: 
Q (AVta 
+AV b)+ AU t 
(5.11 b) AS t= 28pqt-, Vt-l + 2PPA-ut-I + yp t 
where A s, ' denotes the change in the quoted spread at time t expressed as a 
fraction of the spread at time t- I and the subscript p under the parameters 6, P and 
denotes parameters expressed as a fraction of the spread at time t-I so that: 
8p =8 yp =y pp =p and op s t-I s t-I s t-I s 
It is worth pointing out that, owing to our data-selection procedure, the spread at time 
t- I cannot be zero. 
To make comparison between the models easy we also divide the left-hand sides 
of equations (5.9) and (5.10) by the quoted spread at time t- I so as to obtain: 
A a, = opqý-IV, -, -OP 
Vpq, 
_, +öpq, _IV, -, +ßpA, -, .. PAVa +A. t+ mý 
(5.9b) 
Opq, IVj - Op Vpq, -, - 
8pqt-, Vt-l - PPArt-I - YPAV tb+ 
A%t + 71 t 
(5.10 b) 
where A a, and A b, denote the change in he quoted ask and bid respectively at 
time t, expressed as a fractions of the spread at time t- I and the subscript p under the 
parameters 0,5, P and y denotes the same parameters also expressed as a fraction of 
the spread at time t-1. 
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Since there is no reason to support that the random variables Ailt, Avt and &t in 
equations (5.9), (5.10) as well as the random variable A4t in equation (5.11) are 
correlated with the spread at time t-1 we assume that random variables AXj and AXI in 
equations (5.9b), (5.1 Ob) are also uniformly distributed random variables with a zero 
mean and that co, and 7c, are i. i. d random variables. Moreover the random variable Aut 
in equation (5.1 lb) is also an i. i. d random variable. 
In selecting the spread at time t- I to express the parameters to be estimated, instead of 
that at time t, we aim to study the changes in the quoted spread, the ask and bid prices 
in terms of explanatory variables which lag in time behind the dependent variable in 
order to investigate whether these can in a way explain the formation of the dependent 
variables. In other words we try to answer the question as to how the variables at time 
t- I as well as the change in the standing quotes prior to the trade affect the setting by 
the dealer of the variables which affect the quoted spread. 
5.3 Data 
The variables used for the estimation of the models in this chapter have been 
obtained following the procedures described in chapter four. The technical details for 
extracting the data and estimating the variables are given in appendix C. In this 
section we present and discuss these variables and their correlations for the two 
exchanges considered. 
5.3.1 Description 
Tables AG. 5.1 and AG. 5.2 in Appendix G present summary statistics for the 
variables of the quoted spread and the bid and ask change models for the NYSE and 
the NASDAQ samples of stocks. It is important to note that the proportional change in 
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spread is expressed as a fraction of the spread at time W. The average change in 
spread is very small and fluctuates around zero for NYSE but for NASDAQ it has its 
highest value in the lowest activity decile, then decreases as one moves towards the 
high activity deciles. 
Whereas the change in spread from time to time is very small, the average change 
in the proportional spread is 23 percent for NYSE and 13 for NASDAQ. The pattern 
for NYSE is increasing as one moves towards the higher activity deciles, then slightly 
decreases at the last tNvo deciles. For NASDAQ it starts high in the first decile, then 
follows a U-shape till the ninth decile after which it drops. 
The average number of shares traded increases with the size of the decile but on 
average is of the order of 1.65 thousand shares for NYSE (1.5 for NASDAQ) even 
though the maximum number can reach a few million. The average spread is of the 
order of 0.4 USD for both NYSE and NASDAQ stocks and has a distinct trend 
decreasing progressively as one moves from the lowest to the highest activity 
deciles. 113 
The change in the number of shares offered fluctuates around zero but after the 
eighth decile becomes increasingly negative for NYSE. The magnitude of this 
variable for NYSE is however around ten times that of NASDAQ. For NYSE the 
same pattern is observed for the change in the number of shares bid and the magnitude 
of this variable is almost four times larger for NASDAQ compared to that for NYSE. 
The pattern for NASDAQ however is one of variation around the mean. 
As expected, the change in the waiting time between NYSE trades decreases with 
higher activity volume deciles. The pattern for NASDAQ is not representative of the 
true trading conditions since only a few quotes are available and therefore not all 
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trades (only those matched with quotes at the BBO) have been included in the 
analysis. On average however these changes are larger for NYSE. The average change 
in waiting time is about 215 seconds for NYSE and 35 for NASDAQ. 
The average change in the offer, expressed as a proportion of the spread at time 
t-I is positive and that in the bid is negative for both NYSE and NASDAQ - for which 
absolute values are about ten times higher implying more abrupt quote adjustment. 
For NYSE it decreases for the first three deciles then increases to zero till the seventh 
decile and remains around this value in the highest activity range. For NASDAQ, it 
also starts from a high value, fluctuates around zero till the sixth decile, then remains 
close to zero. For NYSE the pattern is repeated for the average change in the bid price 
where the average value is generally larger compared to that for the offer price. 
114 
This is also true for NASDAQ but the pattern is one of a low value at the first decile, 
increasing till the fourth and remaining around zero thereafter. 
5.3.2 Correlation of variables 
The correlations among the variables used to estimate the models developed in this 
chapter are discussed separately for NYSE and NASDAQ in the following 
subsections. 
5.3.2.1 NYSE 
There is negative serial correlation between the proportional change in the quoted 
spread and the change in the offer size or bid size which is of the order of 0.2 to 0.3, 
113 NYSE spreads exhibit slightly higher variation around the mean as compared to NASDAQ spreads 
probably owing to the intervention of the specialist who makes the process more dynamic. Extremely 
low values appear in NASDAQ stocks and extremely high in NYSE. 
114 Note that this discussion refers to absolute values. 
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except for the last three deciles where it is around 0.15. There is also positive 
correlation between it and the proportional change in the offer price (negative for that 
in the bid price) of the order of 0.6 which drops to 0.4 for the proportional change in 
offer price only in decile 9. 
The magnitude of the correlation between the proportional change in spread with 
the spread drops after decile 8. 
The volume of trading in the previous trade shows low correlation (less than 0.05) 
with all variables. 
There is also positive correlation between the change in the size of the offer and 
that of the bid of the order of 0.3 to 0.4 which increases to around 0.45 after the fifth 
decile. The change in the size of the offer is also negatively correlated with the 
proportional change in the offer price (0.10 to 0.20) but positively correlated with 
both the proportional change in the bid price (0.2 but negligible after decile nine) and 
the previous spread (0.15 but negligible after decile 6; decile 7 is however 0.12). 
The change in the size of the bid shows a similar pattern with negative correlation 
(0.2) with the proportional change in the offer price, but positive correlation with both 
the proportional change in the bid price (0.12 to 0.23 but negligible at decile 9) and 
the previous spread (0.15 but negligible after decile 5, seven excluded). 
The change in the waiting time between trades shows no significant correlation 
with all variables. 
The trade indicator variable is positively correlated with the proportional change 
in the offer price (0.2 to 0.3 but drops after decile seven to 0.12 and then becomes 
negligible) and its correlation with the proportional change in the bid price shows a 
similar pattem. 
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The proportional change in the offer price is negatively correlated with both the 
proportional change in the bid price ( 0.20 to 0.40) and the previous spread (0.30 to 
0.50) and the proportional change in the bid price is positively correlated with the 
previous spread (0.36 to 0.62 attaining the highest values at the large activity deciles). 
5.3.2.2 NASDAQ 
The proportional change in spread is positively correlated with the spread (average 
value of coefficient is 0.84), the change in the offer size (0.1 to 0.4 in all but the two 
highest activity deciles), the change in the bid size (0.01 to 0.44), the proportional 
change in the offer price (strong correlation ranging from 0.86 to 0.45) and negatively 
correlated with the proportional change in the bid price (-0.24 to - 0.69) and the 
previous spread (- 0.21 to - 0.62). 
The change in the proportional spread is negatively correlated with the volume of 
the previous trade only in the lowest activity decile. It is Positively correlated with 
both the change in the size of the offer (0.50 to 0.12) and the change in the size of the 
bid (0.32 to 0.01) with the larger values encountered in the low activity deciles. It is 
also positively correlated with the proportional change in the offer price (0.40 to 0.64) 
but negatively with the proportional change in the bid price (-0.36 to -0.53). Its 
correlation with the waiting time between trades is only significant in the three lowest 
activity deciles and almost non-existent with the trade indicator variable. Significant 
negative correlation of this variable with the previous spread is however observed in 
all deciles and ranges from -0.25 to - 0.49. 
The volume of the previous trade is only significantly correlated with the change 
in the waiting time between trades (four deciles), the trade indicator variable (two 
deciles), the proportional change in the offer price ( one decile), the proportional 
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change in the bid price (0.19 and 0.53 in the first two deciles respectively) and with 
the previous spread (weakly negative in six deciles). 
The change in the size of the offer and that of the bid are significantly negatively 
correlated in four deciles (- 0.10 to - 0.18). The former is also positively correlated 
with the proportional change in the offer price (0.10 to 0.35) in all deciles whereas the 
change in the size of the bid is negatively correlated with the proportional change in 
the bid price in six deciles (-0.13 to -0.21) and with the previous spread in four 
deciles (-0.48 to -0.11). 
The change in the waiting time between trades is not significantly correlated with 
any of the variables except weakly negatively with the trade indicator variable in the 
four lowest activity deciles and the proportional change in the bid price in the second 
and third deciles. 
The trade indicator variable is positively correlated with the proportional change 
in the offer price in all deciles (0.46 to 0.16), with the proportional change in the bid 
price (0.15 to 0.40). 
Finally the proportional changes in the offer and bid prices are positively 
correlated (0.17 to 0.38) in all deciles. The proportional change in the offer price is 
negatively correlated with the previous spread (- 0.01 to - 0.47) in all deciles but the 
proportional change in the bid price is positively correlated with the previous spread 
in only five of the highest activity deciles (0.19 to 0.33). 
5.4 Estimation of the Models 
The procedure for estimating the parameters of the models developed in this 
chapter is described in this section and the results of the estimations are provided in 
appropriate tables. Details on the theoretical underpins of the Generalized Method of 
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Moments (GMM) methodology which has been used for estimation are given in 
Appendix A. 
5.4.1 The Quoted Spread Model 
The basic model to be estimated is that described by equation (5.1 lb) which is the 
difference between equations (5.9b) and (5.10b) and is recited below for easier 
reference: 
Q (AVta 
+AV b 
)+AU 
t A ýt = 28pqt-, Vt-l + 2P PAT t-I +yp t 
(5 AI b) 
Equations (5.9b) and (5.10b) describe the changes in the ask and bid prices 
between times t and t-1, relative to the spread at time W. However, since some 
information is lost in the differencing process we estimate both of these equations 
separately. This allows us to study the bid and offer change process separately and 
provides more insight into the quoted spread change process. 
Equation (5.1 lb) involves three parameters, namely 5p, Pp and yp and five 
variables. 
In selecting the GMM estimation method we attempt to avoid making strong 
assumptions regarding the price-generating process. We also do not impose strong 
distributional assumptions on the error terms in our equations which account for a 
number of different stochastic information events as well as rounding errors. 
Moreover, during estimation we can account for various types of serial correlation of 
the residuals as well as any unknown form of conditional heteroscedasticity. Finally 
the latest literature on the testing of the results from GMM estimation, details of 
which are given in appendix B, can be used for specification testing. 
In estimating this equation using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), apart 
from the above parameters which we can denote by the vector 9, we require a set of 
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orthogonality restrictions which can be represented by the following vector function 
of population moments, h,: 
ei VI-1 
e, q, -, 
e, A Vl` 
e AVb 
where et is the error term in equation (5.1 lb) which corresponds to A v, - 
The set of the above restrictions correspond to strict exogeneity conditions in the 
sense that 
E[e, 1 X, 
9 
X2 
9--9 
Xn 1=0 (i=1,2,..., n) 
where Xj is the vector of all the observations of regressor 
Thus the expected value of the error tenn, conditional on the regressors for all 
observations is equal to zero. This implies that the unconditional mean of the error 
term is zero: 
E(e, ) =0 (i=1,2,..., n) 
and also that the above five regressors are orthogonal to the error term for all 
observations: 
E(xj,. e, )=O (ij=l, ....... n; k=l ........... K) 
or 
E(x e, 
E(Xj2e, ) 
E(Xj - ej 0 (for all ij) 
E(xjkei), 
and 
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0 is (Kxl) 
Therefore the regressors are assumed to be orthogonal to the past, current and future 
error terms (or the error terms are assumed to be orthogonal to the past, current and 
future values of the regressors). 
Even though the above conditions are difficult to be satisfied in finite samples in a 
time series model, they are derived from the assumptions made in constructing the 
model. We therefore investigate the validity of these assumptions, during the 
specification tests on the results derived from our estimations, in order to identify 
which particular conditions appear not to be valid in the particular samples used. 
This vector valued function exactly identifies the parameter vector (p by minimizing 
the function 
QT ((P) = 9T (T)'ST9T ((P) 
where 9T((P) is the sample mean of h(y, xT), where QT((P) is the function to be 
minimized andSTis the Newey-West (1987) estimator as explained in appendix A. 
The implied moment conditions imposed for estimation are: 
E[f (9, h, )] =0 
There are three parameters to be estimated and five moment conditions, therefore this 
model is over-identified by a degree of two. 
In our estimations we express volumes in thousands of shares and the change in the 
waiting time between trades in hours. 
5.4.2 The Offer-Change and the Bid-Change Models 
The models to be estimated are those described by equations (5.9b) and (S. I Ob). In 
the last two equations A at and Abt describe the changes in the ask and bid prices 
respectively as a fraction of the spread at time t- I and are re-written below for ease of 
reference: 
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A a, = Opqt-, V, -, - 
Op V pq, -, + 
5pqt-, V, 
-, + 
PPAT, 
-, + 7PAV, 
' + AXt + W, (5.9b) 
A Üt =Opqt-, Vt-, -0pVpqý-, -öpqt-IV, -, -ßPATt-, --yp 
AV tb+ A%t + nt (5.10 b) 
Each equation involves five parameters, namely p, Op, 8p, Pp and yp, which make 
up the parameter vector 9, and five variables. Since p and the average volume can be 
calculated in advance from the data and then treated like constants for the particular 
decile we can reduce the estimation problem into a four parameter- four variable one. 
The vector function of population moments, ht, is now: 
a 
e, V, 
a e, 
f((o, ht) 
eý 
aAVa e, t 
for the Offer-Change model and 
b 
e, 
f((o, h, ebq, -, 
e, bA r, -, bAvb 
e, t 
for the Bid-Change model, where eta and et b are the combined error terms in 
equations (5.9b) and (5.1 Ob) respectively, that is: 
e', = AXt + mt and eb= A% t+ Tct t 
The above error terms have been used to model both random information events as 
well as rounding-off errors due to price-discreteness. 
The comments regarding the strict exogeneity conditions of the regressors which were 
made in section 5.4.1 are also valid here, that is the 
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E(xje 1), 
E(Xj2e, 
) 
E(Xj - ej 0 
. 
E(x,, e, 
) 
(for all ij) and 0 is (Kxl) 
The validity of the above strict exogeneity conditions The for the four regressors in 
each model is examined in the specification tests which follow the estimation of the 
models. 
This vector valued function exactly identifies the parameter vector 9 by minimizing 
the function 
QT ((P) = 9T 
((P)'STgT (T) 
where 9T((P) is the sample mean of h((p, xT), where QT((P) is the function to be 
minimized and ST is the Newey-West (1987) estimator as explained in appendix A. 
The implied moment conditions are: 
E[f(o, h, )] =0 
There are four parameters to be estimated and four moment conditions, therefore 
this model is exactly identified. 
In our estimations we express volumes in thousands of shares and the change in 
the waiting time in hours. 
5.5 Discussion of Results 
The results from the GMM estimation of the three models in this chapter are 
discussed in turn in the subsections which follow. 
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5.5.1 The Quoted Spread Model 
Tables AG. 5.3 and AG. 5.4 in Appendix G show the results of the GMM 
estimation for the Quoted Spread Model using the NYSE and NASDAQ random 
samples of common stocks respectively. These data are plotted in figures 5.2 to 5.4 
where each graph shows the variation of one parameter for both NYSE and NASDAQ 
in order to facilitate the comparison between the two exchange mechanisms. 
As can be seen from figure 5.2 the size of the Quoted Volume Parameter yp 
follows completely distinct patterns for the two types of exchange. In NYSE it is 
negative and increases as one moves from the low (1) towards the highest (10) 
activity deciles. Its value is significant for all deciles and ranges from -0.153 to -0.0 11 
total sample value is -0.015). That is the per thousand share impact of the total volume 
of shares quoted at the bid and the ask accounts for 15 to I percent of the proportional 
change in the spread, which is calculated using the spread at time t-1 in the 
denominator. For NASDAQ stocks it is positive and follows a U-shape with its lowest 
value in the fifth decile while those at the two extremes are the largest values. 
NASDAQ values range from 1.23 to 0.24 (total sample value is 0.4852). Overall, 
ýI, so ab lute values for NASDAQ are much larger compared to NYSE. 
The inventory cost parameter 8p, plotted in figure 5.3 is only significantly 
different from zero in 3 out of ten deciles for NYSE and for only two of the NASDAQ 
deciles (I and 10)115 . For NYSE stocks it is negative and exhibits an increasing 
pattern from decile 5 to seven ranging from -1.67 to -0.9 percent of the previous 
spread for every thousand shares traded in the previous time interval total sample 
value is not significant). For NASDAQ it is significant in decile 10 where it is around 
113 Data of the first NASDAQ decile are not believed to give valid estimates of the parameters since 
their very small number of observations makes GMM estimation inefficient. 
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1.9 percent and negative whereas its value for decile I is 8.7% and positive (total 
sample value is -0.66%). In general it could be argued that the inventory effect 
appears to be valid mainly for NYSE stocks and present only in the medium activity 
deciles. 
The time component parameter Op, plotted in figure 5.4, is only significantly 
different from zero in three of the NYSE deciles namely 3 (at 10%), 8 (at 5%) and 10 
(at the 10% level). For NASDAQ it is significantly different from zero at deciles 3 
and 5 at the 10% level. Overall there is little evidence of it being different from zero 
and its sign appears to be positive for NASDAQ and of mixed sign for NYSE. Total 
sample values for both NYSE and NASDAQ are not significant. 
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FIGURE 5.2 
THE QUOTED SPREAD MODEL 
Variation of the Quoted-Volume Parameter Vp with Activity Volume Decile 
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Numbers appearing on top of the bars refer to probability values. 
FIGURE 5.3 
THE QUOTED SPREAD MODEL 
Variation of the Inventory-Imiding Cost Parameter 5p with Activity Volume Dedle 
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FIGURE 5.4 
THE QUOTED SPREAD MODEL 
Variation of the Waiting Time Parameter N with Activity Volume Decile 
0 IL 
0 
E 
c 
0.1 
0.08 
0.06 
0.04 
0.0ý 
-0.01 
-0.01 
-0.01 
-0.0 
M WSE 
0 NASDAQ 
Numbers appearing on top of the bars refer to probability values. 
140 
Acttvky Volum Declie ZY 10 Total 
5.5.2 The Offer-Change Model 
The estimates of the parameters of the Offer-Change model are exhibited in tables 
AG. 5.5 and AG. 5.6 in Appendix G and have been plotted in figures 5.5 to 5.7. 
The Quoted Volume Parameter yp, plotted in figure 5.5, is significantly different 
from zero in all NYSE deciles at the 1% level and in eight of the NASDAQ deciles. 
The pattern for NYSE, as shown in figure 5.5, is still that of an increasing size with 
negative values as one moves from the low towards the high activity deciles but not as 
smooth as in the quoted spread model. The magnitude of this parameter ranges from - 
9.3 to -0.7 % of the previous spread for NYSE for 1000 shares quoted (total sample 
value is -1%). There are significant differences in the size, as well as the pattern of 
this parameter for NASDAQ deciles. Its value for NASDAQ is positive, significant in 
eight deciles and its absolute value larger than NYSE (5-6 times) ranging from 63 to 
IS % of the previous spread per 1000 shares quoted total sample value is 38.5%). For 
this reason, NASDAQ values in figure 5.5 have been scaled down by a factor of 10. 
Our model does not allow us to estimate separately the inventory parameter Bp and 
the adverse selection parameter Op since their estimation depends on the volume of the 
previous trade. The second term in equation (5.9b) which involves Op, the average 
volume and the correlation coefficient p, has a smaller effect in the calculation of Op 
because the product of the other two quantities is smaller compared to the size of the 
volume of the trade at time t. Thus one should be cautious when interpreting the 
results for Op and 5p from this equation. The same comments should also apply for 
the case of the bid-change equation. 
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FIGURE 5.5 
THE OFFER-CHANGE MODEL 
Variation of the Quoted-Volume Parameter Yp with Activity Volume Decile 
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FIGURE 6.6 
THE OFFER-CHANGE MODEL 
Variation of the Inventory-Cost Parameter 5p with Activity Volume Decile 
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Numbers appearing on top of the bars refer to probability values. 
The value for decile I of NYSE has been scaled down by a factor of 10 since it is large (-8.49) and would distort the 9WK 
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FIGURE &7 
THE OFFER-CHANGE MODEL 
Variation of the Advers*-Selectlon Cost Parameter Op with ActIv Ity Volume Docile 
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Numbers appearing on top of the bars refer to probability values. 
I'lie value for docile I of NYSE has been scaled down by a factor of 10 since it is large (8.46) and would distort the graph. 
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As can be seen from figure 5.6 the inventory cost parameter 8p is negative for both 
NYSE and NASDAQ and significantly different from zero in seven NYSE deciles, 
most at the 1% level of significance but in only two out of the NASDAQ deciles (at 
the 1% and 10% level). For NYSE the value of this parameter follows an increasing 
pattern (absolute value decreases) from the low to the high activity deciles and ranges 
from 65.8 to 9.6 percent of the previous spread (total sample value is -16.6%). For 
NASDAQ, its value is larger (absolute value smaller) at 22 and 28.4% of the previous 
spread (total sample value is -48.1%). Significant differences exist in the size of this 
parameter between similar activity deciles of the two exchanges and overall the value 
of the parameter is larger for NYSE stocks. 
The adverse selection parameter Op, plotted in figure 5.7, decreases from the low 
towards the higher activity deciles for NYSE where its value is significantly different 
from zero in seven deciles at the 1% level and ranges from 62.5 to 9.7% (total sample 
is 16.7%) of the previous spread. It is also significantly different from zero in four 
NASDAQ deciles (one at the 1% and 5% and two at the 10% level) and its value 
ranges from 54.8 to 17.6% of the previous period spread following an inverse-U 
pattem (total sample value is 46.4%). 
The time component parameter Pp is negative and significantly different from zero 
in only one of the NYSE deciles (at the 5% level) and in only one of the NASDAQ 
deciles (decile three at the 10 % level) where it is negative. For this reason this 
parameter has not been plotted. Total sample values are not significant for both the 
NYSE and the NASDAQ sub-samples. 
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5.5.3 The Bid-Change Model 
Tables AG. 5.7 and AG. 5.8 in Appendix G show the results of the GMM estimates 
of the Bid-Change Model which are plotted in figures 5.8 to 5.10. 
For NYSE the quoted volume parameteryp, which has been plotted in figure 5.8, 
follows a similar pattern as in the case of the offer-change model and is significantly 
different from zero in all deciles (in eight of these at the 1% level). Its size ranges 
from -9.2 to -0.5 percent of the previous spread for NYSE (total sample value is - 
0.97%). The pattern for NASDAQ is irregular and the parameter value, which is 
positive and significantly different from zero in seven deciles, ranges from 68 to 18% 
(total sample is 43.68%), that is the absolute values are larger for NASDAQ stocks by 
five to six times. For this reason, NASDAQ values in figure 5.5 have been scaled 
down by a factor of 10. 
The inventory cost parameter 8p, plotted in figure 5.9, is significantly different 
from zero in four NYSE deciles, three at the 1% level of significance. Its value for 
NYSE is positive and ranges from 60.8 to 17.4 percent of the previous spread 
following an inverse-U shape (total sample value is 23.93%). For NASDAQ stocks 
this parameter decreases with increasing activity deciles. Its value is significant in also 
five deciles (two at the 1% level) and ranges from 83 to 19% of the previous spread 
(total sample value is 67.82%). 
As mentioned in the discussion of the parameter for the offer-change model the value 
of the adverse selection parameter Op, plotted in figure 5.10, is close to that of the 
inventory cost parameter 5p. It is statistically significantly different from zero in five 
of the NYSE (four at the 1% level) and five of the NASDAQ deciles (two at the 1% 
and two at the 5% level). Its value for NYSE ranges from 59.8 to 17.7 % of the 
previous spread (total sample value is 24%) whereas for NASDAQ it ranges between 
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80.5 and 21.6% (total sample value is 64.5%). The pattern is an inverse-U shape for 
both exchanges while NASDAQ values are in general larger than NYSE ones. 
The time effect parameter Pp is only statistically significantly different from zero in 
three out of the ten NYSE deciles and in none of the NASDAQ deciles whereas total 
sample values are not significant for both exchanges. 
FIGURE 6.8 
THE BID-CHANGE MODEL 
Varintlon of the Quoted-Volume Parameter Vp with ActIvity Volume Decile 
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FIGURE 6.9 
THE BID-CHANGE MODEL 
Variation of the Inventory-Holding Cost Parameter 5p with Activity Volume Decile 
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FIGURE 6.10 
THE BID-CHANGE MODEL 
Variation of the Adv*rso-Selectlon Cost Parameter Op VAth Activity Volume Decile 
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A summary of the results of the Quoted-Spread and the Offer- and Bid-Change 
Models is provided in table 5.1. 
To estimate the composition of the quoted spread using the estimated values of the 
parameters we derive an equation for the quoted spread by substituting equations (5.4) 
and (5.5) for the ask and bid prices respectively into the quoted spread equation: 
SQ, = a, - b, 
Then by substituting equations (5.4a) and (5.5a) for the conditional expected true 
prices, equations (5.6) and (5.7) for the order processing costs at the ask and bid 
respectively and finally equation (5.8) for the inventory-cost into the above equation 
we arrive at: 
1-1 
+ AVtb) SQ = 20 V+ 28E t qiVi + 2a + 2PArt-I + y(AVt' 
(5.12) 
Using appropriate spreadsheets in which we estimate the above parameters from the 
estimated parameter values which were expressed as fractions of the spread at time t- 
1, we are able to calculate the components of the quoted spread for each decile for the 
NYSE and NASDAQ sub-samples. These results have been plotted in figures (5.1) 
and (5-2) for NYSE and NASDAQ respectively where the adverse-selection and the 
inventory-holding cost components are presented as percentages of the total quoted 
spread explained by our results. Depending on the errors of the estimation the total 
explained spread can vary from zero to even 150 percent of the actual spread but such 
large values are rare. The adverse selection cost for NYSE varies from 68.9 to 1.23% 
of the total explained quoted spread (27.18 to 1.14 for NASDAQ) whereas the 
inventory-holding cost for NYSE varies from 0.006 to 1.2% (0.12 to 0.42% for 
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NASDAQ). Since the latter component is very small compared to the adverse- 
selection one it has been scaled up by a factor of 10 in figures 5.11 and 5.12. 
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Table 5.1 Summary of the Results from the Estimations of the Quoted-Spread, 
the Offer-Change and the Bid-Change Models, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ Data: 
October 1994. 
Table 5.1 presents a descriptive summary of the results from the GMM estimation of the Quoted- 
Spread Model of equation (5.1 1b), the Offer-Change Model of equation (5.9b) and the Bid-Change 
Model of equation (5.10b) for both the NYSE and NASDAQ subsamples from the TAQ database for 
October 1994. 
MODEL 
NYSE NASDAQ 
Quoted-Spread 
yp 
Significant in all deciles (at 11% level) 
15.3 to 1.1 % of previous spread 
Negative; Increases from lowest to highest activity 
deciles 
8, 
ßp 
Offer-Change 
yp 
6, 
0, 
ßp 
Bid-Change 
yp 
Significant In three deciles (at I% level) 
1.7 to 0.9 % of previous spread 
Negative; Increases from fifth to seventh decile 
Significant In three deciles (at 10% level) 
Two negative values and one positive 
Significant In all deciles (at I% level) 
9.3 to 0.7 % of previous spread 
Negative; Increases from lowest to highest activity 
deciles 
Significant In seven deciles (most at 11% level) 
65.8 to 9.6 % of previous spread 
Negative; Increases from lowest to highest activity 
deciles but not smoothly 
Significant In all deciles (at 1% level) 
123 to 24 % of previous spread 
Positive; U-shape / lowest at fifth activity decile 
Larger than NYSE 
Significant In two deciles (at 1% level) 
1.9 % of previous spread 
Very weak evidence 
Significant In two deciles (at 10% level) 
Positive 
Significant in eight deciles (in 7 at the 1% level) 
63 to 18 % of previous spread 
Positive; U-shape; 5 to 6 times larger than 
NYSE 
Significant in two deciles(at the I and 10% level) 
22 and 28.4 % of previous spread 
Negative; Decreases with activity decile 
Smaller than NYSE 
Significant In seven deciles (at the 11% level) Significant in four deciles (at 1,5.10 and 10% level) 
62.5 to 9.7 % of previous spread 54.8 to 17.6 % of previous spread 
Decreases from lowest to highest activity deciles Inverse-U shape 
Significant In one decile (5% level); Negative 
Significant in all deciles (most at the 1% level) 
-9.2 to -0.5 % of previous spread 
Negative; Decreases from lowest to highest activity 
deciles 
6, 
Significant In four deciles (3 at the 1% level) 
60.8 to 17.4% of previous spread 
Positive; Inverse-U pattern 
0, 
Significant In five deciles (4 at the 1% level) 
59.8 to 17.7 % of previous spread 
Inverse U-pattern 
Significant In one decile (110% level); Negative 
Significant In seven deciles 
68 to 18 % of previous spread 
Irregular pattern, 5 to 6 times larger than NYSE 
Significant In four deciles (2 at the 1%, 2 at the 10% level) 
Positive; 83 to 19% of previous spread 
Decreasing with increasing activity decile 
Significant In five deciles (2 at the 1%t 2 at the 5% level) 
80.5 to 21.6 % of previous spread 
Inverse U-pattern 
00 
Significant In three deciles; Negative Nowhere significant 
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Figure 5.11 
Adverse-selection and Inventory-holding cost components 
as percentages of the total Quoted Spread explained. 
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Figure 5.12 
Adverse-selection and InventoryAholding cost components as 
percentages of the total Quoted Spread explained. 
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5.6 Specification Testing 
The procedure for the specification testing of the models follows three stages: First 
the J-Statistic of over-identifying restrictions is studied to verify whether there are 
moment conditions which are different from zero, second, an attempt is made to test 
which moment conditions hold in the sample and third, tests are carried out to check 
whether parameters are equal to zero. 
5.6.1 The J-test statistic 
This should be distributed as a chi-square with two degrees of freedom. As can be 
seen from table AG. 5.3 in Appendix G in all but the last NYSE deciles the value of 
this statistic lies within the 5% confidence interval whereas for NASDAQ, in table 
AG. 5.4, it is within the same interval (or even the 1% interval) in six out of the ten 
deciles. This indicates that there are in general more moment conditions which are not 
satisfied in the NASDAQ sub-sample as compared with the NYSE one, that is part of 
the original moment conditions are not used in estimation. 
For the Bid- and Offer-Change models this statistic is zero since the models are 
exactly identified. 
5.6.2 Checking for correct moment conditions - Moment Selection 
The models are then estimated by excluding one moment condition at a time so as 
to verify whether that particular moment is incorrect. The Eichenbaum, Hansen and 
Singleton (1988) test statistic is used to this end which is the difference between two 
estimations, one including the full set of moment conditions and the other including 
only those moments which are believed to be true under both the null and the 
alternative hypothesis. A detailed description of this and the other relevant tests is 
given in Appendix B but the fundamental ideas of the test are described here in brief. 
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Assuming that the vector of all the moment conditions is given by 
E[f (x,, 00)] where x, are the variables in the model and 
parameter vector we can express our null hypothesis as: 
Hso : E[f, (x )]= 0 t9001 
and the alternative as: 
HA : E[f, (x ,* 001)] = 
where 00 ý 
(0'01$0'02) 
and E[f2 
(Xt 
9 
00)] =0 
-Y 
2T and E[f2(Xt$00)1 ' 
00i 
: ýi x 1) 
f(XIIOOY 
"I 
[fl(Xt, 
001)'sf2(Xt9oOY1 fi (e): (q, x 1) 
00 is the true 
that is we have partitioned both the parameter vector 00 as well as that of the 
moment restrictions E[f (x t, 00)] 
into two sub-vectors. 
The C, statistic is then given by 
Ct(A 
)_ 
7. =T 
QT Or QIT(OIT)j where 01 T: value of 0 which minimizes 
the objective function QlTusing part of the 
moment conditions 
and is distributed according to: 
V, 0 (degree to which 00ý is overidentified 
CT -X 
2 
under Hsv, = q2 - P2 
by E(f2 (x, 9 00)) =0 if 00, is known). 
that is v, is the degree to which the first parameter sub-vector is over-identified 
by the second sub-vector of moment conditions. 
In tables AG. 5.9 and AG. 5.10 an attempt is made to diagnose the source of the 
problem, that is to deten-nine which moments are candidates to be characterized as 
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over-identifying. At the 5% level it is evident from table AG. 5.9 for NYSE that the CT 
statistic is not significant in seven deciles for all moments. In deciles 5 and 6 the null 
hypothesis that all moment conditions in the sample are satisfied can be rejected for 
the variables related to the change in the size of the bid and ask and for the change in 
the size of the bid and the waiting time respectively. In decile 10 it is rejected for the 
volume, the change in waiting time as well as the trade indicator variable related 
moments. In this decile, the CT statistic has a very high value which indicates that the 
particular moment conditions are probably not satisfied in the sample. For the 
NASDAQ sub-sample from table AG. 5.10 theCT statistic is nowhere significant at 
the 5% (or even the 10%) level providing no further evidence as to which moments 
are not satisfied in this sub-sample. 
The next problem we are faced is to choose which moment restrictions are valid in 
the sample. Andrews (1999) has proposed moment selection criteria (MSC) analogous 
to the model selection criteria used when choosing among competing models. We use 
his GMM-BIC (Bayesian Infonnation Criterion) statistic which is based on the J 
statistic of over-identifying restrictions of Hansen and is given by: 
MSC 
BIC n 
(C )=Jn (c )- h ýc 1ý 
where c is a moment selection vector (selects only certain moments), Icl is the 
number of moments selected by the vector, p is the number of parameters estimated 
by GMM and J,, (c) stands for the J-test statistic for over-identifying restrictions 
constructed using the moment selection vector c. The J-test statistic is distributed as a 
chi-square with [Icl - min(p, lcl)] degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis that all 
moment conditions in c are correct. 
The second tenn in the above equation is a bonus term which rewards the selection 
of vectors which use more moment conditions and is required in order that the 
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increase in J, which occurs when more moment conditions are added, even if they are 
correct, is counterbalanced. For this reason h(e) is defined as a strictly increasing 
function with kn -ý oo and kn= o(n) where n is the sample size. Andrews 
(1999) has stated that both h(e) and kn should be specified by the researcher. As 
the latter increases the bonus given for more moment conditions employed increases 
without bound. For our purposes we define 
hýcjý. = 
qc I-P )log n 
Based on this statistic we adopt a downward testing procedure that is a procedure 
which starts from the most restrictive model and progresses towards the least 
restrictive one. According to this procedure we start with moment vectors containing 
the largest number of moments and estimate our models progressively decreasing the 
number of moments until the J-statistic (i. e. the null hypothesis that all moment 
conditions considered are correct) is not rejected. 
In table AG. 5.9 in Appendix G for NYSE the exclusion of one of the initial 
moment conditions from the estimating procedure led to J-statistics which were not 
significant in seven out of ten deciles at the 5% level whereas for the NASDAQ sub- 
sample in table AG. 5.10 this statistic was nowhere significant. Referring to tables 
AG. 5.11 and AG. 5.12 in Appendix G which tabulate the GMM-BIC moment- 
selection statistic of Andrews (1999) which in turn indicates which moment 
conditions are most likely to be over-identifying one can see that in NYSE such 
moment conditions can be the change in the size of the bid and offer, which give a 
low MSC value in six out of the ten deciles. The change in waiting time moment also 
gives very low MSC values in five deciles while the moment conditions related to the 
volume and the trade indicator variables seem to hold well in most activity deciles, 
esPecially the higher ones. For NASDAQ one can see from table AG. 5.12 that the 
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same three moment conditions appear to be over-identifying in almost half of the 
deciles but in this case the volume and trade indicator moment conditions appear to be 
violated more often that in the NYSE sub-sample. It should be noted that one cannot 
proceed further with this test by excluding more moment conditions in this model 
since excluding two moment conditions will result to the model becoming just 
identified which will produce a J-statistic equal to zero. 
5.6.3 Testing the Parameters of the Model 
The second stage involves testing the parameters of the model. The null 
hypothesis is 
HR : r(o, )=o versus H": r(00)=T-y2, uR where r(e) is a (s x 1) vector of continuous 0A 
differentiable functions of the 
form R(O)=ar(O)IaO' 
The number of restrictions, s, should not exceed the number of parameters, p. 
Since the SHAZAM program, which has been used to estimate the model, calculates 
the Wald statistic for each parameter separately, we carry out a Likelihood Ratio (LR) 
test for the joint hypothesis that all parameters in the model are equal to zero. The 
reason for using the LR statistic is that the Wald statistic has two disadvantages. First 
it is not invariant to a re-parametrization of the model or the restrictions and second it 
tends to be less well approximated by the chi-square in finite samples. Rejection of 
the null however can occur either because the identifying restrictions are satisfied at 
the true parameter vector and restrictions are different from zero or because 
restrictions are equal to zero and the identifying restrictions are not satisfied at the 
true parameter vector. 
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As can be seen from tables AG. 5.13 and AG. 5.14 in Appendix G for the Quoted 
Spread Model the null hypothesis that all parameters are equal to zero should be 
rejected for all deciles of the NYSE sub-sample and for most of the NASDAQ deciles 
with the exception of the first three lowest activity ones. Especially for the case of the 
first and second NASDAQ deciles the LR statistic is very low while decile 3 is close 
to the 5% confidence region. This observation could probably be attributed to our 
limited number of observations for NASDAQ in these deciles. A similar observation 
can be obtained from tables AG. 5.15 and AG. 5.16 for the Offer- and Bid-Change 
models. While for NYSE the null hypothesis should be rejected for all deciles in the 
NASDAQ sub-sample it should be accepted for the first decile whereas the statistic 
for the second decile is close to the 5% interval value. 
5.6.4 Testing for Structural Stability 
A third stage of the specification testing procedure could be to test for instability 
in the model. However due to limitations in our package we are not in a position to 
carry out tests such as those of Sowell (1996a, b) presented in Appendix B, which 
could investigate the potential existence of structural breaks at known or unknown 
points in the sample. 
5.6.5 Conclusions from the Specification Tests 
The above specification tests indicate that in the NYSE sub-sample the assumptions 
made in the Quoted-Spread Model about the moments related to the change in the size 
of the ask and the bid as well as those related to the waiting time between trades do 
not hold well in the medium activity deciles violating the strong exogeneity 
assumptions made regarding the corresponding regressors which appear to be 
correlated with the error term. It appears that for stocks in those deciles the change in 
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the spread at some point in time has an effect on the above variables which is not 
described by our model. 
Similarly, in the highest activity decile of NYSE the strong exogeneity assumption is 
violated for the trading volume, the change in waiting time and the trade indicator 
variable regressors. This indicates that in the highest liquidity stocks these variables 
are influenced by the change in the spread an effect not captured by the model. 
The strict exogeneity conditions appear to hold better in the NASDAQ sub-sample 
even though the much smaller number of observations does not help to uncover their 
likely violation. 
5.7 Conclusions 
The evidence from the Quoted Spread Model indicates that there exists a relatively 
strong quoted-volume parameter, yp, which, as described by equations (5-6) and (5-7) 
affects the order processing cost the dealer charges when setting the bid-ask quote. In 
NYSE this should be interpreted either as imposed by the specialist, or as the cost of 
placing an order by the investor. The evidence in this chapter documents that the 
quoted spread is affected by the number of shares quoted prior to a trade. However, 
the sign of this parameter for NYSE is negative indicating that it tends to reduce the 
order-processing cost and thus the spread and this effect is the same for both the ask 
and the bid side of the spread as can be seen from tables AG. 5.5 and AG. 5.7 in 
Appendix G as well as from figures (5.5) and (5.8). Three important aspects of this 
parameter should be taken into consideration in this analysis. Its magnitude, its pattern 
across the deciles and the degree of symmetry in its size between the ask and the bid 
sides of the spread. In NYSE the size of this effect tends to diminish as one moves 
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from the low to the high activity deciles. Even though it is small throughout it is very 
small in the highest activity decile. What is more interesting to point out, however, is 
the degree of the symmetry of the parameter which is almost equal for the ask and bid 
sizes thus justifying our use of the same parameter to model both sides. The question 
remains as to what causes the negative value which is due to the negative relationship 
between the changes in the values of the quotes and the depths at the quotes. A 
probable explanation may be based on the exchange-mechanism for NYSE. The 
specialist has knowledge of the orders in the book and sets the quotes according to the 
limit-orders placed but can charge what he believes to be an appropriate order- 
processing cost. However as orders build up, increasing the quoted volume at both 
sides, this initial cost, which may be quite conservative need not remain the same 
since with increased volume the specialist will be able to recover his clerical costs 
from more transactions by charging less per transaction. Thus when volume at the 
quotes builds up quoted prices are reduced slightly. The effect is larger in the low 
activity deciles where it is likely that a larger initial fixed order processing cost would 
be charged which would be corrected sooner as volume picks up. These arguments are 
supported by the fact that we do not observe this negative effect in NASDAQ where 
the dealer is not alone in making a market for a particular stock. 
Caution should be exercised when interpreting this component for NASDAQ. 
Since the TAQ database only gives the prices and volumes of the Best Bid Offered 
(BBO) and not the total size of the quotes of all dealers in a stock at a given price and 
since dealers in a quote-driven market like NASDAQ are only obligated to quote for a 
certain size , which is usually 10 lots (1000 shares), this size cannot be used to make 
inferences on the effect of the volume quoted since it is likely that it will not vary 
much. NASDAQ dealers can use this limited size to protect themselves against 
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private-information holders as well as a means for discovering prices gradually. They 
thus set an order-processing cost proportional to the volume they quote since by 
positioning themselves on the BBO they have already offered a competitive price and 
should attempt to recover their clerical costs through the increased volume. For this 
reason the size of this parameter is larger compared to NYSE. The U-sbape for the 
offer-change model may be attributed to the attempt of dealers to recover their clerical 
costs quickly in less liquid stocks and to take advantage of public demand for 
transactions in the most liquid ones. In contrast with the symmetry in the size of this 
parameter for the ask and bid sides in NYSE we observe a large asymmetry for 
NASDAQ stocks. This asymmetry is probably 
due to the nature of our database since the ask and bid prices of the BBO quoted do 
not originate from the same dealer and thus this finding cannot support the idea that 
the behavior of NASDAQ dealers might influence this parameter differently for each 
side of the spread. 
The inventory cost parameter 8p, introduced through equation (5-8) of the model, 
appears to be significant for NYSE in the middle deciles of the Quoted-Spread Model 
in figure (5.3). Looking into figures (5.6) and (5.9) for the Offer- and Bid- Change 
models we observe that even though the net effect of this parameter on the spread is 
nil for most deciles, which should be expected since empirical evidence has indicated 
that inventory adjustments occur over long time intervals, its absolute value follows a 
diminishing pattern in the offer and bid change equations. This can be explained by 
the fact that the specialist over-charges in low liquidity stocks to compensate for his 
adverse inventory position because these stocks are more likely to bring him into 
such a position and also because it is easier to recover from an undesired position 
when trading in high liquidity stocks where recovery could be accomplished through a 
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large number of small steps. For NASDAQ there is weaker evidence for this effect in 
all of the models even though the size of the parameter appears to be smaller for the 
ask side but larger for the bid side of the spread compared to that for NYSE. A 
possible explanation for the weaker evidence is that the NASDAQ dealer, as opposed 
to the NYSE specialist, is partially protected from extreme undesired inventory 
positions by both his obligation to quote for a limited number of shares only, which of 
course applies also to the specialist, but also from his ability to post quotes which are 
away from the BBO whenever he feels he does not wish to take additional risk. The 
large number of dealers in a NASDAQ stock implies that the collective inventory risk 
is shared among them unlike the specialist who is obliged to maintain a 'fair and 
orderly market'. Moreover, as is also discussed in Bessembinder (1999) for NASDAQ 
as well as in Menyah and Paudyal (2000) for the ISE, preferencing (sending an order 
to a market-maker who has not posted the best quote) and internalization (sending an 
order to a dealer who belongs to the same firm but does not have the best quote) 
which are possible in these trading mechanisms can affect the sizes of the adverse- 
selection and the inventory-holding cost. Another reason why evidence for NASDAQ 
is weaker is the nature of the data for this exchange where the total quoted volume is 
not reported, therefore a complete picture of the collective inventory imbalance is not 
available. 116 Finally it is worth pointing out the asymmetry in the absolute sizes of this 
component between the bid and ask sides of the spread. Even though NYSE absolute 
values of this component at the bid can be larger or smaller than values of the 
equivalent decile at the ask NASDAQ values at the bid are larger compared to those at 
the ask. Finally the sign of the parameter is as expected from theory and discussed in 
section 5.2, that is it is negative for the ask and positive for the bid. 
116 For example a dealer with excess inventory might offer more shares for sale. 
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The quoted spread model does not provide information on the adverse selection 
parameter Op since the pertinent term cancels out during differencing when deriving 
equation (5.1 lb). The Offer- and Bid-Change models, however, do so and the 
parameter has been plotted in figures (5.7) and (5.10) respectively. Due to the nature 
of our model the pattern of this parameter is similar to that of 8p for the reasons given 
below. Examining equations (5.9b) and (5.10b) it is evident that the difference 
between the adverse-selection and the inventory-holding terms, apart from the 
different parameters, is that in the adverse-selection term the product of the average 
volume 
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and the autocorrelation coefficient of the trade indicator variable is 
subtracted. This raises the question as to how strong this term is in differentiating 
between the two components. Its differentiating power depends on the size and sign of 
the autocorrelation coefficient, the value of the average volume, which however does 
not change very much from decile to decile and finally on the sign of the trade- 
indicator variable. An analysis of the values which the above parameters can take 
reveals that negative adverse-selection parameters can arise from small trades when 
the autocorrelation coefficient is positive or from large trades when the change in the 
ask or bid price is to the opposite direction to that of the last trade. The problem of 
negative adverse-selection parameters has been overcome by clustering trades at the 
same price when there is no change in the quotes as was explained in section 4.3.2 
which discusses the data-selection procedure. However, when the autocorrelation 
coefficient is small the term subtracted in the adverse-selection component part of the 
above equations (the product of the average volume and the autocorrelation 
coefficient of the trade indicator variable) is also small and thus the estimated 
It7 Estimations have been carried out using the median as well as the mode of the volume but there has 
been no significant difference in the results obtained. The median was used because it minimizes the 
effect of extreme observations whereas the mode is the most likely statistic to be close to the 
impression the trader has of an expected volume (the one most frequently occurring). 
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adverse-selection component is close to the estimated inventory-holding cost 
component. Unfortunately in our dataset the autocorrelation coefficients calculated 
and used for estimation are the averages of the values of all the stocks in each decile 
because we do not run the estimations for each stock separately but for all the trades 
of all stocks in a given decile. A stock-by-stock estimation would be an onerous task 
requiring the use of specially written computer programs. The effect of using average 
autocorrelation coefficients is that positive values are averaged with negative ones 
resulting in small values. This is a limitation of our procedure. 
The value of the adverse-selection parameter for the NYSE subsample follows a 
diminishing pattern for the ask side of the spread and an inverse-U pattern for the bid 
side. In general, for both the ask and bid sides high activity deciles have smaller 
values which can be attributed to the fact that specialists can recover this cost through 
a large number of trades in the high activity deciles so the cost recovered per trade is 
small in those deciles. The value of the parameter is larger for the ask, compared to 
that for the bid which indicates that our assumption about the symmetry of the 
adverse-selection component may be wrong. For NASDAQ, where evidence is 
weaker, there appears to be an inverse-U pattern for both the ask and bid sides of the 
spread. We also observe that some bid-side values are very large and that there is 
asymmetry between the ask and bid sides of the spread for this component. 
There is some evidence, albeit weak, from the Quoted Spread model for the 
significance of the waiting time parameter Pp, plotted in figure (5.4). However there is 
little evidence elsewhere to support the hypothesis that it is different from zero and we 
therefore have to either reject the hypothesis or assume that our models, methodology 
or our database, are not capable of yielding any sensible values. 
164 
The average sizes of the components as percentages of the explained quoted 
spread for stocks in the NYSE and the NASDAQ deciles have been plotted in figures 
(5.11) and (5.12) respectively. For NYSE we can observe from figure (5.11) that the 
adverse-selection cost is large ranging from 68.9 to 1.23 percent of the quoted-spread, 
wherever it is significantly different from zero and is larger in the medium-activity 
deciles following an inverse-U shape (excluding decile 2 which has the highest value). 
The inventory-holding cost is small, mainly present in the medium-activity deciles 
and ranging from 0.006 to 1.2 % of the quoted spread. It also follows an inverse-U 
pattem. 
For NASDAQ the adverse-selection cost ranges from 27.18 to 1.14 percent of the 
quoted spread and is larger in the medium activity deciles. The inventory-holding cost 
is very small and present in the higher-activity deciles and ranges from 0.12 to 0.42% 
of the explained quoted spread. Stoll's (1989) value for the adverse-selection of the 
quoted spread in NASDAQ (43%) is larger and outside our range. 
Compared with the values for the adverse-selection cost for NYSE estimated by 
Huang and Stoll (1997), which however refers to the realized spread, our values for 
the higher activity deciles, which correspond to the large stocks they use, compare 
well with their average of 9.6% (range from 1.3 to 21%). We also find much smaller 
values for the inventory-holding cost component compared to the above authors. 
However their results are not comparable to ours since they examine fewer stocks the 
trades of which however span a period of twelve months compared to the one month 
of our data. This should allow them to uncover the inventory-adjustment effect which 
may not be as evident in the month we consider. 
Overall the contribution of the models in this chapter has been to: 
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1. Document the significance of the quoted-volume parameter yp for both 
NYSE and NASDAQ, providing evidence that the volume quoted at the 
bid and ask directly affects the size of the spread. 
2. Document the existence and estimate parameter values for an adverse 
selection component which depends directly on the number of shares 
traded, unlike previous studies which only use dummy variables for 
ranges of size. This has been accomplished for both NYSE and 
NASDAQ but within certain limitations which have been described 
above and have been imposed by the models employed. 
3. Document the existence and estimate parameter values for an inventory- 
holding component which varies with the trading activity of the stock for 
both NYSE and NASDAQ. 
4. Show that the waiting time between trades may account for a very small 
part the spread but further research is required to uncover a possible 
relationship. 
5. All of the above have been accomplished for deciles of trading activity 
which help determine the patterns of the parameters. 
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Chapter 6 
The Price-Change Model 
6.1 Introduction 
Following the development of the Quoted-Spread Model we will now attempt to 
develop a model which describes the change in price of a security based on the idea 
that it is the outcome of the dealer's attempt to be compensated both for his order 
processing as well as for his inventory holding costs. Moreover the adverse selection 
component should have been incorporated into his idea of the true price of the stock, 
immediately preceding a trade which is expressed through mt in equation (5.1). 
Therefore the development of the price-change equation draws from previous 
concepts but this does not imply that the dealer will be able to incorporate all his costs 
into the spread since, as is true especially in the New York Stock Exchange market, 
trades can and do occur inside the spread due to many reasons among which the most 
important is the ability of the trader to place limit-orders inside the spread. ' 18 Placing 
limit orders was not possible in NASDAQ in 1994 where our data come from. 
Implementation of a limit order book has been introduced in NASDAQ in 1998 and 
customer limit orders should now be displayed to the public as NASDAQ quotations 
if they improve the prices of the market-makers allowing limit-order traders to 
compete with them. Discussion in this chapter follows the same procedure as that for 
chapter 5 and an outline of the steps taken is given below: 
e First a model is developed for the change in price of a stock following on 
from principles and equations presented in chapter 5. 
118 Barclay, Christie, Harris and Schultz (1999) provide a description of the new rules for NASDAQ. 
The change in the behaviour of this market, as far as the components of the spread are concerned, after 
the implementation of the book is a topic of future research. Bessembinder (1999) has found that 
trading costs for NASDAQ still remain larger than in NYSE probably owing to order-preferencing 
even though the bid-ask spread decreases as shown by McInish, Van Ness and Van Ness (1998). 
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9 Next summary statistics for the variables used in the estimation of the 
above model are tabulated and commented. 
Results of the estimations using the two datasets from NYSE and 
NASDAQ are presented and discussed. 
The specification tests of the model developed and their results are 
provided and commented and 
9 Finally conclusions drawn, based on the estimation and specification 
results for this model, are discussed. 
6.2 Development of the Model 
At time ta trade takes place at the bid, the ask or inside the spread and the price at 
t is assumed to result from the common information price after the trade at time t, 
mt+,, (notation of figure 5.1) after the inventory-holding as well as the order- 
processing costs have been added on this price : 
m+ IV + q, 0,1, ' +q toblb + ýt ttttt 
Where ýt is a zero mean error term which is an asymptotically uniformly 
distributed random variable which accounts for the effect of price discreetness. I' (P) 
is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 (0) when a trade is buyer-initiated 
and the value of 0 (1) when it is seller-initiated. The above equation is constructed in 
such a way that when the trade is seller-initiated and qt is thus equal to -1, V is equal 
to 0 and lb equal to 1. The order-processing cost component is thus subtracted from 
the 'true' price of the stock mt. The opposite effect takes place when the trade is 
buyer-initiated. In that case where qt is equal to 1, V is equal to 1 and Ib equal to 0. 
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The order-processing cost component is thus added to the 'true' price. The 
relationship between It and qt is therefore the following: 
Ja Ib =I_ la t= -11 
(q 
t+ 1) tt 
(6.2) 
The asymmetric (adverse-selection) cost of the dealer is contained into the common 
information price, mt+,. 
Taking first differences of equation (6.1) we obtain: 
äPt = Am,.  + AIVt +qý0, 'I'ý' -q ý_, 0' '-, 1 'ý_, +q toblb -q t_Job lIb 1 
+gt 
tt t- t- 
(6.3) 
where Apt = Pt - P, -, 
and Aý, = ý, - ý, _, 
is also a zero mean asymptotically uniformly distributed 
random variable. 
Substituting for the components of the spread from equations (5.3), (5.8), (5.6) and 
(5.7) into equation (6.3) leads to: 
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t 
+I b 
)+ prt 
t 
+I b 
)+ 
7(laVta +I 
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(I attttt 
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t_j 
+ lb I 
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7(ja t_, 
Vta 
t-I 
+ Pr 
t-2 
(If 
t- 
+IbIVb+p0_ 8vt_l qt 
t- t- + 
Aýt + &t+l (6.4) 
Substituting equations (6.2) into equation (6.4) we obtain: 
Apt CL + pT t_j +. 
I (V,,, 
+ Vtb + q, 
(Vt' 
_ Vtb + OVt qt- 21 
-. 
+Vtb I+ %_1 (Va - 
vb (X + PTt-2 +1 (va t-, +p0 'V- 5V, q t-I + 
12 
Aýt + aw (6.5) 
In order that we allow for easier comparison of the results from the estimation of 
the parameters of this model with those of the Quoted-Spread, the Ask- and the Bid- 
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Change models we express, as was done in the case of the latter models, the change in 
price as a fraction of the spread at time t-1. Moreover, owing to the diversity of the 
stocks used in this study, which trade at different exchanges (different mechanisms) 
with prices and spreads which exhibit large variation, it would be more meaningful to 
study the parameters of the components of the spread relative to some other variable 
such as the quoted spread. 
Dividing the left-hand side of equation (6.5) by the quoted spread at time t-I we 
obtain the change in the price between times t and t-I relative to the quoted spread at 
time t-1 which implie's that since the same variables are used for estimation in the 
right-hand side the parameters of the components of the spread, that is 8, P andy will 
now be given relative to the quoted spread at time t-l. Thus equation (6.5) becomes: 
Af, = (IP+ß, T, _, +i-p(V, 
"+V, +q, (VR-V, »+OPV, qt- 
1 
+ 
12- (Vt" 
I+ Vt', +qt- Vt' 
ý, - 5 
lap 
+ PpCt-2 
2 -1 
(Vt" 
I -1))+pO P pvt-, 
]qt-I 
+Kt (6.5b) 
where APt denotes the change in price between times t and t- 1, expressed as a 
fraction of the spread at time t-1 and the subscript p under the parameters a, 5, P, 0 
and y denotes parameters expressed as a fraction of the spread at time t-l, sothat: 
= 
(X 
-8y=0 p9 5p =9 Yp =9 ßp =ß and OP s t-1 s t-1 s L-1 s t-1 s t-1 
Owing to our data-selection procedure, the spread at time t- I cannot be zero. 
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Moreover, we assume that 
Aýt 
+ 
&t+l- 
is a zero mean, independently, identically distributed random S t-I S t-I 
variable since there is no reason to support that Aý, and &,., are correlated with the 
spread at time W. 
The difference between equations (5.11b) and (6.5b) is that whereas (5.11b) 
describes the change in the quoted spread in terms of the components of the spread as 
set by the market maker in anticipation of the impact which the size and direction of 
the order flow will have on the true price, equation (6.5b) describes the change in the 
transaction price in terrns of the actual sizes of the components of the spread 
following the trade at time t. It can thus be argued that (5.1 lb) gives us the ex-ante 
values of the components whereas (6.5b) gives the ex-post values. When trades occur 
at the quoted bid or the ask the spread components in the two equations should be 
equal. However when trades occur inside the spread the components will have 
different sizes and it is not certain that all cost will be recovered at the full value set 
by the market-maker. 
By estimating the parameters of the two equations separately one can therefore 
infer to what extent each component of the spread is reduced following a trade inside 
the quotes. It is expected that by choosing to trade inside the spread, if that is possible, 
a trader can reduce his adverse selection cost as well as that related to the dealer's 
inventory holding cost. 
6.3 Data 
Following the procedures discussed in chapter 4 and appendix C the variables 
which are required for the estimation of the parameters of the Price-Change Model 
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have been calculated and are presented and discussed in this section together with the 
correlation between them. 
6.3.1 Description 
Tables AG. 6.1 and AG. 6.2 in Appendix G present summary statistics for the 
variables of the price change model for the NYSE and the NASDAQ samples of 
stocks. The change in price is expressed as a proportion of the spread at time t- I so as 
to derive equivalent values for the parameters of the model since those of the previous 
models have been expressed in the same way. The mean proportional change in price 
for the NYSE sample follows a decreasing pattern till the third decile then increases 
remaining close to zero till the largest activity decile. For NASDAQ it starts from a 
negative (lowest) value and increases in the second decile, then fluctuates around 
zero. Its value ranges from 0.0068 to -0.0017 for NYSE and from -0.0059 to 0.068 
for NASDAQ. 
The mean number of shares traded in the previous time period increases uniformly 
with the larger activity volume deciles and ranges from 949 to 2690 for NYSE and 
from 938 to 1974 for NASDAQ the mean in both samples being around 1600. 
The waiting time between trades at t and t-1 and between t-I and t-2 decreases 
uniformly for both NYSE and NASDAQ samples ranging from 2890 to 65 seconds 
for NYSE and from 3,100 to 116 seconds for NASDAQ. Average waiting times are 
almost twenty percent lower for NYSE compared to NASDAQ samples with 
NASDAQ values exhibiting much higher variability. 
The mean offer size for NYSE stocks increases irregularly till the seventh decile 
then smoothly till the largest activity decile ranging from 693 to 4770 shares, its 
average being 2180 shares. For NASDAQ it follows a smoother pattern increasing till 
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the third, remaining almost constant till the sixth decile and finally increasing towards 
the last one. It ranges from 794 to 969 shares with an average of 869. 
The mean bid sizes follow the same pattems as those followed by the mean offer 
sizes of each sample. The mean bid size for NYSE ranges from 571 to 4630 (average 
2150) and that of NASDAQ from 688 to 4970 with an average of 973. 
The trade indicator variable for NYSE follows an increasing pattern with troughs 
at deciles 4 and 8 and has an average value of 0.148. That of the previous time period 
is also increasing but with more troughs (average 0.139) whereas that at time t-2 is 
constant till decile 4 then increases smoothly (average 0.32). For NASDAQ a 
smoother increasing pattern is observed with troughs at the fourth and seventh deciles. 
First decile values are negative. Average values are 0.064 for the current variable, 
0.061 for that at time t-I and 0.425 for t-2. 
The average quoted spread decreases smoothly with increasing activity decile for 
the NYSE and NASDAQ samples. For NYSE it ranges from 0.497 to 0.287 USD with 
an average of 0.394 whereas for NASDAQ it ranges from 0.69 to 0.32 USD but the 
average spread is almost the same as for NYSE. NASDAQ spreads however exhibit 
lower variability. 
Finally, the realized spread, as a percentage of the quoted spread, for NYSE and 
NASDAQ stocks shown in tables 6.1 and 6.2 has been calculated using the method of 
Petersen and Fialkovski (1994) described in section 3.4, that is for buy orders we 
calculate the difference between the ask price and the transaction price, for sell orders 
we calculate the difference between the transaction price and the bid price and each 
time we subtract each difference from half the quoted spread. NASDAQ effective 
spreads are larger than NYSE ones in all deciles and spreads in both subsamples 
follow the same pattern, that is they are larger in the medium-activity deciles and have 
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large values in the lowest and highest activity deciles. NYSE effective spreads range 
from 32.2 to 42.63% of the quoted spread whereas NASDAQ effective spreads range 
from 49.6 to 71.7 % of the quoted spread. 
6.3.2 Correlation of variables 
The correlations among the variables used to estimate the models developed in this 
chapter are discussed separately for NYSE and NASDAQ in the following 
subsections. 
6.3.2.1 NYSE 
The change in price, relative to the quoted spread at time t-1, is positively 
correlated with the trade indicator variable at time t (0.65 to 0.50) and negatively with 
that at time t- 1 (-0.19 to -0.3 5 increases with decile). 
The volume traded at time t shows little correlation with any variables. 
The same behaviour is exhibited by the waiting time between times t and t-I 
except that it is slightly correlated with that between times t- I and t-2 from decile 3 
and higher and this correlation becomes stronger with increasing activity decile 
(ranges from 0.12 to 0.38). 
The waiting time between times t-I and t-2 is slightly positively correlated with 
the bid and offer sizes in decile 1, with the previous bid size in deciles 2 and 3 and 
slightly negatively correlated with the with the trade indicator variable at time t-2 in 
deciles 2,5,7 and 8. 
The offer size is positively correlated with the bid size (0.24 to 0.55) and the offer 
size in the previous time period (0.32 to 0.66). It also exhibits a weaker positive 
correlation with the bid size in the previous time period (0.10 to 0.36) and a weak 
negative correlation with the spread in the previous time period (-0.08 to 0.27). 
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The bid size is positively correlated with the offer size in the previous time period 
(0.095 to 0.36) but shows a rather strong positive correlation with the bid size in the 
previous time period (0.4 to 0.71). It is also negatively correlated with the quoted 
spread in the previous time period (-0.07 to -0.26) with the weakest values in most of 
the highest activity deciles. 
The offer size and bid size at time t- I exhibit stronger negative correlation with the 
quoted spread in the same time period ranging from -0.16 to -0.39 and from -0.15 to 
-0.41 respectively (smaller values are generally encountered in the higher activity 
deciles). 
The trade indicator variables at times t, t- I and t-2 show little correlation with any 
other variables. 
6.3.2.2 NASDAQ 
The change in price, relative to the quoted spread at time W, is positively 
correlated with the trade indicator variable at time t (0.48 to 0.58) and negatively with 
that at time t-I (-0.01 to -0.36). 
The volume traded at time t shows little correlation with any variables except for 
the first decile where it is weakly positively correlated with the offer and bid sizes at 
time t and t-I and negatively with the quoted spread at time t-1 in six of the other 
deciles. 
The waiting time between trades between times t and t-I is weakly positively 
correlated with that between trades between times W and t-2 and the strength of the 
relationship increases with the activity decile reaching 0.29 at decile 10. 
The waiting time between times t- I and t-2 is weakly negatively correlated (-0.14 
max) with the trade indicator variable at time t-2 in six of the deciles. 
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The offer size is positively correlated with the bid size ( 0.10 to 0.58) and strongly 
correlated with the offer size at time t-1 (0.26 to 0.82 weaker in the high deciles). It 
also exhibits a weaker correlation with the bid size of the previous time period (0.22 
to 0.58, in general weaker in the high activity deciles). 
The bid size is positively correlated with the offer size in the previous time period 
(0.002 to 0.52), shows a stronger positive correlation with the bid size in the previous 
time period (0.35 to 0.70) and a weak negative correlation with the quoted spread in 
the previous time period in four of the deciles, with higher values at the low activity 
deciles. 
The offer size in the previous time period is positively correlated with the bid size 
in the same period (0.16 to 0.5 1) and positively correlated with the quoted spread in 
the same time period in seven of the deciles. The bid size in the previous time period 
is positively correlated with the spread in the same time period in six of the deciles. 
The trade indicator variable at time t is weakly correlated with that at t-I in five 
deciles and positively correlated with the same variable at time t-2 in three deciles. 
The same variable at time t- I is positively correlated with that in the previous period 
in only three of the deciles. 
6.4 Estimation of the Model 
The procedure for estimating the parameters of this model is described in this 
section and the results of the estimations are provided in appropriate tables. Details on 
the theoretical underpins of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
methodology which has been used for estimation are given in Appendix A. 
The model to be estimated is that described by equation (6.5b) which is recited 
below: 
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This model describes the change in the transaction prices between times t and W, 
relative to the quoted spread at time t-l. 
Equation (6.5b) involves six parameters, namely p, Op, 8p, Pp, ap andyp and eleven 
variables. As in the offer-change and the bid-change models, p and the average 
volume can be calculated in advance from the data and then treated like constants for 
the particular decile allowing us to reduce the estimation problem into a five 
parameter - ten variable one. In estimating this equation using the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM), apart from the above parameters which we can denote 
by the vector (p, we require a set of orthogonality restrictions which can be 
represented by the following vector function of population moments : 
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[e, 
ef r, tte, t I- tIIt 11 
where el is the error tenn in the equation (6.5b) which corresponcls to Ký t 
The set of the above restnctions correspond to strict exogeneity conditions in the 
sense that 
E[ef IXX2, .... IX»1=0 (i=1,2,..., n) 
where Xj is the vector of all the observations of regressor 
Thus the expected value of the error term, conditional on the regressors for all 
observations is equal to zero. This implies that the unconditional mean of the error 
tenn is zero: 
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E(e, P) =0 (i=1,2,..., n) 
and also that the above ten regressors are orthogonal to the error term for all 
observations: 
E(xjk - ef) =0 (ij=l ........ n; k=l ........... K) 
or 
E(xj, e, " 
E(X, 
2e, 
f 
E(Xj - ef) 0 (for all ij) and 0 is (Kx I) 
E(xjkei, l 
Therefore the regressors are assumed to be orthogonal to the past, current and future 
error terms (or the error terms are assumed to be orthogonal to the past, current and 
future values of the regressors). 
As in chapter 5, the validity of the above strict exogeneity conditions is examined in 
the specification tests which follow the estimation of the model. 
The implied moment conditions are: 
E[f (p, h, )] =0 
There are five parameters to be estimated and ten moment conditions, therefore 
this model is over-identified by a degree of five. 
In our estimations we express volumes in thousands of shares and the change in the 
waiting time between trades in hours. 
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6.5 Discussion of Results 
Tables AG. 6.3 and AG. 6.4 in Appendix G present the Generalized Method of 
Moments Estimates of the Parameters of the Price Change Model described by 
equation (6.5b) for the NYSE and NASDAQ samples of stocks respectively. The 
parameter values are also plotted in figures 6.1 to 6.5. 
The fixed-cost-of-trade parameter ap, plotted in figure 6.1, is significantly 
different from zero in eight of the ten deciles for NYSE (seven at the 1% level of 
significance) and in only four of the NASDAQ deciles (one at the 1% and two at the 
5% level). Its value for NYSE follows an inverse-U shape and ranges from 4 to 21 
percent of the previous period spread (total sample value is 4%). The pattern for 
NASDAQ stocks is different, the parameter being significantly different from zero 
mainly in the higher activity deciles and decreases with increasing activity, its value 
ranging from 60 to 25 percent of the previous spread (it is 10% for the total sample). 
The time parameter Pp, plotted in figure 6.5, is significant in two of the NYSE 
deciles (at the 1% level of significance). In the NASDAQ sub-sample it is also 
significant in two of the deciles (one at the 1% and one at the 10% level). For NYSE 
its values are 99 and 264 percent of the previous period spread and the total sample 
value is significant at the 1% level and equal to 222%. For NASDAQ its values are 
negative at 20 and 30% of the previous spread and the total sample value is not 
significant. 
The quoted volume parameter yp has been plotted in figure 6.2. For NYSE it is 
significant in eight of the deciles, in seven of these at the 1% level. Its value 
decreases steadily towards the highest activity decile and ranges from 3 to 0.2 percent 
of the previous spread (total sample value is 0.4%). For NASDAQ, where the value of 
this parameter is significant in only the second lowest and the highest activity deciles 
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at the I and 5% level respectively, its values are 61.6 and 26.1% of the previous 
spread and the total sample value is not significant. 
The inventory cost parameter 8p, plotted in figure 6.3, is significant in six of the 
NYSE deciles (two at 1% and two at the 5% level), its value ranging from 3 to 0.2% 
of the previous spread (total sample value is 0.06%). Its pattem follows a U-shape 
(with the exception of decile 9 which has a low value) being insignificant in the 
medium-activity deciles. For the NASDAQ sub-sample this parameter is significantly 
different from zero in also five deciles, in four at the 1% level and shows an 
increasing pattern as trading activity increases. Its values range from 5.3 to 8.6 % of 
the previous spread being much larger than NYSE values (total sample value is not 
significant). 
The adverse selection parameter Op, plotted in figure 6.4, which is significant in 
four NYSE deciles (at 1%), has values ranging between 6.3 and 0.3% of the previous 
spread (the value for the total sample is 0.1%), decreasing as activity increases. For 
NASDAQ stocks it is significant in three medium-activity deciles (two at the I and 
one at the 10% level) ranging from 8.8 to 3.3% of the spread and follows the same 
decreasing pattern as for NYSE (total sample value is 9.3%). 
A summary of the results of the Price-Change Models is provided in table 6.1. 
Using the parameter values estimated and presented in tables AG. 6.3 and AG. 6-4 
in Appendix G together with the values for the average realized spreads which are 
presented in tables AG. 6.1 and AG. 6.2 in the same Appendix the adverse-selection 
and the inventory-holding costs present in the realized spread have been calculated for 
the NYSE and NASDAQ subsamples as percentages of the realized spread and are 
given in table 6.2. As is evident from this table only a very small part of the above 
costs is recovered through trading. For NYSE the adverse-selection cost ranges 
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between 0.11 and 2.59 percent of the realized spread whereas the inventory-holding 
cost ranges from 0.12 to 0.86 percent. For NASDAQ stocks the adverse-selection cost 
varies from 1.18 to 2.34 percent whereas the inventory-holding cost from 0.16 to 3.61 
percent of the realized spread. However, as has been shown by Ellis, Michaely and 
O'Hara (2000) and discussed in section 4.3, the effective spread we have calculated 
may be over-estimated due to our use of the Lee and Ready (1991) rule for trade- 
classification in which case the estimated components as percentages of the realized 
spread could be even larger. 
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Table 6.1 Summary of the Results from the Estimations of the Price-Change 
Model, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ Data: October 1994. 
Table 6.1 presents a descriptive summary of the results from the GMM estimation of the Price-Change 
Model of equation (6.5b) for both the NYSE and NASDAQ sub-samples from the TAQ database for 
October 1994. 
PRICE-CHANGE MODEL 
NYSE 
ap 
Significant In eight deciles (7 at I% level) 
4 to 21 % of previous spread 
Inverse U Shape 
yp 
Significant In six deciles (four at I% level) 
1.8 to 0.6 % of previous spread 
Decreases from lowest to highest activity 
deciles 
6, 
NASDAQ 
Significant in four deciles (I at 1%; 2 at 5%) 
25 to 60 % of previous spread 
Decreases with increasing activity decile 
Significant in two deciles (I and 5% level) 
61.6 and 26.1 % of previous spread 
Highest activity decile has lower value 
Significant In six deciles (2 at 1% and In 2 Significant in five deciles (in four at I% and In one 
at 5% level) at 5% level) 
Positive; 3 to 0.2 % of previous spread 
U-shape with highest value in low activity 
deciles (but lowest value in highest) 
Positive; 5.3 to 8.6 % of previous spread 
Increases with Increasing activity deciles 
0, 
Significant in four deciles (at I% level) Significant in 3 medium - activity deciles 
(2 at 1% and 1 at 10% level) 
6.3 to 0.3 % of previous spread 
Decreases with increasing activity decile 
8.8 to 3.8% of previous spread 
Shows decreasing trend as activity increases 
PP 
Significant in two deciles (at 1%) Significant in two deciles (1 and 10% level) 
99 to 264 % of previous spread 20 to 30 % of previous spread 
Positive Negative 
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Table 6.2 Adverse-selection and Inventory-holding costs as Percentages of the 
Realized Spread, NYSE and NASDAQ Common Stocks, TAQ Data: October 
1994. 
Table 6.2 presents the adverse-selection and inventory-holding costs present in the realized spread, as 
percentages of this variable, for NYSE and NASDAQ subsamples from the TAQ database for October 
1994. Figures for the adverse-selection parameter, Op and the inventory-holding cost parameter, Sp, 
from tables AG. 6.3 and AG. 6.4 in Appendix G, which have been estimated by the Price-Change 
Model, together with values for the average realized spreads, SR. presented in tables AG. 6.1 and 
AG. 6.2 in the same Appendix have been used for the calculations. 
NYSE 
Decile 1123456789 10 
Averse-Selection 0.00 0.00 2.59 0.00 2.16 0.00 1.37 0.00 0.12 0.00 
Cost 
Inventory-Holding 0.00 0.12 0.23 0.27 0.12 0.57 0.00 0.86 0.12 0.00 
Cost 
NASDAQ 
Decile 123456789 10 
Averse-Selection 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.33 1.18 1.73 0.00 1.78 0.00 
Cost 
Inventory-Holding 0.00 0.16 0.00 2.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.03 0.00 3.61 
Cost 
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FIGURE 6.3 
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FIGURE 6.5 
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6.6 Specification Testing 
We follow the same procedure for the specification of this model as for the Quoted 
Spread Model in chapter five. We first examine Hansen's J-statistic of overidentifying 
restrictions to verify whether there are moment conditions which are different from 
zero. Second we estimate the Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988) CT statistic 
to test for the validity of the moment restrictions in each decile one-by-one. We also 
use the GMM-BIC MSC statistic of Andrews (1999) to identify which moment 
conditions are satisfied in deciles 10 of the samples. Only decile ten is examined in 
this test for brevity since the procedure in this case could be long owing to the degree 
by which the model is over-identified in the initial estimation, that is one could go 
down to a series of steps, each time omitting one more variable. Subsequently we test 
for the validity of the parameter restrictions using the Likelihood Ratio (LR). 
6.6.1 The 3-test statistic 
This should be distributed as a chi-square with five degrees of freedom. As is 
evident from table AG. 6.3 in Appendix G for the NYSE sub-sample the statistic lies 
within the 10% interval in four and within the 5% interval in two deciles. It is only 
for deciles 3,7,9 and 10 that we can infer that part of the moment conditions used in 
the initial estimation are over-identifying. The picture is different for the NASDAQ 
sub-sample as can be seen from table AG. 6.4 where the J statistic lies outside the 1% 
interval in only one decile (decile 7) and between the 1 and 5% critical values in 
deciles 5,6 and 10. Overall it can be argued that the moment conditions used in the 
original estimation of the NASDAQ sub-sample hold better compared to the NYSE 
one. 
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6.6.2 Checking for correct moment conditions - Moment Selection 
To determine which moment conditions could be characterized as over-identifying 
the Eichenbaurn, Hansen and Singleton (1988) CT statistic has been presented in 
tables AG. 6.5 and AG. 6.6 in Appendix G for all deciles. As is evident from table 
AG. 6.5 for NYSE at the 5 percent level the statistic is not significant for the majority 
of moment conditions in all except in the ninth and tenth deciles where it is significant 
for most moment conditions. At the same level of significance the null hypothesis that 
all moment conditions in the NYSE sub-sample are satisfied can be rejected in most 
deciles for the trade indicator variable-related moments at times t and W as well as 
the difference in waiting time-related moment at time t-l. As can be seen from table 
AG. 6.6 for NASDAQ for most deciles and the majority of the moment conditions the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% level. It is only in three out of the ten 
deciles that the hypothesis can be rejected for the trade indicator-related moments at 
time t and t- I as well as for the trading volume at t- I- related moment condition (and 
for one decile for the volume at time t). 
To choose which moment conditions are valid in the sample we use the GMM- 
BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) statistic of Andrews (1999) as in chapter 5. This 
statistic is presented for the NYSE and the NASDAQ sub-samples in tables AG. 6.7 
and AG. 6.8 in Appendix G respectively where two moment conditions are excluded 
from the full set of moment conditions which had been used in the initial estimation. 
The degree to which the Price-Change model is over-identified in the initial GMM 
estimation in tables AG. 6.3 and AG. 6.4 is five which implies that by following the 
same downward testing procedure, as in chapter 5, that is by excluding one moment 
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condition in turn until the J-statistic is not rejected, could lead to a very large number 
of estimations. For this reason the procedure has only been carried out for decile 10 
and conclusions on which moment conditions hold in the whole sub-sample are drawn 
from this decile. As can be seen from table AG. 6.7 for NYSE by excluding the 
moment conditions related to the couples of variables change in volume of ask at 
time t with the same change in time t-1 as well as with the change in the volume of 
bid at time t- I one obtains the lowest values of the BIC statistic together with J-values 
which are well within the 5% confidence interval. Values of the BIC statistic very 
close to the above are also obtained for the moment conditions related to a) the change 
in waiting time at t-2 with the change in the volume of the bid at time t-1, b) the 
change in the volume of the ask at time t-I with the change in the volume of the bid at 
t-1, c) the trade indicator variable at time t with that at time t- I and d) the change in 
the volume of the bid at time t with both the volume at time t and at time t-l. From 
table AG. 6.8 for NASDAQ, the couples of moment conditions giving the lowest BIC 
values, as well as i-values well within the 5% confidence interval are those related to 
a) the waiting time at W with that at t-2 as well as the trade indicator variable at t-2 
and b) the waiting time at t-2 with both the change in the volume of the ask at t as 
well as the trade indicator variable at time t. 
6.6.3 Testing the Parameters of the Model 
As was done in chapter 5 we test for the joint hypothesis that all parameters in the 
model are equal to zero by carrying out a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test. It is evident 
from tables AG. 6.9 for NYSE and AG. 6.10 for NASDAQ that at the five percent level 
of significance the null hypothesis should be rejected for all deciles of the NYSE 
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subsample and for all but the first NASDAQ decile. It is possible that the small 
number of observations in the latter decile is not adequate for carrying out the test. 
6.6.4 Conclusions from the Specification Tests 
The above specification tests indicate that many of the strong exogeneity 
assumptions regarding the regressors used in the Price-Change model appear to be 
violated for the NYSE sub-sample, especially in the case of very liquid stocks. In 
particular, the changes in the size of the bid and ask as well as the trade indicator 
variable related assumptions seem not to be valid in the highest activity decile a fact 
which indicates that for highly liquid stocks these variables appear to be correlated at 
some points in time with the change in price. This effect has not been accounted for in 
the development of the Price-Change model where the particular variables have been 
assumed to be able to explain the change in price and not vice-versa. 
Overall the exogeneity assumptions appear to hold better in the NASDAQ sub- 
sample where the ones related to the change in waiting time and the trade indicator 
variable appear to be violated more often than the rest. However, as discussed in 
section 5.6.4 the stronger validity of the assumptions for NASDAQ may be due to the 
smaller number of observations. 
Finally, the specification tests in this section indicate that at least for NYSE the 
change in price should be modelled in such a way as to better capture the effect of 
lagged price changes on variables such as the change in the volume of bid and ask as 
well as on the trade indicator variable. 
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6.7 Conclusions 
The results from the GMM estimation of the Price Change Model indicate that 
there is a significant Fixed-Cost-of-Trade parameter, ap for NYSE stocks which, apart 
from the second and third decile where we obtain two smaller values, is larger in the 
medium activity deciles and becomes smaller as liquidity increases. Even though for 
NASDAQ the evidence is weaker, this component appears to be large in illiquid 
stocks and decreases slightly with increasing activity. The trend of a decreasing fixed 
cost of trade as liquidity increases, which is evident in figure (6.1), accords well with 
the idea of a dealer who charges a larger fixed order-processing cost for low liquidity 
stocks so as to deal with the danger of failing to recover his costs due to the small 
expected number of trades. In liquid stocks the dealer sets a lower fixed cost knowing 
that he could recover his costs from a larger number of trades. 
The Quoted Volume parameteryp, plotted in figure (6.2), is only a fraction of the 
fixed cost and follows a decreasing pattern for NYSE while it is only present in the 
highest and lowest activity deciles of NASDAQ. The decreasing pattern as one moves 
from the low to the higher activity deciles for NYSE can be attributed to the rate at 
which the dealer attempts to recover his order-processing cost according to the 
liquidity in the stock and can be combined with the evidence for the fixed-cost-of- 
trade component. Evidence for the first and third deciles of NYSE is weak implying 
that there is probably only a fixed cost-of-trade component for the order-processing 
cost in the very low activity deciles. This is also true for NASDAQ as evidenced by 
the large difference between the two values which indicates that the procedure for the 
recovery of clerical costs probably follows the same mechanism. A point which 
requires an explanation though is the positive sign of this parameter for NYSE which 
192 
was found to be negative for the equivalent parameter in the Quoted-Spread and Ask- 
and Bid-Change models in chapter 5. A possible explanation for this seemingly 
conflicting evidence for NYSE is that the increase in volume at the quotes forces 
traders to place limit orders inside the quotes so that they stand a better chance of 
having their orders carried out ahead of the queue. This has the effect of decreasing 
the size of the quoted spread. The quoted spread in NYSE however is only 
representative of the state of the book and the depth of the inside spread may be small. 
Anxious traders who wish to transact at high volumes and willing to pay a higher 
price may place market orders which will quickly exhaust the depth at the posted ask 
and bid and will eventually lead to an increase in the effective spread which would not 
have taken place had such orders not been placed. 
It appears that both the Inventory-holding Cost Parameter, 8p, in figure (6.3) and 
the Adverse Selection Parameter, Op, in figure (6.4) are close to zero in most deciles of 
both exchanges. The most likely explanation for this finding, is that, even though the 
two components are present in the spread quoted prior to the trade, the Order- 
Processing cost component is the main constituent of the realized spread which 
eventually leads to the formation of the price. Thus our model which, contrary to 
previous research like Huang and Stoll (1997) and Madhavan et. al (1997), uses 
trading volume directly into the equations for the quoted spread and the price does not 
find serious evidence that these two components are recovered through the price 
which from our evidence appears to be driven mainly by the order-processing cost. 
Note that equation (6.5b) described the change in price taking into account the 
realized spread and in this sense it refers to the outcome of the trade while equation 
(5.1 lb) for the quoted spread refers to the time before the trade. 
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For the inventory-holding cost this may imply that even though it is used in the 
quote-generating mechanism a very small part is recovered through price during the 
limited time-horizon (one month) which our dataset spans. NASDAQ values are much 
larger than NYSE and no evidence is found of values which are significantly different 
from zero in the medium-activity deciles. The values for the total inventory-holding 
cost relative to the realized spread which are given in table 6.6 reveal that only a very 
small proportion of the cost implicit in the quoted-spread is eventually recovered in 
the realized spread. This cost, compared to that estimated by Huang and Stoll (1997) 
for NYSE which ranges from 7.5 to 58 percent for the sample of the twenty stocks 
they used, is much smaller and apart from the different datasets used can only be 
attributed to the period of one year they examine which is longer than our one month. 
Nevertheless their assumption of a constant realized spread may also influence their 
results. Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) do not model this cost in their 
equations. Stoll(1989) estimated the quoted spread and the realized spread and from 
this he inferred the components of the realized spread which he argued should exclude 
adverse-selection. Using his results the average inventory-holding cost in the realized 
spread should drop to 17.5 percent. 
The adverse-selection parameter, Op, in the three deciles of NYSE where it is 
significant also appears to be small, around 6 to 2% of the previous spread whereas 
for NASDAQ it is also significant in three medium-activity deciles. The pattern for 
both exchanges is one of decreasing values as activity increases. The values for the 
total adverse-selection cost relative to the realized spread which are given in table 6.2 
indicate that, as in the case of the inventory-holding cost, only a very small proportion 
of the cost implicit in the quoted-spread is eventually recovered in the realized spread. 
Both Huang and Stoll (1997) and Madhavan et. al (1997) use only NYSE stocks for 
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their estimations. Our values are of the same order as those found in both of the above 
papers. Whereas our values range from 0.12 to 2.6 percent of the realized spread from 
decile to decile, Madhavan et. al. (1997) values range from 4.15 to 2.87 percent 
during the day. Huang and Stoll (1997) find an average value of 9.6 percent but the 
values for individual stocks range from 1.4 to 21 percent. Lin, Sanger and Booth 
(1995) with their statistical model find very large values (ranging from 19.8 to 62.6 
percent) but spread components are not estimated together as in the other two models. 
It is possible that if a stock-by-stock estimation was carried out in this thesis the 
results obtained could lie between those of Huang and Stoll(1997) and Madhavan et. 
al. (1997). 
The average adverse-selection cost in the realized spread for NASDAQ which has 
been estimated in this thesis is 12.5 % higher than that for NYSE. This finding is in 
agreement with the findings of Van Ness, Van Ness and Warr (2002) who showed 
that the adverse-selection component for NASDAQ stocks is higher than for NYSE 
and AMEX stocks, a result which is oPposite to that found by Affleck-Graves, Hegde 
and Miller (1994). 
Of course it is possible that our model cannot properly uncover this effect from the 
data and that a better equation may be required to be developed which would model 
this effect in a different way. Moreover, since this model is much more complex, 
compared to those in chapter 5, it may be severely affected by the averaging of the 
autocorrelation coefficients of the trade-indicator variables already discussed in 
section 5.7. For the NASDAQ dataset there is the additional problem that there are 
fewer matched trades which render estimation from this model more difficult. 
The waiting time between trades parameter Op, plotted in figure (6.5) does not 
appear to play a significant role in the formation of the price in the NYSE but its very 
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large value in the ninth decile together with a similar and significant value for the total 
sample is worthy of further investigation perhaps by modeling its relation to prices 
and quotes differently or using a larger and more accurate database. The idea that the 
time between trades may serve as an information signal has already been presented in 
the work of Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and Easley and O'Hara (1992a). As the 
latter paper argues, the absence of trade may serve as a signal for the existence of 
new information. An explanation for our evidence may thus be that in high activity 
deciles where a large number of trades take place, the existence of a long period of 
no-trade, which would not normally be expected, adds to the uncertainty regarding 
infonnation and results in an increase in the price of the stock. How this increase is 
brought about, given that the evidence of a similar effect in the quoted spread models 
is weak, is not however clear and requires further investigation. 
Even though our data for NASDAQ do not provide us with adequate information 
on the volume of shares quoted, they give us full information regarding the trades 
taking place. However, during the matching procedure a number of trades, which 
could not be matched with quotes (including mid-quote trades) have been discarded. 
Perhaps, if a different matching procedure is followed, during which trades would be 
matched with older quotes, assuming those still prevail, better results could be 
obtained. Judging from the results from NYSE, which come from a fuller database, it 
is anticipated that these components will not be large. Nevertheless, the weak 
evidence for the adverse-selection and inventory-holding costs from the Price-Change 
model necessitates the development of an improved model to study the components of 
the effective spread before accepting the idea that volume does not influence these 
components. 
Overall the contribution of the model in this chapter has been to: 
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1. Document that there is a significant fixed-cost-of-trade component in both 
NYSE and NASDAQ stocks which decreases as trading activity increases. 
2. Show that quoted volume affects the price-formation process of NYSE 
stocks its effect decreasing with increasing trading activity in the stock. 
3. Indicate that trading volume does not seem to exert a significant influence 
on the adverse-selection component of the realized spread even though 
there are doubts regarding the effectiveness of the model in uncovering 
this effect. 
4. Indicate that there is weak evidence of the existence of an inventory- 
holding cost affecting the realized spread and thus the price but it is 
doubtful that such could be uncovered in the short horizon which our 
datasets span. 
5. Show that there is some evidence of the significance of the time between 
the trades for the price-formation process of NYSE stocks which have 
very high liquidity but this factor requires more extensive research. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
The two models which have been developed in chapters five and six of this thesis 
have attempted to measure the components of the bid-ask spread of common stocks 
when the volume of shares traded as well as the volume quoted at the bid and the ask 
prices (depth) are taken into account explicitly and not merely considered as ranges of 
volume in the analysis. The role played by the waiting-time between trades in the 
price-generating process, through the formation of the bid-ask spread, has also been 
investigated by building appropriate variables and parameters into the models and the 
fixed cost of trading has been incorporated into the order-processing cost equation. 
Finally the behaviour of the spread has been investigated for two different exchange 
mechanisms as well as across deciles of varying trading activity within each 
exchange. 
It should be pointed out that the main equations of the two models, in particular 
the Quoted-Spread and the Price-Change model, deal with two separate stages of the 
price-generating process. The former model covers the first stage in the process where 
the bid and ask quotes are formed by the market-makers or the traders, just before 
trading takes place and examines the components of the quoted-spread that arise from 
this procedure. The latter model examines the components of the spread which have 
led to a change in price after a trade has taken place, following the quotation 
procedure. The interpretation of the results of the two models together aids in the 
analysis of the spread components highlighting their differences before and after a 
trade. The main difference between the data used in the estimation of the two models 
is the use of prices which the Price-Change model employs leading to the particular 
results of the estimation of the parameters. 
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In contrast to other papers, which employ the same estimation methodology as the 
one in this dissertation, we have also examined the validity of the moment conditions 
in the samples used for the GMM estimations of our models in order that a clearer 
picture is obtained regarding the accuracy of the estimation results. 
The two papers most relevant to this research are those of Huang and Stoll (1997) 
and Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997). Neither of these papers considers 
the effect of the quoted volume of shares on the spread. Moreover, the latter uses 
quotes only in order to determine the trade indicator variable and does not consider 
the inventory cost effect. The former model assumes that the spread is constant and 
estimates it using all the data. None of these studies incorporates the volume of shares 
traded explicitly like we have done and none attempts to study the behaviour of these 
components based on activity deciles. They also do not contrast the behaviour of the 
two exchanges in the two separate trading mechanisms. Therefore our results, 
especially those pertaining to the quoted spread, are not directly comparable to the 
findings of the above papers since in our models a larger number of parameters is 
involved with fewer assumptions. 
7.2 Main Findings 
The main findings of this thesis are: 
1. Trading volume affects the formation of the adverse selection-cost implicit in 
the quoted spread. In the NYSE the adverse-selection parameter becomes 
smaller the higher the trading activity in the stock imposing a similar pattern on 
the adverse-selection cost. This is probably due to the ability of specialists to 
recover it through a large number of trades in more liquid stocks. It is not 
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symmetric for the bid and ask sides of the spread (larger for the ask) that is the 
assumption of symmetry in our as well as most other empirical work is wrong. 
For NASDAQ stocks its effect is in general larger compared to NYSE probably 
showing that the information asymmetry in this exchange mechanism is 
stronger than in NYSE and demands the placement of a stronger charge for this 
cost on behalf of the dealers when it comes to quoting. We also find an 
asymmetry between the bid and ask sides in NASDAQ stocks but this effect is 
believed to be the outcome not of the quote-setting behavior of the dealer but 
rather results from the nature of our data which only report quotes at the BBO. 
Evidence indicates that the adverse-selection cost component in the realized 
spread which depends on the volume of shares traded is very small. This shows 
that the largest part of these components, build by dealers during the quoting 
procedure, is practically not recovered on average during the transactions. Our 
results which show that the average adverse- selection cost in the realized spread 
for NASDAQ is 12.5 % higher than that for NYSE agree with the findings of 
Van Ness, Van Ness and Warr (2002) who showed that the adverse-selection 
component for NASDAQ stocks is higher than that for NYSE and AMEX 
stocks. Prior evidence by Affleck-Graves, Hegde and Miller (1994) had 
indicated the opposite result. 
2. The absolute value of the inventory-holding cost parameter in the quoted spread 
is found to decrease as trading activity in a stock increases. The fact that, for 
both NYSE and NASDAQ, this component is found to decrease as one moves 
from the low to the high activity deciles, contrary to volume which of course 
exhibits the opposite pattern, indicates that in higher activity deciles the total 
inventory holding cost is recovered through the increased number of shares 
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traded, even though at a slower per share rate to comply with the faster 
adjustment in inventory for frequently traded stocks which has been found 
empirically by Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993). This implies that dealers can 
possibly recover this cost through a large number of trades in high activity 
deciles. Nevertheless the pattern found for the total inventory-holding cost in the 
quoted spread is found to be present mainly in medium-activity deciles and to 
follow an inverse-U shape. The value of the inventory holding cost parameter is 
not symmetric for both the NYSE and NASDAQ implying that the assumption 
of symmetry built into our models as well as all other models in the literature is 
probably erroneous. There is weaker evidence for this effect in NASDAQ stocks 
probably owing to the particular trading mechanism which allows dealers to 
share the collective inventory risk or avoid exposing themselves to this risk by 
quoting away from the BBO. The inventory-holding cost parameter however 
appears to have a smaller effect on the quoted spread compared to the impact of 
the quoted-volume parameter. Even though the size of this component is large, 
as evidenced by the results from the Bid- and Ask-Change models, the net effect 
is quite small since the two effects apparently cancel out. Evidence also 
indicates that this cost is almost completely recovered through the effective 
spread. Our values for this cost are smaller than those found by other 
researchers probably due to the short horizon of our database (one month). 
Inventory changes, which according to Madhavan and Smidt (1993)119 and 
Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) take place during a particularly long period of 
time, cannot be captured by our intraday data which span a period of one month 
only, thus the parameter in our models may not be able to reflect this effect 
119 As mentioned in footnote 22 in chapter 2. 
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since there may be a small number of large changes, beyond the horizon of our 
database, which affect the inventory position of dealers,. Another explanation for 
the small size of this effect is the fact that we have used in our models the 
average inventory imbalance of all stocks in a decile to estimate the inventory- 
holding component and it is possible that part of the effect could cancel out due 
to this averaging procedure. 
3. There is strong evidence that the volume of shares quoted at the ask and bid 
prices (depth) affects the size of the quoted spread of both NYSE and 
NASDAQ stocks and the impact of this effect appears to be larger for 
NASDAQ as compared to NYSE stocks. The parameter values for this effect in 
NYSE are negative since, on average, there is negative correlation between the 
changes in the prices of the quotes and the depth at the quotes. Our explanation 
for this effect on NYSE is that the specialist has the power to correct his initial 
fixed-cost-of-trade in low activity deciles when he realizes that quoted volume 
is building up. For NYSE stocks the effect is symmetric at both sides of the 
spread justifying our assumption of modeling it in the same way for both sides. 
For NASDAQ stocks however the effect is not symmetric probably owing to the 
nature of our data as explained above. It is found that quoted volume has a 
positive effect on the price of both NYSE and NASDAQ stocks and this effect 
for NYSE decreases with increasing activity in the stock exerting a significant 
but small impact on the formation of the price of a stock. One explanation for 
this finding is that the large impact that this component has on the quotes is 
reduced as prices alternate between the bid and the ask prices set by the dealers, 
nevertheless it affects price-formation slowly but steadily. The evidence that 
this component affects the prices of NASDAQ stocks is weak but, wherever it is 
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significantly different from zero, it has a large value. Our finding regarding this 
component is in agreement with the findings of Chakravarty, Harris and Wood 
(2001) who have shown that new information is first reflected in the depths of 
the bid and ask quotes, rather than in the updates in the spreads, implying that 
size leads prices as far as the information brought into the market is concerned. 
While they have used a statistical model to arrive at this result we have built this 
effect into a comprehensive model of the bid-ask spread which is based on 
sound theoretical principles and have estimated it for both NYSE and NASDAQ 
stocks. 
4. There is weak evidence that the waiting time between trades affects the quoted 
spread which indicates that it plays practically no role in the formation of the 
quoted spread. There is also weak evidence that it affects the price-formation 
process of NYSE (not NASDAQ) stocks with its effect increasing with 
increasing activity in the stock. The mechanism of how this takes place is 
worthy of further investigation. 
5. There is strong evidence for the existence of a fixed-cost-of-trade parameter for 
both NYSE and NASDAQ stocks which becomes smaller with increasing 
trading activity in a stock. This is attributed to the fact that dealers in less liquid 
stocks set a larger fixed cost since they are less likely to recover their order- 
processing costs from a large number of trades. 
7.3 Contribution 
The main contribution of the research work in this thesis has been to show that: 
1. There is an adverse-selection component implicit in the quoted-spread which 
depends directly on the number of shares traded, unlike previous studies which 
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only use dummy variables for ranges of size. It has been shown that this e ect is 
not symmetric for the ask and bid sides of the spread implying that empirical 
models which assume that it is are wrong. Parameter values for this effect have 
been estimated for both NYSE and NASDAQ stocks but within certain 
limitations which are described below and have been imposed by the models 
employed. Evidence has been found that trading volume has a small effect on 
the adverse-selection component of the realized spread. The evidence in this 
thesis also reinforces recent evidence which indicates that the adverse-selection 
costs recovered through the realized spread are larger for NASDAQ compared 
to NYSE stocks. 
2. There is an inventory-holding component implicit in the quoted spread which 
varies with the trading activity of both NYSE and NASDAQ common stocks. It 
has been shown, as for the adverse-selection component, that it is not symmetric 
for the ask and bid sides of the spread. Evidence has also been found of the 
existence of a small inventory-holding cost affecting the realized spread and 
thus the price but it is doubtful that such could be completely uncovered in the 
short horizon which our datasets span. 
I Even though the adverse-selection cost constitutes a large part of the quoted 
spread it appears to be a very small part of the realized spread. The results of 
this thesis for both the adverse-selection and the inventory-holding cost show 
that they are smaller compared to those estimated in other papers. 
4. The volume of shares quoted at the bid and ask (depth) plays a significant role 
in the formation of the quoted spread for both NYSE and NASDAQ common 
stocks, a feature not considered in earlier work. This effect is found to be 
symmetric for the ask and bid sides of the spread. Depth also affects the price- 
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formation process of NYSE stocks its effect decreasing with increasing trading 
activity in the stock. This component, even though it has been presented here as 
part of the Order Processing Cost, it could also be considered as a component of 
the Adverse Selection cost. The reason for extending this argument is that it too 
acts as a signal to the trader / dealer of the expected change in price and the 
market participant accordingly places his order so as to minimize the effect of 
this expected demand / supply of the stock in line with the original idea of 
Bagehot (1971). The evidence in this thesis is in line with recent findings which 
indicate that new infonnation first enters the price-process through the depths of 
the quotes and not the size of the spread, however we provide a thorough 
analysis of this effect for two separate market mechanisms and also for stocks of 
varying trading activity. 
5. There is a significant fixed-cost-of-trade component in both NYSE and 
NASDAQ stocks which decreases as trading activity increases. 
6. The waiting-time between trades may account for a very small part of the 
quoted spread but may also play a significant role in the price-formation process 
of those NYSE stocks which have very high liquidity. Further research is 
required to uncover a possible relationship and further research is required to 
investigate the mechanism through which this effect takes place. 
7. The above analysis has been carried out for two different trading mechanisms, 
at both the pre-trade and post-trade stages, using deciles of trading activity 
which help determine the patterns of the parameters of the above components. 
8. A thorough analysis of the components of the spread cannot be carried out 
without explicitly incorporating the effect of volume whether it is in the form of 
shares traded or shares quoted prior to a particular trade. 
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The results in this thesis have demonstrated that, in spite of the competitive 
nature of the multiple-dealer market of NASDAQ, its dealers overreact to 
adverse information extracting higher rents from traders compared to what a 
specialist in NYSE would charge. This behaviour could lead to a liquidity crisis 
easier than under the specialist system of NYSE where the monopoly power of 
the specialist and his privileged position, owing to the consolidation of the order 
flow for a stock through him, could help him moderate his losses. Even though 
quotes in NASDAQ are competitive, the lack of a limit order book, as was the 
case in the period where our data originate from, leads to higher effective 
spreads. However, the ability of NASDAQ dealers to share the risks of 
inventory imbalances allows them to charge lower inventory costs as has been 
found by our analysis. 
7.4 Policy Implications 
A comparative examination between the results of this thesis relating to the NYSE 
and NASDAQ sub-samples can shed some light into their implications to design 
issues regarding the two exchange mechanisms as well as to likely policies which 
could be adopted to the advantage of certain types of market participants. 
As mentioned in chapter three the two major differences between the two exchange 
mechanisms are the monopoly power of the specialist in NYSE and the consolidation 
of the order flow for a particular stock through him against the competitive multiple 
dealer system of NASDAQ. 
Even though, average quoted spreads in NYSE and NASDAQ are very close, as is 
evidenced from tables AG. 6.1 and AG. 6.2 in Appendix G, the realized spreads of 
NASDAQ stocks are significantly larger implying that traders in that market bear 
higher trading costs. Combined with the results for the adverse selection component 
207 
which indicate that it is also larger in NASDAQ stocks, one can conclude that 
uninformed traders in this multiple dealer market eventually pay higher information- 
related costs. This implies that competition is effective in shaping the quotes of the 
dealers but price improvement under this mechanism is lower relative to the 
specialist system of NYSE. For the latter, consolidation of the order flow through the 
specialist brings him to a better position in assessing the level of informed trading and 
he can thus set a more reasonable adverse selection cost. In NASDAQ however, 
dealers only experience part of the order flow and they probably overreact to informed 
trading extracting excessive rents from uninformed traders. Another advantage of 
consolidating the order flow is that, as the probability of orders arriving 
simultaneously at the exchange increases with liquidity, the probability of matching 
opposite orders also increases and the specialist has the tendency to decrease his 
adverse selection cost to the advantage of traders. Moreover, he is not obliged, or even 
allowed, to match all orders himself since many of these transact against limit orders 
in the book. As liquidity increases, together with competition from limit order traders, 
the monopolist position of the specialist can help him extract some rents from traders 
and thus continue to offer a market in the stock, otherwise he would not risk deviating 
from his optimum inventory position during large imbalances of buy or sell orders in 
which case a liquidity crisis would emerge. Thus our results indicate that the 
inefficiency of NASDAQ dealers in handling adverse information without extracting 
excessive rents from uninformed traders could easily lead to liquidity crises when in 
the face of excessive volatility they overreact increasing their spreads very much thus 
driving liquidity traders out of the market. 
On the other hand the specialist, as indicated by our results, charges higher inventory 
holding costs since he is the only one to bear the risks of undesired inventory during 
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order imbalances compared to the risk-sharing capabilities of the dealers in the quote- 
driven NASDAQ market who handle part of the order flow. 
The effect of the quoted volume parameter, which from our results appears to be 
larger for NASDAQ and which also does not decrease with trading activity, 
contributes to our conclusion regarding the overreaction of dealers in NASDAQ to 
increased infonnation trading. 
Whereas increasing liquidity can decrease costs in both exchanges it is believed that it 
is only through the introduction of a limit order book that the adverse selection 
component in the effective spread could be reduced in NASDAQ since trading could 
then take place inside dealers' quotes who then have to compete with limit order 
traders. It should be noted that the NASDAQ data used for the empirical analysis in 
this thesis come from a period of time when limit orders were not allowed. 
Since as was expected, empirical evidence in this thesis indicates that adverse 
selection as well as inventory holding costs decrease with trading activity regulators 
in all markets should aim at increasing the scale of trading. The problem with thin 
markets, that is those where the number of transactions per unit time is low, is that 
they are not able to absorb large imbalalances of buy and sell orders without 
increasing price volatility. Then, risk averse traders who face increased transaction 
costs have the tendency to leave the market aggravating the situation. 
The number of traders and the number and size of orders play an important part in 
arriving at a clearing price but depending on the choice between monopoly power, 
market transparency and types of orders allowed certain market participants will be 
worse off. So designers have to strike a balance between the satisfaction of the desires 
of all types of traders while at the same time keeping liquidity high and allow the 
hedging of price risks. 
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Assessing which type of market organization is appropriate or which policies should 
be implemented however demands a clarification as to whose advantage the design is 
aiming at. Exchanges normally wish to have high commissions or lower them and 
increase volumes. Dealers certainly wish to maximize their profits if competition 
would allow them and at the same time to abide by the rules of the exchange. Traders 
wish to carry out their orders at the minimum cost while at the same time minimize 
the effects of their trading on price. Finally, regulators wish to keep the market as 
stable and liquid as possible. The design of a market should attempt to compromise on 
the above motives and satisfy what Domowitz (1990) has defined as the three most 
important requirements of the market, namely: 1) reliable price discovery, 2) broad 
price dissemination and 3) effective hedging against price risks. 
A reliable price-discovery implies that the market is always capable of arriving at a 
market clearing price. A monopolistic market like NYSE contributes to this end but 
this comes usually at the expense of the traders since consumer surplus goes to the 
specialist. Moreover, the price is not close to the underlying value of the security 
rendering prices inaccurate signals of value. However removing the monopoly power 
of the specialist could lead to liquidity crises as discussed above. 
When prices are widely disseminated markets become transparent and traders can 
obtain information from market prices without losing to certain types of privileged 
traders. However, removing some of the advantages of informed traders may tempt 
them to move to other markets where they might have those advantages. 
Uninformed traders will also be able to protect themselves from price risks when 
market liquidity is high and there is no anonymity as long as the lack of anonymity 
does not deter informed traders from trading since they will be unable to conceal their 
trades and thus take advantage of their information resulting in an illiquid market. 
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Market designers should at all times strive to create an efficient market in the sense 
that new information should be quickly aggregated and impounded into prices. The 
speed of assimilation of information is important since when assimilation is fast there 
is large price volatility and the ability of uninformed traders to hedge against price 
risk decreases. The speed of adjustment of prices in turn depends on the extent of 
informed trading which affects the losses of the uninfonned but this conflicts with the 
task of the minimization of trading costs. The question then arises as to how a given 
surplus should be allocated among market participants. The answer is not 
straightforward and will depend on which types of traders' motives are the most 
important to be satisfied by the designer. 
7.5 Limitations 
The limitations of our models and database should be considered when 
interpreting the results of the estimations. In particular there are two types of 
limitations or drawbacks to our work. Those related to the models and those related to 
the data used. 
1. The ability of our models to thoroughly describe the price-change mechanisms of 
the two exchanges is hindered by a number of simplifying assumptions which have 
been put forward during their development. The first is that the adverse-selection 
and the inventory-holding cost components have been assumed to be symmetric, 
that is to behave similarly for the bid and ask quotations which as evidenced by our 
results of the Offer and Bid-Change models is probably not true. It has also not 
been possible to estimate the adverse-selection parameter completely 
independently from the inventory holding cost one since we have used average 
autocorrelation coefficients of the trade-indicator variable so as to avoid a stock- 
by-stock estimation which would be difficult. Another assumption is that it is only 
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standing quotes which affect the components and not the quote revisions preceding 
them. As Bessembinder (2002) has shown estimated trading costs increase if, 
during trade classification, trade prices are compared to earlier, rather than 
contemporaneous, quotes reflecting adverse quote movements prior to trade report 
times. If these movements occur after order-submission but before trade execution 
then they impose a cost to traders which cannot be captured if trade prices are 
compared to quotes which are in effect at trade report times. Thus utilizing the 
information in the quote revisions could possibly improve the estimation of this 
component. Another limitation of our method is that we have used the average 
inventory imbalance of all stocks in a decile to estimate the inventory-holding 
I 
component. It is possible that part of the effect cancels out due to this averaging 
procedure. 
2. Data limitations include the fact that the TAQ database does not provide 
information regarding the origin and nature (buy or sell orders) of the trades as 
well as that NASDAQ quotes in this database do not disclose the full depth of the 
number of shares at the bid or ask across all the dealers who make a market in the 
stock. The first problem has necessitated the use of one of the methodologies 
presented in Chapter Four in order that trades can be classified as buyer- or seller- 
initiated and this results in introducing a number of errors due to the potentially 
erroneous classification of some of the trades and / or the inability of the methods 
to classify certain trades, especially mid-point ones. The second problem 
unavoidably leads to the evidence obtained from the NASDAQ subsample being 
poorer compared to that from NYSE. The short time-horizon of our dataset does 
not allow to properly uncover the inventory-holding effect since, as explained 
above, inventory imbalances have been shown to reverse over long time intervals. 
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Another problem during the preparation of the data for estimation has been that a 
large number of it is lost during the filtering and matching procedures described in 
chapter four. During these procedures significant information is lost which could 
otherwise improve estimation. 
Finally, had intra-day seasonal patterns been removed from the variables in the 
models better estimation results would have been obtained. 
7.6 Recommendations for Further Research 
The above mentioned limitations and drawbacks of our work suggest the way into 
refining and improving potential future research. Our models, even though they carry 
the burden of more complexity, could furnish improved results by using more 
detailed databases (which unfortunately are not easily publicly available) and by 
making certain improvements on them provided that the new data can support these. 
Assuming that improved data were available 120 which a) could identify the origin 
of a trade, that is whether it came from a buy or a sell order, the nature of the 
participants in the transaction, that is whether market orders were matched with 
market or limit orders, or with trades from the specialist, and b) would indicate the 
full depth of the quotes, it would not be necessary to use any trade classification 
methods with a resulting positive effect on the accuracy of the data and better results 
would be obtained for NASDAQ. Moreover, infon-nation on the inventory positions of 
dealers and traders would aid in the exact estimation of the size of the inventory 
holding cost component allowing for a better estimation of the adverse selection 
component as well. 
As improvements to our models it is suggested that one should attempt to model 
the effect of quote revisions on the formation of the bid and ask through its effect on 
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the adverse-selection and order-processing cost equations. The adverse-selection 
component should also be modeled independently from the inventory-holding cost 
component either by the use of improved data, as described above, or analytically 
probably using an alternative method if one could be devised. Different adverse- 
selection and inventory-holding cost parameters should be used in the ask- and bid- 
change equations to model the asymmetry in these parameters as indicated by the 
evidence in this thesis. The fixed-cost-of-trade parameter in the order-processing cost 
equation could also be modeled separately for the bid and ask since it may not exhibit 
the same behaviour when dealers buy as compared to when they sell. 
Repeating the estimations in this dissertation using deciles constructed on the basis 
of turnover, instead of volume, might throw more light into the price-generating 
mechanism. It is expected that the use of data for more than one month in a period, 
from different months in a year or from two similar calendar months in two separate 
years would improve our understanding of the mechanisms involved in the formation 
of the spreads and prices of common stocks. Data for periods longer than the one 
month considered in this thesis could also allow for the proper estimation of the 
inventory-holding cost. NASDAQ data after 1998, when a limit-order book was 
implemented could also be used to investigate the differences in the particular 
exchange mechanism brought about by the new rules. Removing intra-daily seasonal 
patterns from the variables used for estimation in the models would probably lead to 
better results. Finally, by developing special programs which would allow for the 
stock-by-stock estimation at a fast pace would certainly improve the results obtained 
in this thesis. 
120 As in the papers of Hansch, Naik and Viswanathan (1998) and Hasbrouck and Soflanos (1993) 
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Appendix A 
GMM Methodology 
To avoid imposing strong assumptions about the distribution of the parameters of 
interest we choose to estimate equations (5.9b), (5.10b), (5.11b) and (6.5b) by the 
Generalized Method of Moments as developed by Hansen (1982). This method 
requires one to sPecify only a certain number of moment conditions and not the full 
probability density. However, this may have the drawback that it only uses some of 
the information in the sample. 
Hansen (1982) offered an extension of the earlier minimization methods based on 
the minimum chi-square estimators of Cramer (1946), Ferguson (1958) and 
Rothenberg (1973) as well as the minimum distance estimator of Malinvaud (1970). 
He provided the most general characterization of this approach and derived the 
asymptotic properties for serially dependent processes. 
For an (hxl) vector of variables wt observed at time t, and an (axl) vector of 
unknown coefficients (parameters) 0, an (rxI) vector valued function h(O, wt) of 
instruments is selected so that the true value of 0,0., is characterized by the condition 
Efh(Ooswt))= 0 
Which is a set of orthogonality conditions. 
if 
YT ý- 
(WT 
I WT-1 I W, 
I 
is a (Thxl) vector containing the observations in a sample of size T, and g(O, yT) is 
a (rxl) vector-valued function denoting the sample average of h(O, wt): 
IT 
9(0; YT) -2>ýh(O, wj 
216 
The method consists of choosing 0 so as to make the sample moment of g(O, yT) as 
close as possible to the population moment of zero. 
The GMM estimator is the value of 0 which minimizes the scalar 
Q(O; YT) = 
[9(0; 
YT) 
IWT[9(0; 
YT)l 
where 
00 IWTIT=l 
is a sequence of (rxr) positive definite weighting matrices (may be a function of 
the data yT). The minimization problem is non-linear and requires numerical methods. 
The first order condition is 
(A 
D0w T T)' TgT(OT 
Where DT(O) is a matrix of partial derivatives given by 
DT (0) 
«2 
ag 
T 
(0) / 80 
which converges asymptotically to D,, and OT is asymptotically distributed 
according to 
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217 
which is the asymptotic variance matrix whose inverse times any positive scalar 
gives the optimal value for the weighting matrix WT. The variance covariance matrix 
of the parameters is thus given by 
(D. S-'D. Yl 
The minimized objective function times T is distributed as chi-square with (Nf-Np) 
degrees of freedom where Nf is the number of orthogonality conditions and Np is the 
number of parameters to be estimated. Estimation starts with an initial value for WT 
(usually the identity matrix). 
To avoid problems related to the autocovariances of the function of the 
instruments (the number of estimated autocovariances cannot increase rapidly with 
the size of the sample) and to ensure that the estimator of S will be positive definite, 
the most common method is to use the Newey and West (1987) estimator which 
guarantees positive definiteness by downweighting higher-order autocovariances. The 
method is also consistent since this downweighting disappears asymptotically. Thus 
the estimator used is 
A (0 ) 
+, q-j '0 ST(q, OT JTq ri. T 
(OT j+Ii, 
T 
( AT ý) 
q- I is the maximum lag length which receives a non-zero weight. 
Other estimators which can be applied are those proposed by Gallant (1987), 
Andrews (1991), Andrews and Monahan (1992). 
The non-linear regression command (NL) in SHAZAM version 7.0 has been used 
with the GMM = BARTLETT option for estimation and a maximum lag length of 2 
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(with AUTOCOV=2) for computing the weighting matrix in the Newey-West 
estimator. For this estimator, when BARTLETT is selected, the weights, wj, used in 
the estimator are given by: 
L+l 
where L is the lag length and j the number of weights used (maximum=L). 
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Appendix B 
GMM Testing Methodology 
B. 1 Testing Hypotheses about the set of moment conditions E[f(xtq0O)] 
For a vector of observed variables x, of size T and a vector of unknown 
parameters 00 (px 1) the model implies that there is a (q x 1) set of population 
moment conditions: 
E[f (xt, 00)] =0 
-V The null hypothesis in this case is HO :V -2E[f (x, 9 00)] 
and V is a non-singular matrix where it is also true that: 
= FT 
(ýT )'Výl 
fT 
(ýT 
0 
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A 
where OT is the value of Owhich minimizes 
QT (0) = fT 
A V; l fT (0) -= 
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Z" Axt 
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0) 
1/2f 
andVTis a consistent estimator of V= lim var[T 7, 
(00)1 
T-+QO 
The null hypothesis cab be partitioned into that hypothesis pertaining to the set of the 
identifying and to the set of the over-identifying restrictions as follows: 
Ho =H'r)HO 00 
h rl PV-Y2 0 E[f 
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Therefore estimation is actually based on the population analogue of 
/2f 
() 
P Výl T Or = 0, that is pV-112 E[f(x,, 0)] =0 and P= M(M'MY'M', 
m= v; 1/2 E[F, (00)], F, (0) = 
af (Xt 
9 
0) 
ab, 
i. e. P is a projection matrix (of rank p) which sets only p unique linear combinations 
on the (q x 1) vector E[f(x, tOo)] equaltozero. 
The first sub-hypothesis cannot be tested since the sample analogue to the 
identifying restrictions are satisfied by the estimated sample moments. The second 
however can be tested because the overidentifying restrictions are not imposed during 
estimation. 
Hansen (1982): 
JT=TQT(OT 
A 
J _X2_p under Ho Tq0 
This is the well-known Test of Overidentifying Restrictions. 
The local alternatives to the above null hypotheses are: 
H' : PV-Y2E[f(xt)00)]=T-y2p, A 
Ho: (Iq- P)V-y -Y A 2E[f(xt, 00)]= T 2po where p, and po >0 
The main question posed is whether the JT statistic has power against violations of 
the overidentifying restrictions. 
Assuming that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied by the data, i. e. 
A 
H' n HO are satisfied, it is shown that J2 has power AT -Xq_PýOpo) andsince[t'[to ýý'OPJT 00 
against this alternative. 
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Assuming that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied but the identifying 
restrictions are not, i. e. 
A 
_X2 H' oHO is satisfied, then it is shown that JT q-p A0 
Regardless of whether H1 or H' holds the statistic has the same distribution under HOO 0A 
that is it has no power to discriminate between the latter two hypotheses. However, failure 
to reject HO does not imply the validity of H because H' may be violated. 000 
B. 2 Testing Hypotheses about Subsets of the moment conditions 
4f(Xtq0o)1 
Local alternatives can be expressed as: 
Hs : E[f, (x 0,, )] =0 and E[f2(x,, 00)]=O 0 to 
Hs: E 001)] =0 and E[f2 
(x 
t, 
00 ý12 2 T-Y A 
lfl(xt) 
where 00 = 
(0'019 
0'02 
) 
00i : 
ýi 
x 1) 
f(Xt'00)' =[fl(Xtl001)'5f2(Xt9OOYI fi (o): (q ix 
Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988) proposed a statistic, CT which is based 
on two estimations, the first including the full set of moment conditions and the 
second only those population moment conditions which are held to be true under both 
Hs and Hs 0A 
(A )_ 
CT= T QT OT QIT(61T)l where OIT : value of 01 which minimizes Q IT 
and Q IT = 
fTI (o 
I 
)'V; 
I 
fTI(Ol) 
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2 CT - Xv, under Hs v, -=q2 -P2 (degree to which 00, is overidentified 0 
by E(f2(x,, 00)) =0 if 00, is known). 
This statistic offers a method for the detection of E[f2(Xt, 
0, )]# 0 
via its impact on the overidentifying restrictions. 
Under certain conditions it is possible to develop complementary statistics which 
are sensitive to violations in the identifying restrictions. 
If p2 =0 and q, ý: p we can use E[f, (x, , Oo)] =0 to obtain an alternative estimator of 
0, 
0. which, by construction, does not satisfy the identifying restrictions. This test is sensitive 
to alternatives which satisfy both Hs and H' .A convenient Hausman (1978) type statistic, AA 
expressed in terms of the parameter estimators of two separate estimations is : 
AAA 
HT=T OT-OT Vý OT-OT where Vh is a consistent estimator of Vhwhich results from 
partitioning the sample moments. 
X, 
2 This statistic allows testing Hs'. Newey (1985a) has shown that it converges to a 2under 0 
Hs where v2is equat to the rank of Vh 0 
All of the above statistics are conditioned on the validity of E[f, (x ,9 00)] =0 
If this does not hold then the statistics can be significant even though 
E[f2(x,, 00 )]is actually zero. 
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B. 3 Testing Hypotheses about the Parameter Vector 
The general framework for testing these types of hypotheses is: 
HRR: r(Oj = 
T-Y2 where r(e) is a (s x 1) vector of continuous . : r(o,, 
)=0 versus HA ILR 
differentiable functions of the 
form R(O) = ar(O)IaO' 
A 
Assuming that the unrestricted estimator is denoted by OT and the restricted by OT the three 
statistics are given by : 
A- 
-1 
A 
M, 
AA )' 
r( 
A 
Wald Test: WT= Tr OT)' R(OT M R(OT OT 
LR Test: LRT=T[QT(OT)-QT(OT)] and 
f 
(Eý -Y2' - VT-Y2 fT LM Test: LMT= TTVpT whereP=M MM M' and TT 
M= VýV'FT 
(6-T ) 
The number of restrictions, s, should not exceed the number of parameters and 
these restrictions must form a coherent set of equations in such a way so that given the 
value of p-s elements of Oo, it should be possible to solve uniquely for the remaining s 
values using the null hypothesis. 
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Newey and West (1987) have proposed three main statistics which are extensions 
of the Wald, Likelihood Ratio (LR) and Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests to the GMM 
framework. 
All three statistics were shown to be asymptotically equivalent under both the null 
and the alternative hypothesis. Under the null, the statistics converge to a chi-square 
distribution with s degrees of freedom. 
LR is the most difficult statistic to calculate since it requires both the restricted and 
the unrestricted estimation to be carried out. However the Wald statistic has two 
serious disadvantages, first that it is invariant to a reparametrization of the model or 
the restrictions and second that it tends to be less well approximated by the chi-square 
in finite samples. 
Sowell (1996a) has shown that the above null hypothesis can be rejected either 
because the identifying restrictions are satisfied at Oo but r(O, ) #0 
or when r(OO) =0 because the identifying restrictions are not satisfied at the true 
parameter vector 00. The two main issues which arise from the above discussion are 
first that specification tests must precede inferences about the parameters and second 
that the trio of the tests are functions of the identifying restrictions and are thus 
asymptotically independent of the previous statistics which are based on the 
overidentifying restrictions under the null or any other local alternatives. 
B. 4 Testing Hypotheses about Structural Stability 
Structural stability may occur even when the expected value of the moment 
conditions is the same at all t. On the contrary, structural instability occurs when the 
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expected value of the moment conditions is not equal to zero for only part of the 
sample. 
Assume that there exists a breakpoint nT where some aspect of the model changes. 
This point may be known or unknown but in the latter case the null hypothesis is a 
much broader one since it postulates that there is no instability at any point. The two 
sub-samples thus formed are: 
T, = 11,2,..., [nT]l and T2= qnT]+ I ...... Tj 
B. 4.1 Andrews and Fair (1988) tests for parameter variation 
To allow for the possibility that the usual moment conditions are satisfied at 
different parameter values before and after the breakpoint, they introduced an 
augmented population moment condition: 
E[g(x, ý0)]= 
d, (ny(x,, O, ) 
=0 where d, (n) is a dummy variable equal to 
[(l-dt(TC)Y(X 
t902 
)] 
I for t: 5 TcT and ý0' = 
(011 
0'2) 
The procedure followed is : 
1) Estimate ýo using GMM 
2) Calculate W, LR or LM for the hypothesis: [IPq-IPýO=OP 
3) All of the above statistics have a limiting X' distribution if the restriction p 
holds. 
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B. 4.2 Ghysels and Hall Test 
They test: 
Ho : E[f(xtg0o)]=O for tET, r-)T2 against the local alternative 
HA : E[f (x,, 00)] =0 for t c: T, and 
E[f (xt, 00)] = 
T-V2P2 for tc T2 whereP2 ý6 0 
i. e. they evaluate the sample moments from T2 at 
01(71) 
Therefore under the null these moments should (in probability) converge to zero. 
The Predictive Test Statistic they derived is: 
AAA 
PRT (TC)=T -V2 Ef xtý O(IT) V; Rl T-W2 
Ef 
xt)O(Tc 
tGT2 
( 
tr: T2 
( 
A 
VPR is a covariance matrix defined in Ghysels and Hall (1990b). 
,X2 The above statistic converges to a ,q under the null. 
Since this limiting 
distribution has more degrees of freedom than the Wald statistic, the Predictive 
Statistic clearly tests something more than parameter variation, as is explained below. 
To understand the difference between the above two types of tests it is useful to 
restate the hypotheses distinguishing between the identifying and the over-ldentl ing 
restrictions. Since the latter are imposed in estimation some parameter values must 
satisfy them in both subsamples and therefore these restrictions will be structurally 
stable if they are satisfied by the same parameter values in both. Three types of null 
hypotheses can thus be stated. For the identifying restrictions these are: 
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Hol(n)=PV-y 2E[f(x,, 00)] =0 
PV IE[f(x0, )]=0 
for t c= T, 
for te T2 
For the overidentifying restrictions structural stability implies that they hold 
before and after the sample, namely: 
Ho'(n) == 
[lq-P, ý-YIE[f(xt, O, )]=O for tr=Tl and 0 
H 02 [Iq - P2 
ý-y 
0 2E[f(x,, 02)1=0 for tE T2 
where Pi =Mi(Mi 
I M, Mjy i 
Vi is defined on T, for i=1,2. 
and Mi = Vi-'I'E[Ft (0j)] 
Therefore the two null hypotheses for the overidentifying restrictions imply that 
they are satisfied at different values. 
For instability to occur any one of the three null hypotheses must be violated. The 
null hypothesis for the identifying restrictions is equivalent to that of no parameter 
variation and therefore the trio of test statistics (Wald, LR and LM) can be used to test 
it. However, since the overidentifying and the identifying restrictions are orthogonal, 
these statistics have no power against any local alternatives on the null hypotheses for 
the overidentifying restrictions but Ghysels, Guay, and Hall (1997) have shown that 
their Predictive Test has such power (hence the increased degrees of freedom). 
To overcome the weaknesses of the above tests, Hall and Sen (1996a) have 
proposed testing the two types of restrictions separately. To test the stability of the 
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OT(70ý-- O'T(71)+02T (70 where 0 'T (n) and 02T (n) are the overidentifying 
restrictions tests based on the sub - samples 
and T2 respectively. 
overidentifying restrictions one can use: 
Hall and Sen (1996a) have shown that under the null hypothesis 0 
converges to a X2 As they have shown, a Wald (or any of the trio) test has 2(q-p) * 
power against local alternatives to H01(n) , denoted as 
HA (70 but no power 
against local alternatives to HO(7r) , denotedas HO(7E) . However, 
OT(7t) has 0A 
power against H0 (7E) but none against H' (7c) . Since these two statistics are AA 
asymptotically independent they can be used together to diagnose the source of the 
instability. 
B. 4.3 Unknown Breakpoint 
When the position of the breakpoint is not known the composite null hypothesis to 
be tested is: Ho'(7c) for all 7t c rI c 
(0, I) 
Suppose we use the Wald statistic, then we calculate it for each possible n to 
produce a sequence of statistics and inference is based on some function of this 
sequence which is chosen is such a way so that the power of the test is maximized 
against a local alternative in which a weighting distribution is used to indicate the 
relative importance of departures from H'O(, n) in different directions at different 
breakpoints. 
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Andrews and Ploberger (1994) have presented a general framework for the 
derivation of these optimal tests which has been generalized to GMM by Sowell 
(1996a). The local altematives to H(, (n) to be tested are: 
HA (TO: pV-ý2 E[f(x,, 00)] = T-V2 I,,, for t r= T, ý111 =0 
pV-V2 E[f(x, 00)]=T-ý2ý112 for t ET2 
Andrews (1993), Andrews and Ploberger (1994) and Sowell (1996a) have 
proposed statistics for testing the above alternatives and based on the same principles 
Sowell (1996b) has derived optimal tests for testing the null hypothesis for the 
overidentifying restrictions, i. e. that HOO(n) holds for all nErI. His alternative 
hypothesis is that the overidentifying restrictions are violated before the breakpoint 
i. e. HOA'(n)r)HO'(n). Hall and Sen (1996b) have shown that his statistics are 0 
suboptimal against an alternative where the overidentifying restrictions are violated 
after, instead of before, the breakpoint, Le - HO'(7t)(-)HO2 
(7E) However, the more 0A 
general alternative, where the overidentifying restrictions can be violated either 
before or after the breakpoint is more interesting, i. e. 
jHO'(n)r) Ho'(ic)lu IHO'(Tc)n H 02(71)1 A00A 
Hall and Sen (1996a) have derived statistics to test the above alternative. 
Sowell's (1996b) test, apart from being optimal for local alternatives that imply a 
one-time structural jump in the moment conditions, it is also consistent for any 
testable alternative. These tests are independent of his optimal tests for parameter 
instability presented in Sowell (1996a) and (1994). He presented tests which 
simultaneously test for the stability of both types of restrictions but he further 
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expanded these by separating them into statistics appropriate for each type of 
restriction separately, as described below: 
Optimal test for alternatives with one time jumps of the identifying restrictions 
when the level of the jump is extremely large: 
TAAAAA 
EA,,, 2-1: exp -TF, 
OT WTM M WTM M WTFt(OT) 
T týj 2 
Optimal test for alternatives with one time jumps of the overidentifying restrictions 
when the level of the jump is extremely large: 
E1T1 TFt WT -WT 
' "' 
Ft(% 
)ý 
B «- -ZCXP - 
OT MM WTM M WT OT 
T2 
10 
J, 
Optimal test for alternatives with one time jumps of the identijying restrictions 
when the level of the jump is extremely small: 
T 
Ft 
^'WTFt LA221 OT WTMMWTM M OT 
Optimal test for alternatives with one time jumps of the overidentifying restrictions 
when the level of the jump is extremely small: 
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AAAA 
L, 
3= 
±F, (OT)' 
WT - WT M M'WT M M'WT F, 
(OT) 
Sowell (1996b) also provides critical values for the distributions of EA I log(EB), 
LA and L,,. Apart from their optimality properties these statistics only require 
the single standard GMM optimization to be carried out and are easily computed from 
terms typically calculated during GMM estimation. 
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Appendix C 
Data-Selection Procedure 
CA Procedure for Selecting Data 
Chapter 4 describes the methodology used to for processing raw data in such a way as to 
obtain appropriate inputs for the GMM estimation of the models. However technical details 
have been omitted in order to make it easier to read the text. 
The detailed technical procedure for selecting data for the GMM estimation of the 
models is similar for both the NYSE and the NASDAQ deciles and is described below in 
detail while an outline is given in table AC. 1. The following steps have been carried out so as 
to select data which are as free from errors as possible: 
Step 1 
The first step is to select from the master file the symbols of all common stocks traded in 
NYSE and all common stocks traded in NASDAQ as a primary market (see appendix E for 
details of the codes used). This is accomplished by running program MAST of the TAQ 
package which retrieves user-selected symbols by security type and / or exchange from the 
master file of the particular month. Extracted symbols are stored in file MAST94 I O. IN 
Step 2 
The file containing the extracted symbols in step I is renamed as SELECT. IN to be used 
to extract more detailed data in step 3. 
Step 3 
Symbols in file SELECT. IN are used to extract more detailed data for the above stocks 
from the MAST94101N file using program TAQSEL. PAS which has been written for this 
purpose. Detailed data for each stock include the symbol, the number of issued and outstanding 
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shares, the tick size, and the number of shares in a round lot (UOT number). These details are 
stored in file NEWSYMBDAT whereas symbols only are stored in file SELSYMB-DAT for 
further use. The TAQSEL. PAS program also attempts to filter errors at this stage by checking 
whether the particular stock is actually traded in the particular exchange and also ensures that 
the number of outstanding shares is not equal to zero. 
Step 4 
File SELSYMB. DAT is renamed as SELECT. IN so as to be used to extract trade and 
quote data from the Consolidated Trade and the Consolidated Quote binary files of the TAQ 
database using the TAQ program SELECT. The extracted trade and quote data are 
automatically stored in files SELECT-T and SELECT. Q respectively. 
Step 5 
Program TAQSTAT2. PAS, written specifically for this purpose, is used to classify 
symbols in file SELECT. IN by trading activity, based on the trading volume of each stock in 
the particular month examined, which is extracted and calculated from file SELECT. T. 
Classified stocks are then grouped into deciles, using a routine ('heapsort') which sorts stocks 
by descending volume and then 20 stocks are selected randomly (using a random selection 
routine) from each NYSE decile (60 from each NASDAQ decile so as to obtain an adequate 
number of observations). Selected stocks for NYSE are then stored in file NYRAND-DAT 
(NASRAND. DAT for NASDAQ) and detailed data for NYSE are stored in file 
RANDSTK. DAT (RANDNAS. DAT for NASDAQ). These detailed data for each selected 
stock include the symbol, the volume as number of shares traded in the month, the turnover as 
total value in USD for the month and the decile which the particular stock has been grouped 
into. 
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Step 6 
File NYRAND. DAT (NASRAND. DAT for NASDAQ) is renamed to SELECT-IN and is 
used again to extract final trade and quote data from the respective Consolidated binary files by 
running the TAQ program SELECT. Trade and quote data are stored in files SELECT. T and 
SELECT. Q and are renamed as NYALL. T and NYALL. Q for NYSE (NASALL. T and 
NASALL. Q for NASDAQ) to be used in later steps. 
Step 7 
For each of the files NYALL. T and NYALL. Q for NYSE (NASALL. T and NASALL. Q 
for NASDAQ) the following procedure is used to sort symbols alphabetically using program 
SortSymbols which has been written specifically for this purpose: 
1) For each calendar day trades and quotes are sorted alphabetically and are 
output in files NYALLNLT and NYALLNI. Q respectively for NYSE (NASALLNI. T 
and NASALLN I. Q for NASDAQ) - 
2) For each symbol in a particular day trades and quotes are sorted by time 
and are output in files NYALLN. T and NYALLN. Q respectively for NYSE 
(NASALLN. T and NASALLN. Q for NASDAQ). 
The above procedure is necessary so as to avoid errors during matching of trades with 
quotes which may occur due to the specific structure of the TAQ trade and quote files. 
Further errors are filtered using the specially written programs KILLTRADTAS and 
KILLQUOTTAS for trades and quotes respectively and results are output in files NYALLN2. T 
and NYALLN2. Q respectively for NYSE (NASALLN2. T and NASALLN2. Q for NASDAQ). 
The above filtering programs ensure that certain critical fields like the price, size of trade, bid 
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price, ask price and sizes of quotes are not less or equal to zero and also checks certain 
condition and correction codes which are described in Chapter 4 and tabulated in Appendix E. 
Step 8 
Trade and quote data from step 7 are read and matched using the specialty written 
program NY20GMM. PAS for NYSE (NAS20GMM. PAS for NASDAQ) and are output in files 
NYMODLDAT and NYMOD2. DAT for the Quoted Spread Model and the Price-Change 
Model respectively for NYSE (NASMODLDAT and NASMODIDAT for NASDAQ). These 
files are later used for the GMM estimation of the models by the SHAZAM package after their 
data are split into deciles of trading activity. 
Step 9 
For each exchange-related subsample the specially written program MAKEDECSTAS is 
used to split the data in the above files of matched trades and quotes into deciles of trading 
activity and the results are output separately for each decile and for each model to be used for 
GMM estimation by the SHAZAM package. 
Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for the trade and quote data of each sub-sample are extracted using 
programs NYSUMT. PAS and NYSUMQ. PAS respectively for NYSE (NASUMT-PAS and 
NASUMQ. PAS for NASDAQ). These programs have been written specifically for this 
purpose. 
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Appendix D 
Tables and Gra hs of p 
Summary Statistics 
Tables AD. 4.1, AD. 4.2, AD. 4.3 and AD. 4.4 
Summary Statistics of the Trades and Quotes of the Random Samples of NYSE 
and NASDAQ Common Stocks, TAQ data: October 1994. 
Tables ADAI and AD. 4.3 present Summary Statistics of the Trades and Quotes respectively for 
the sample of 200 NYSE Common Stocks and Tables AD. 4.2 and AD. 4.4 present similar statistics of 
the Trades and Quotes respectively for the sample of 600 NASDAQ Common Stocks. Stocks for each 
sample have been randomly selected from the TAQ database and grouped under dccilcs of trading 
activity based on the total number of shares of each stock traded in October 1994. 
For the variables: Daily Volume of Shares traded, Daily Turnover, Daily Number of Trades, Daily 
Volume of Ask and Bid and the Daily Number of Quotes the averages are given by: 
mn 
lExii 
Average(X) = i=l j--l 
n 
where n is the number of trading days in the month (equal to 21 for our samples) 
m is the number of trades of all stocks in a decile, and 
X is the variable for which the average is calculated 
The mammum and the mmimwn for each variable arc given by: 
n MaxlXij) Maximum (X) = Max i=I j=I 
n 
Minimum (X) = Min MijXi» i=I j=I 
where Max and Min denote the maximum and Minimum of a set of values respectively. 
For the other variables, namely: the Change in Price of transaction, Change in Ask and Bid Prices, 
the Time between Trades, Time between Quotes, Change in Spreadý Change in Proportional Spread, 
the Spread and the Proportional Spread the average the maximum and the minimum are given by: 
m jxj 
Average(X) 
m 21 
and 
M 
Maximum (X)= Max(Xi) 
i=I 
Nlin Minimum (X) (X, ) 
i=I 
The Averages, Maximum and Minimum values of the total sample have been calculated as the 
average, maximum and minimum values of the individual deciles respectively, that is: 
10 
Average(XT. w) = Avg(Avg(X, 
)) 
k=l 
241 
10 
Maximum(XT. w) = Max(Max(Xk k=l 
Nfinimum (X,,, ) = M'Oin 
(Mn(Xk)) 
k=l 
where 
Avg denotes the average of a set of values and 
k is the number of the deciIe the prorerty of which is calculated by the above formula. 
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Figure AD. I Variation of Average Daily Trading Volume with Trading Activity Volume 
Decile, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Data presented in tables AD. 4.1 and AD. 4.2 have been used in Figure AD. I to plot the variation of the 
average value of daily trading volume, expressed as the average number of shares traded in a day, with activity 
volume decile for NYSE and NASDAQ samples of data. 
Following appropriate filtering procedures, described in chapter four, a total number of 200 NYSE and 600 
NASDAQ common stocks are randon-dy selected from the TAQ database and grouped under deciles of trading 
activity based on the total number of shares traded in October 1994. One is the lowest activity and ten the highest 
activity volume decilc. 
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Figure AD. 2 Variation of Average Daily Turnover with Trading Activity Volume Decile, 
NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Data presented in tables AD. 4.1 and AD. 4.2 have been used in Figure AD. 2 to plot the variation of the 
average value of daily turnover, expressed in thousands of US Dollars traded in a day, with activity volume decile 
for NYSE and NASDAQ samples of data. 
Following appropriate filtering procedures, described in chapter four, a total number of 200 NYSE and 600 
NASDAQ common stocks are randomly selected from the TAQ database and grouped under deciles of trading 
activity based on the total number of shares traded in October 1994. One is the lowest activity and ten die highest 
activity volume decile. 
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Figure AD. 3 Variation of the Average Change in Share Price with Trading Activity 
Volume Decile, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Data presented in tables AD. 4.1 and AD. 4.2 have been used in Figure AD. 3 to plot the variation of the 
average change in the price of shares, expressed in U. S. Dollars, with activity volume decile for NYSE and 
NASDAQ samples of data. 
Following appropriate filtering procedures, described in chapter four, a total number of 200 NYSE and 600 
NASDAQ common stocks arc randomly selected from the TAQ database and grouped under deciles of trading 
activity based on the total number of shares traded in October 1994. One is the lowest activity and ten the highest 
activity volume decile. 
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Figure AD. 4 Variation of the Average Time between Trades with Trading Activity 
Volume Decile, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Data presented in tables AD. 4.1 and AD-4.2 have been used in Figure ADA to plot the variation of the 
average time between trades, in seconds, with activity volume decile for NYSE and NASDAQ samples of data. 
Following appropriate filtering procedures, described in chapter four, a total number of 200 NYSE and 600 
NASDAQ common stocks are randomly selected from the TAQ database and grouped under deciles of trading 
activity based on the total munber of shares traded in October 1994. One is the lowest activity and ten the highest 
activity volume decile. 
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Figure AD. 5 Variation of the Average Daily Number of Trades with Trading Activity 
Volume Decile, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Data presented in tables AD. 4.1 and AD. 4.2 bave been used in Figure AD. 5 to plot the variation of the 
average daily number of trades, with activity volume docile for NYSE and NASDAQ samples of data. 
Following appropriate filtering procedures, described in chapter four, a total number of 200 NYSE and 600 
NASDAQ common stocks are randomly selected from the TAQ database and grouped under deciles of trading 
activity based on the total number of shares traded in October 1994. One is the lowest activity and ten the highest 
activity volume decdc. 
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Figure AD. 6 Variation of the Average Daily Volume of the Offer (ASK) Price with 
Trading Activity Volume Decile, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Data presented in tables AD. 4.3 and AD. 4.4 have been used in Figure AD. 6 to plot the variation of the 
average daily volume of the offer (ask) price, expressed as the average number of shares offered for all stocks in a 
decile in a day, with activity volume dccile for NYSE and NASDAQ samples of data- 
Following appropriate filtering procedures, described in chapter four, a total number of 200 NYSE and 600 
NASDAQ common stocks are randomly selected from the TAQ database and grouped under deciles of trading 
activity based on the total number of shares traded in October 1994. One is the lowest activity and ten the highest 
activity volume decile. 
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Figure AD. 7 Variation of the Average Daily Volume of the Bid Price with Trading 
Activity Volume Decile, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Data presented in tables ADA. 3 and AD. 4.4 have been used in Figure AD. 7 to plot the variation of the 
average daily volume of the bid price, expressed as the average number of shares bid for all stocks in a docile in a 
day, with activity volume docile for NYSE and NASDAQ samples of data. 
Following appropriate filtering procedures, described in chapter four, a total number of 200 NYSE and 600 
NASDAQ common stocks are randomly selected from the TAQ database and grouped under deciles of trading 
activity based on the total number of shares traded in October 1994. One is the lowest activity and ten the highest 
activity volume decilc. 
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Figure AD. 8 Variation of the Average Change in the Offer (Ask) Price with Trading 
Activity Volume Decile, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Data presented in tables AD. 4.3 and AD. 4.4 have been used in Figure AD. 8 to plot the variation of the 
average change in the Offer (Ask) Price, in U. S. Dollars, with activity volume decilc for NYSE and NASDAQ 
samples of data. 
Following appropriate filtering procedures, described in chapter four, a total nwnber of 200 NYSE and 600 
NASDAQ common stocks are randomly selected from the TAQ database and grouped under deciles of trading 
activity based on the total number of shares traded in October 1994. One is the lowest activity and ten the highest 
activity volume decilc. 
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Figure AD. 9 Variation of the Average Change in the Bid Price with Trading Activity 
Volume Decile, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Data presented in tables ADA. 3 and AD. 4.4 have been used in Figure AD. 9 to plot the variation of the 
average change in the bid price, m U. S. Dollars, with activity volume decile for NYSE and NASDAQ samples of 
data. 
Following appropriate filtering procedures, described in chapter four, a total number of 200 NYSE and 600 
NASDAQ common stocks are randomly selected from the TAQ database and grouped under deciles of trading 
activity based on the total number of shares traded in October 1994. One is the lowest activity and ten the highest 
activity volume decilc. 
Rgure ADA Variation of the Average Change in the Bid Price with 
Trading Activity Decile 
0.004 
im CO 0.002 
0 
.E -0.002 10 Co 
1 
-0.004 
im 
-0.008 
WSE 
RASIAQ 
257 
Figure AD. 10 Variation of the Average Time between Quotes with Trading Activity 
Volume Decile, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Data presented in tables AD. 4.3 and AD. 4.4 have been used in Figure AD. 10 to plot the variation of the 
average time between quotes, in seconds, with activity volume docile for NYSE and NASDAQ samples of data. 
Following appropriate filtering procedures, described in chapter four, a total number of 200 NYSE and 600 
NASDAQ common stocks are randon-dy selected from the TAQ database and grouped under deciles of trading 
activity based on the total number of shares traded in October 1994. One is the lowest activity and ten the highest 
activity volume decile. 
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Figure AD. II Variation of the Average Change in Spread with Trading Activity Volume 
Decile, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Data presented in tables AD. 4.3 and AD. 4.4 have been used in Figure AD. II to plot the variation of the 
average change in spread, in U. S. Dollars, with activity volume decile for NYSE and NASDAQ samples of data. 
Following appropriate filtering procedures, described in chapter four, a total number of 200 NYSE and 600 
NASDAQ common stocks are randomly selected from the TAQ database and grouped under deciles of trading 
activity based on the total number of shares traded in October 1994. One is the lowest activity and ten the highest 
activity volume decile. 
Rgure A1111 Variation of the Average Change In Spread with 
Trading Activity Dedle 
CL 
Co 
A 
06 
dc 
0.002 
0.0015 
0.001 
0.0005 
0 
-0.0005 
-0.001 
-0.0015 
-0.002 
Docile 
WSE 
RASEAQ 
259 
Figure AD. 12 Variation of the Average Change in Proportional Spread with Trading 
Activity Volume Decile, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Data presented in tables AD. 4.3 and AD. 4.4 have been used in Figure AD. 12 to plot the variation of the 
average change in the Proportional Spread, with activity volume decile for NYSE and NASDAQ samples of data. 
Following appropriate filtering procedures, described in chapter four, a total number of 200 NYSE and 600 
NASDAQ common stocks are randon-fly selected from the TAQ database and grouped under deciles of trading 
activity based on the total number of shares traded in October 1994. One is the lowest activity and ten the highest 
activity volume decile. 
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Figure AD. 13 Variation of the Average Spread with Trading Activity Volume Decile, 
NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Data presented m tables AD. 4.3 and ADAA have been used in Figure AD. 13 to plot the variation of the 
average spread, in U. S. Dollars, with activity volume docile for NYSE and NASDAQ samples of data. 
Following appropriate filtering procedures, described in chapter four, a total number of 200 NYSE and 600 
NASDAQ common stocks arc randomly selected from the TAQ database and grouped under deciles of trading 
activity based on the total number of shares traded in October 1994. One is the lowest activity and ten the highest 
activity volume docile. 
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Figure AD. 14 Variation of the Average Proportional Spread with Trading Activity 
Volume Decile, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Data presented in tables AD. 4.3 and AD. 4.4 have been used in Figure AD. 14 to plot the variation of the 
average proportional spread, with activity volume decdc for NYSE and NASDAQ samples of data. 
Following appropriate filtering procedures, described in chapter four, a total number of 200 NYSE and 600 
NASDAQ common stocks are randomly selected from the TAQ database and grouped under decilcs of trading 
activity based on the total number of shares traded in October 1994. One is the lowest activity and ten the highest 
activity volume decile. 
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Figure AD. 15 Variation of the Average Daily Number of Quotes with Trading Activity 
Volume Decile, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Data presented in tables AD. 4.3 and AD. 4.4 have been used in Figure AD. 15 to plot the variation of the 
average daily number of quotes for all stocks in a decile in a day, with activity volume decile for NYSE and 
NASDAQ samples of data. 
Following appropriate filtering procedures, described in chapter four, a total number of 200 NYSE and 600 
NASDAQ common stocks are randomly selected from the TAQ database and grouped under deciles of trading 
activity based on the total number of shares traded in October 1994. One is the lowest activity and ten the highest 
activity volume decilc. 
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App en dix E 
Trade and Quote (TAQ) Database 
Condition and Correction Codes 
AE. 1 Introduction 
A number of condition and correction codes have been used for the creation of the 
Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. These provide useful infonnation which aids 
researchers in evaluating the validity of the data reported. 
The following information has been obtained from the TAQ Database Manual of 
the New York Stock Exchange, Version 3.1,1995. 
The main files included in the TAQ database are the following: 
Name of File Description 
Date File Provides information on the dates on 
which transactions have taken place and 
the positions in the trade and quote files 
where data can be found for a particular 
date. 
Consolidated Trade File Contains one record for each trade 
reported and contains fields for the time, 
price, size and exchange of each trade. 
Also contains condition and correction 
codes. 
Consolidated Quote File Contains one record for each quote 
reported and contains fields for the time, 
bid price, bid size, offer price, offer size 
and exchange of each quote. Also 
contains condition codes as well as 
information identifying market makers 
for NASDAQ trades. 
Master Table File Contains reference information about the 
stocks in the trade and quote files, 
including, among other: symbol, name, 
CUSIP (Committee on Uniform Security 
Identification Procedure) number which 
uniquely identifies each stock, exchange 
which trades stock, number of 
outstanding shares, size of round lot, 
trading denomination (tick size), type of 
stock (i. e. common, preferred etc). 
Dividend File Contains one record for each symbol that 
either paid a dividend or redistributed 
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stock during the month. Fields: symbol ' 
CUSIP number, cas dividend, stock 
dividend or split and date of split or 
dividend. 
AE. 2 Condition and Correction Codes 
The following conditions and correction codes have been used for filtering data in 
this thesis: 
Code Type File Description 
z Condition Consolidated Trade File Transaction has been reported to 
the tape at a time later than it 
occurred and out of sequence. 
There are other trades between 
the time the transaction occurs 
and the time it is reported. 
0 Correction Consolidated Trade File Good Trade - No Correction 
1 Correction Consolidated Trade File Good Trade - Corrected Trade 
2 Correction Consolidated Trade File Good Trade - Corrected Symbol 
0 Condition Consolidated Quote File Invalid Field for this issue 
4 Condition Consolidated Quote File A regulatory halt used because 
relevant news influencing the 
stock is disseminated. Trading 
has been suspended until the 
resultant impact has been 
assessed. 
7 Condition Consolidated Quote File A non-regulatory halt used 
because there is severe buy or 
sell order imbalance. To prevent 
a disorderly market, trading is 
temporarily suspended. 
9 Condition Consolidated Quote File A regulatory halt used because 
the level of trading activity in a 
security is such that the 
Exchange cannot collect, process 
and disseminate quotes that 
accurately reflect market 
conditions. The specialist, with 
Floor Official approval, may _j 
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switch to 'non-firm mode' for 30 
minutes. 
11 Condition Consolidated Quote File Indicates a regulatory trading 
halt or delayed opening due to an 
expected news announcement 
which may influence trading in 
the stock. A trading halt or 
opening delay may be reversed 
once the news has been 
disseminated. 
13 Condition Consolidated Quote File A non-regulatory halt used 
because events relating to one 
security will affect the price and 
performance of another security. 
14 Condition Consolidated Quote File A non-regulatory halt used 
because matters that affect the 
common stock of a company 
may affect the performance of 
other classes of securities for the 
same company. 
15 Condition Consolidated Quote File A non-regulatory halt used 
because there is a severe influx 
of buy and sell orders. To 
prevent a disorderly market, 
trading is temporarily sus 
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Appendix F 
Limit Orders 
F. 1 Introduction 
This appendix discusses a number of issues relating to limit orders. In particular, 
existing literature is presented on the following research areas: 
1) The effect of the existence of limit orders on the trading process. 
2) The decision process followed by traders in choosing among different types of 
orders. 
3) Comparison between market and limit orders 
4) Components of limit orders and the limit-order book, and 
5) Types of limit orders available and proposed 
F. 2 How the existence of limit orders affects the trading process. 
The difficulty in modeling limit-orders 12 1 has led early researchers to either ignore 
them completely or involve both types of order but not include quote-driven dealers. 
However, even in models of the latter type 122 bid and ask quotes are either infinite 123 
or are exogenously specified and never exhausted by the incoming order flow. 124 
The presence of the limit-order book 125 has been shown by Cohen, Meir, Schwartz, 
and Whitcomb (1981) to introduce significant negative serial correlation into both 
121 Kyle (1989), Rock (1996), Angel (1995), Kumar and Seppi (1994), Foucault (1993) Glosten (1994). One 
of the earliest models to use them was Kyle (1989) who defined the schedule of limit orders as a linear 
demand schedule covering all quantities. O'Hara and Oldfield (1986) and Hamao and Hasbrouck 
(1995) also used limit orders in their analyses. Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995), Hamao, and Hasbrouck 
(1995) and Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) described empirical properties of limit orders in the Paris, 
Tokyo and New York Stock Exchanges respectively. Hollifield, Miller and Sandas (1996) and Sandas 
(1998) carried out structural estimation on Swedish data. 122 Easley and O'Hara (199 1), Chakravarty and Holden (1995), Harris (1994), Parlour (1998), Seppi (1997). 
123 Harris (1994), Parlour (1998). 
124 Easley and OHara (1991), Chakravarty and Holden (1995). Seppi (1997) allows the depth of a monopoly 
specialist to be exhausted but his analysis focuses on tick size. 
Pure limit order book markets have been examined by Niemeyer and Sandas (1993) for Stockholm, 
Hedvall (1994) for Helsinki, Lehmann and Modest (1994) for Tokyo, Niemeyer (1994) for Helsinki 
and Stockholm, Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) for Paris, Frino and McCorry (1995) for Australia, 
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transaction and quotation returns for measurement intervals of at least several days. 126 
Rock (1996) has also showed that uninformed limit orders exacerbate the inventory 
problem of the market maker and thus delay the full adjustment to an inventory shock 
and that the book of limit orders can improve prices available to some traders by 
increasing the liquidity of the market. 
Copeland and Galai (1983) introduced the idea of the free option'property of 
limit orders, also tackled by Rock (1996) and Stoll (1990), based on the idea of 
Bagehot (197 1), 127 by addressing the adverse selection problem from the part of a 
quote-setting dealer who by offering his bid and ask quotes is in effect writing a put 
and a call option (a 'free' straddle option) to an information motivated trader. This 
behaviour is equivalent to that of a limit order trader who, by submitting his orders, 
offers put or call options to the other traders in direct competition with the dealer. 
F. 3 How a trader chooses among the various types of orders available. 
A number of papers have analyzed the decision to trade via a market or a limit 
order and the relative perfonnance of the two types of order. This order-selection 
decision is associated with the strategic behaviour of traders. However, most of the 
early models of market microstructure 128 could not study the mix between market and 
Hamao and Hasbrouck (1995) for Tokyo, de Jong, Nijman and Roell (1995) for Paris, Hollifield, Miller 
and Sandas (1996) for Stockholm and Sandas (1998) for Stockholm. 
126 Limit orders already in the book fail to reflect changes in information, a property they called 
"stickiness" of the limit order book. Stickiness causes prices to depart from the efficient markets model 
and this depends on factors such as the age of limit orders on the book, the number of orders on the 
book and their price distribution. 
127 They assumed that a dealer who wishes to maximize his profit adjusts the length of his bid-ask 
spread in such a way as to increase the difference between his losses to information-motivated traders 
and his gains from liquidity traders. 
128 Kumar and Seppi (1994) analyzed equilibrium in a static setting that allowed market and limit 
orders with discreetness. Seppi (1997) allowed only the specialist to act strategically whereas limit 
order submitters were assumed to be competitve. Parlour and Seppi (1997) compared the limit-order / 
specialist market structure in Seppi (1997) with the pure limit-order book in Glosten (1994). 
Angel(1990), Foucault (1993) and Harris (1994) modeled the order placement strategy of an informed 
investor for choosing between market and limit orders but the investor could select only one of these 
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limit orders because they did not allow agents to choose between the two types of 
order. 129 Almost all of the models reflect the essential trade off between market and 
limit orders, which is that between execution uncertainty and transaction costs. ' 30 
In his analysis of the limit order market Glosten (1994) allowed only for 
monopolistically competitive limit order submitters" and assumed that the trader will 
place a limit order only when his expected gain from transacting with liquidity traders 
exceeds his expected loss from informed traders but he did not explicitly model the 
investor's decision to trade via a market or a limit order. 
Easley and O'Hara (1991) found that apart from the fact that different order forms 
lead to changes in the informativeness of the order flow, price-contingent orders lead 
to faster price adjustment and thus improve the efficiency of a market-maker system. 
Chakravarty and Holden (1995) as well as Handa and Schwartz (1996) showed 
that placing a network of buy and sell limit orders around the current price is 
profitable and Handa, and Schwartz (1996) who extended Glosten (1994) found 
evidence that returns to the limit order strategy given that the orders execute are 
greater than the unconditional returns to the market order whereas returns to the limit 
order strategy conditional on the orders not executing were lower than unconditional 
market order retums. 
types of order. Hamon et al (1993), Handa and Schwartz (1996) and Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) 
focused on optimal order-submission strategies. 
129 Of these models Glosten and Milgrom (1985) focused explicitly on dealers; Biais, Foucault and Salanie 
(1998), Glosten (1994), Rock (1996), Seppi (1997) and Parlour and Seppi (1997) focused on limit order 
trading. 
130 Blume and Goldstein (1993) and Lee (1993) carried out comparative market studies based on price 
improvement defined as the difference between a transaction price and the prevailing quote. 131 In his model a single risk-averse, utility-maximizing trader who may be informed or uninformed arrives 
and submits a market order which is transacted against the limit order book (he is not allowed to submit a 
limit order). 
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When limit order traders do not run the risk of being picked off132 Parlour (1998) 
showed that a risk-neutral trader prefers to trade in a limit order market, compared to 
a hybrid or dealership market whereas when all dealers act strategically, as in the 
model of Viswanathan and Wang (1999)133 and the customer's order is competed for 
and divided among a number of risk-averse market makers a risk-neutral customer 
prefers to trade in a limit-order market instead of in any hybrid market. Foucault 
(1999) found that higher volatility in the asset traded increases its risk and affects the 
mix between market and limit orders in favour of the latter. Since volatility decreases 
with finn size (Hasbrouck (1991b)), and since spreads are positively related to 
volatility, small firms should have a larger proportion of limit orders, lower fill rates 
and larger spreads than large firms in limit order markets. 134 
F. 4 How the performance of limit orders can be compared to that of 
market orders 
As a number of papers have concluded the NYSE generally offers investors better 
prices than those available on alternative exchanges 135 and therefore brokers should 
route market orders to the NYSE. However most such studies ignore limit orders 
despite the fact that they constitute a large portion of the order flow. 
132 Since the asset value fluctuates, the execution of limit orders is uncertain so they run the risk of 
becoming mispriced as new public information arrives. This creates a winner's curse problem since 
limit orders are more likely to be executed at a loss ('picked off) when they are mispriced than when 
they are not. 
133 Glosten (1994) has showed that the anonymity of markets and thus the ability to divide order flow 
creates a problem for dealership markets but not for the limit order book. Bernhardt and Hughson 
(1997) have analysed the equilibria that arise when order flow is divisible. 
134 The model suggested that the observation that spreads enlarge at the end of trading in limit order 
markets (as note, for example, by McInish and Wood (1992) for the NYSE) can be due to increased 
execution risk at the end of trading. 135 Blume and Goldstein (1993), Lee (1993), Angel (1994), Petersen and Fialkowski (1994), Ready (1996), 
Ross, Shapiro and Smith (1996), Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), SEC (1997), Battalio, Greene, and 
Jennings (1998). 
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In their previously discussed work Handa and Schwartz (1996) showed that when 
transaction prices change solely in response to information, trading via limit order is 
suboptimal for all traders because the advent of adverse news can trigger an undesired 
trade, while the advent of favourable news can result in the limit order not 
executing. 136 Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) found that limit orders placed at or better 
than the prevailing quote perform better compared to market orders even after 
imputing a penalty for unexecuted orders, and after taking into account market order 
price improvement and that in some cases the use of limit orders can reduce execution 
costs. 
Measuring execution quality using non-price issues, as well as prices, Battalio, 
Greene, Hatch, and Jennings (1999) concluded that the routing of limit orders to 
regional exchanges frequently appears justified and fill rates and the economic 
performance of limit orders on regional exchanges may be higher compared with 
identical NYSE orders thus conflicting the evidence of other studies, 137 which 
showed that market order traders pay more for liquidity on regional exchanges than on 
the NYSE. 
The SEC (1997) study138 has shown that traders face similar adverse selection 
costs across exchanges. 
139 
Considering several market structures when the order size is known 140 Biais, 
Foucault and Salani6 (1998) 141 showed that the limit order market, where there is 
136 They referred to the cost of being bagged by informed traders which alludes to the situation where a 
limit order trader faces a negative expected gain from the execution of his order when this is not 
triýgered by liquidity-driven changes in the transaction price. 13 Blume and Goldstein (1993), Petersen and Fialkowski (1994), Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), 
Battalio, Greene, and Jennings (1998) 138 Lightfoot, Martin, Peterson, and Sirri (1999) and the SEC (1997) are the only two detailed limit- 
order execution quality studies but the former is not as detailed as the latter. 139 Moreover, this study did not consider the possibility that orders routed to regional exchange might 
receive better execution quality if routed to the NYSE but it is possible that they are not routed there 
owing to conflicts of interest. 
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competitive pricing, efficient risk-sharing and no tacit collusion (in line with Wilson 
(1979) and the empirical findings of Christie and Schultz (1994a, b) 142 is the optimal 
trading mechanism under certain prerequisites. 143 
F. 5 Components of the limit order spread and the limit order book 
In their empirical study of the effect of limit orders on NYSE spreads Chung, Van 
Ness and Van Ness (1999) found that specialists quote more actively for low-volume 
stocks and during early hours of trading when there are fewer limit orders submitted 
which suggests that they intervene in order to provide liquidity when that supplied by 
limit order traders is low. The spread was shown to be widest when both bid and ask 
prices are quoted by specialists alone and narrowest when both sides of the quote 
originate from limit order traders which suggests that competition from limit order 
traders has a significant effect on spreads. They also showed that the well-documented 
U-shaped pattern of spreads reflects the intraday variation in spreads established by 
limit order traders which is associated with the intraday variation in competition 
among limit order traders. 
144 
140 Viswanathan and Wang (1999), Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (1997) and Roell (1998) considered market 
structures where the exact order size is unknown to the dealers when they submit their bidding schedules. 
141 Similar to Hedvall and Niemeyer (1996) they also focused on variations in the order flow due to 
transient changes in the state of the limit order book. 
142 Reiss and Werner (1995) found empirically that SEAQ dealers offer quantity discounts. Dutta and 
Madhavan (1997) analyzed how long term interaction can enable risk neutral (in contrast to this 
model's risk averse) dealers to collude on large spreads. 
143 Their analysis is related to the study of auctions for divisible goods and the papers of Wilson (1979), 
Berhheirn and Whinston (1986), Back and Zender (1993), and Klemperer and Meyer (1989) even 
though their analysis is more complete and uses a different modeling framework. 144 Their results were consistent with the information models of Madhavan (1992) and Foster and 
Viswanathan (1994), partially consistent with the market-power models of Stoll and Whaley (1990) 
and Brock and Kleidon (1992) since they did not find a rise in spreads at close and opposite to the 
inventory model of Amihud and Mendelson (1982) since they did not find a wider spread at or near the 
close. 
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In a study similar to that of Chung, Van Ness and Van Ness (1999), Kavajecz 
(1999) dealt with the management of the depth 145 and partitioned the specialist's 
quoted depth into that part contributed by the specialist and that contributed by the 
limit order book thus describing it as the difference between the quoted depth and that 
on the limit order book. Using the TORQ database he showed that the specialist's 
quotes reflect only the limit order book on the side of the market where he believes 
that there is a possibility of infonned trading in order to avoid their own exposure to 
such trading. Changes in quoted depth were shown to be consistent with specialist's 
managing their inventory positions as well as having knowledge of the future value of 
the stock. He also showed that limit order traders and specialists reduce depth around 
information events in order to reduce their exposure to adverse selection costs. 
F. 6 Types of Limit Orders available and proposed 
An important element in modeling limit orders is the time between the submission 
and the execution of limit orders and this is related to the time between transactions. 
Limit orders lack price risk but their execution is not guaranteed and their time-to- 
execution is a random function of many factors including limit price, number of 
shares, market conditions, private information etc. 
A number of papers, like Angel (1994) and Holifield, Miller and Sandas (1996) 
have studied the probability of limit order execution both analytically and empirically, 
while another class 146 have been based on the idea that traders submit both types of 
145 According to rule 2092 of the NYSE, the specialist is obliged to give priority to limit orders at the 
quoted prices, contrary to his interest, unless he betters any limit order price before he can take the 
trade. The specialist contributes depth above that posted on the limit order book since he is responsible 
for maintaining a reasonable level of depth apart from a continuous price, a narrow spread and to 
stabilize trades. Moreover by offering depth he can signal his interest for trading to the trading crowd. 146 Glosten (1989), Easley and O'Hara (1991), Glosten (1994), Parlour (1998), Chakravarty and Holden 
(1995), Harris and Hasbrouck (1996), Kavajecz (1999), Rock (1996), Seppi (1997). 
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order in their attempt to balance the opportunity cost of delaying execution against the 
risks of immediate execution. 
Hausman, Lo and MacKinley (1992) found that time between trades is an 
important determinant of the variability in transaction-price changes whereas Lo, 
MacKinlay and Zhang (1997) indicated that execution times can be sensitive to 
certain explanatory variables like market depth, spread between limit price and quote 
midpoint and market volatility justifying the use of the types of order-placement 
strategies described in previous papers. 147 They also showed that hypothetical limit 
order executions are unreliable indicators of actual execution times and thus very poor 
substitutes for actual limit-order data. 
Other researchers have proposed altemative types of limit orders. Black (1991, 
1995) argued that in an unrestricted world equilibrium, if it could exist, uninformed 
traders would use 'unpriced' limit orders ('indexed limit orders, 148 orders with a limit 
price continually adjusted to market conditions) that specify the number of shares 
requested and a level of urgency and could not do better by using (1) conventional 
limit orders at a limit price, (2) specialized exchanges, (3) basket trading, or (4) 
sunshine trading 149 whereas informed traders would predominantly use market orders 
but might occasionally use unpriced limit orders. 
Brown and Holden (1996) analyzed three alternative types of limit orders which 
they showed could offer benefits to different types of traders. 
147 For example Angel (1994), Foucault (1993), Harris (1994), Hollifield, Miller and Sandas (1996), 
Kumar and Seppi (1994) and Parlour (1998). 
148 Called Participating Limit Orders in Black (1971 a, b). 149 An order to buy / sell a certain number of shares at a set future time at whatever price suffices to 
clear the market. 
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Appendix G 
Tables of the Results and 
the Specification Tests 
of the Models 
G-1 Summary Statistics of the Variables of the Quoted-Spread the Offer- and the 
Bid-Change Model 
Tables AG. 5.1 and AG. 5.2 
Summary Statistics of the Variables of the Quoted Spread, Offer-Change and Bid- 
Change Models, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Tables AG. 5.1 and AG. 5.2 present Summary Statistics of the Variables of the Quoted Spread, Offer-Change 
and Bid-Change Models described by equations (5.1 lb), (5.9b) and (5.1 Ob) respectively for the random Samples 
of NYSE (Table AG. 5.1) and NASDAQ (Table AG. 5.2) Common Stock data in October 1994. 
Where 
-Q ASt: change in the quoted spread between times t and t- I expressed as a fraction of 
the spread at time t-1. 
SP spread at time t- I expressed as a fraction of the spread at t- I (proportional t spread) 
SQ quoted spread at time t- I 
t 
Vt-I volume of shares traded at time t-I 
Aat change in ask prices quoted between times t and t- I expressed as a fraction of 
the spread at time t-l. 
Abt change in bid prices quoted between times t and t-I expressed as a fraction of 
the spread at time t- 1. 
A, r, j 
difference (seconds) between the time elapsed between trades at W and t-2, r, l 
and the time elapsed between trades at t-2 and t-3, TT-2 
Avt, a Change in the number of shares offered between times t and W 
AVt b Change in the number of shares bid between times t and t- I 
V Average number of shares per transaction 
Trade Indicator Variable: equal to +I when the trade is buyer-initiated 
equal to -I when the trade is seller-initiated 
First-order autocorrelation coefficient of the trade indicator variable, q, 
A total number of 200 common stocks for the NYSE and 600 common stocks for the NASDAQ sub-samples 
I-espectively are randomly selected from the TAQ database and grouped under deciles of trading activity based on 
tfle total number of shares traded in October 1994. Trades for each decile are matched with preceding quotes and 
t1le, above variables are calculated. 
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G. 2 Results from the GMM Estimations of the Quoted-Spread Model 
Tables AG. 5.3 and AG. 5.4 
Generalized Method of Moments Estimates of the Parameters of the Quoted Spread 
Model, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Tables AG. 5.3 and AG. 5.4 present the Generalized Method of Moments estimates of the Quoted Spread 
Model described by equation (5.1 lb) for the NYSE and NASDAQ sub-samples respectively. 
Q 
A =25pq, -, 
V, 
-1+2ppAT, -I+yp(AVta+AV, 
)+Aut 
where 
Q 
A change in the quoted spread at time t, expressed as a fraction of the spread 
at time t- I (proportional change in the quoted spread). 
Vt-I volume of shares (in thousands) traded at time t- I 
difference (seconds) between the time elapsed between trades at t- I and t-2, T, j 
and the time elapsed between trades at t-2 and t-3, Tz-2 
AVt, Change in the number of shares (in thousands) offered between times t and W 
AV 
tb 
Change in the number of shares (in thousands) bid between times t and t- I 
Trade Indicator Variable : equal to +1 when the trade is buyer-initiated 
equal to -1 when the trade is seller-initiated 
8: Inventory-holding cost parameter expressed as a fraction of the spread at time t-1 
PP : Waiting time parameter expressed as a fraction of the spread at time t-1. 
7P Quoted-Volume parameter expressed as a fraction of the spread at 
time t- I 
Aut : Error term at time t which is an i. i. d random variable 
A total number of 200 common stocks for the NYSE and 600 common stocks for the NASDAQ sub-samples 
respectively are randomly selected from the TAQ database and grouped under deciles of trading activity based on 
the total number of shares traded in October 1994. Trades for each decile are matched with preceding quotes and 
the above variables are calculated. The three parameters of the model, 8p, Pp, and yp are estimated using the 
Generalized Method of Moments. Standard errors, followed by probability values appear in parentheses. The table 
also shows Hansen's J-Test statistic of Over-identifying Restrictions which is distributed as chi-square with 
degrees of freedom equal to the degree by which the number of parameters estimated is exceeded (over- 
identified) by the number of moments used in the estimation. For the Quoted-Spread Model this value is two. The 
confidence limits of this distribution are: 
Pr ()? > 4.60517) = 0.100 
Pr ()? > 5.99147) = 0.050 
Pr (2 > 9.21034) = 0.0 10 
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G. 3 Results from the GMM Estimations of the Offer- and Bid-Change 
Models 
Tables AG. 5.5 and AG. 5.6 
Generalized Method of Moments Estimates of the Parameters of the Offer-Change 
Model, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Tables AG. 5.5 and AG. 5.6 present The Generalized Method of Moments estimates of the Offer- 
Change Model described by equation (5.9b) for the NYSE and NASDAQ sub-samples respectively. 
Aat =Opq, -, 
V, 
-, -Op 
Vpq, 
-1+8pq, -, 
V, 
-, +PPAT, -, +yPAV, +AXt +mt 
Where 
Aat : change in the ask prices quoted between times t and W, expressed as a fraction 
of the spread at time t- I (proportional change in the quoted ask). 
Vt_l : volume of shares (in thousands) traded at time t- I 
ATt-I : difference (seconds) between the time elapsed between trades at t- I and t-2, T, j 
and the time elapsed between trades at t-2 and t-3, Tir-2 
Volume (in thousands) of shares offered between time t 
Average number of shares (in thousands)per transaction in a day 
qt-, : Trade Indicator Variable : equal to +I when the trade is buyer-initiated 
equal to -I when the trade is seller-initiated 
0P Adverse-Selection cost parameter expressed as a fraction of the spread at time t- I 
5P Inventory-holding cost parameter expressed as a fraction of the spread at time t-I 
PP Waiting time parameter expressed as a fraction of the spread at time t-l. 
7P Quoted-Volume parameter expressed as a fraction of the spread at 
time t- I 
P Coefficient of Correlation of the trade indicator variable 
AX, Random error term at time t assumed to be uniformly distributed with zero mean 
Mt Random error term at time t assumed to be independently, identically distributed. 
A total number of 200 common stocks for the NYSE and 600 common stocks for the NASDAQ sub- 
samples respectively are randomly selected from the TAQ database and grouped under deciles of trading 
activity based on the total number of shares traded in October 1994. Trades for each decile are matched 
with preceding quotes and the above variables are calculated. The four parameters of the model, Op, 8ps Pp, 
and yp are estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments and four moment conditions, therefore 
Hansen's J-Test of Over-identifying Restrictions is almost zero since the model is exactly identified. 
Standard errors, followed by probability values appear in parentheses. 
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Tables AG. 5.7 and AG. 5.8 
Generalized Method of Moments Estimates of the Parameters of the Bid-Change 
Model, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Tables AG. 5.7 and AG. 5.8 present The Generalized Method of Moments estimates of the Bid-Change 
Model described by equation (5.1 Ob) for the NYSE and NASDAQ sub-samples respectively. 
Abt= Opq, 
-, 
V, 
-, - 
OP V pq, -, - 
5pq, 
-, 
V, 
-, - 
PPAT, 
-, - yPAV tb+ý, 
% 
t +, 5 t 
where 
Aýt 
: change in the bid prices quoted between times t and t-1, expressed as a fraction 
of the spread at time t- I (proportional change in the quoted bid). 
Vt_1 : volume of shares (in thousands) traded at time t- I 
ATt_1 : difference (seconds) between the time elapsed between trades at t- I and t-2, T,., 
and the time elapsed between trades at t-2 and 0, TT-2 
Avt b: Change in the volume (in thousands) of shares bid between times t and W 
V: Average number of shares (in thousands) per transaction in a day 
: Trade Indicator Variable: equal to +I when the trade is buyer-initiated 
equal to -1 when the trade is seller-initiated 
OP Adverse-Selection cost parameter expressed as a fraction of the spread at time t-I 
5P Invcntory-holding cost parameter expressed as a fraction of the spread at time t- I 
PP Waiting time parameter expressed as a fraction of the spread at time t- 1. 
7P Quoted-Volume parameter expressed as a fraction of the spread at 
time t- I 
P Coefficient of Correlation of the trade indicator variable 
Axt Random error term at time t assumed to be uniformly distributed with zero mean 
7tt Random error term at time t assumed to be independently, identically distributed 
A total number of 200 common stocks for the NYSE and 600 common stocks for the NASDAQ sub- 
samples respectively are randomly selected from the TAQ database and grouped under deciles of trading 
activity based on the total number of shares traded in October 1994. Trades for each decile are matched 
with preceding quotes and the above variables are calculated. The four parameters of the model, Op. 8pt Ppt 
and yp are estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments and four moment conditions, therefore 
Hansen's J-Test of Over-identifying Restrictions is almost zero since the model is exactly identified. 
Standard errors, followed by probability values appear in parentheses. 
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GA Results from the Specification Tests of the Quoted-Spread, the Ask- 
and the Bid-Change Models 
Tables AG. 5.9 and AG. 5.10 
Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988) CT Statistic for testing the validity of 
moment conditions in the Quoted-Spread Model Equation, 
NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Tables AG. 5.9 and AG. 5.10 present the Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988) CT Statistic for the 
samples of NYSE and NASDAQ stocks of October 1994 respectively. The CT Statistic tests the null 
hypothesis that fractions of the set of moment conditions used to estimate the Quoted Spread Model, 
described by equation (5.11 b), by Generalized Method of Moments are true. For each exogenous variable 
omitted, which corresponds to a particular moment condition, entries in the table represent in the first line 
the J-statistic of over-identifying restrictions of Hansen, from the GMM estimation when the particular 
variable is excluded and in the second line the value of the CT statistic, based on the same estimation. The 
CT statistic is given by 
OT 
1 
CT =TJQT 
(A)- 
QIT 
(0 -T )i 
Where 
QT is the value of the objective function minimized during GMM based 
on the full set of moment conditions and a sample of size T 
QIT is the value of the objective function minimized during GMM based 
on the set of moment conditions which are held to be true and on a sample of 
size T 
OT is the full parameter vector which minimizes the objective function through 
GMM estimation using the full set of moment conditions and a sample of size T 
OIT is the part of the parameter vector which minimizes the objective function 
through GMM estimation using only that set of moment conditions which 
are held to be true based on a sample of size T 
The statistic is distributed as chi-square with Vi degrees of freedom which is equal to the degree by 
which the number of parameters estimated is exceeded (over-identified) by the number of moments used 
in the estimation. For the Quoted-Spread Model when one of the moments is omitted this value is one. 
The confidence limits of this distribution are: 
Pr (ý > 2.70554) = 0.100 
Pr > 3.84146) = 0.050 
Pr > 6.63490) = 0.0 10 
The J-statistic shown on the fourth line of the table is Hansen's J-Statistic for Over-identifying 
restrictions estimated using the full set of moment conditions, also presented in table AG. 5.3 together with 
the definitions of the pertinent variables in the table. 
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Tables AG. 5.11 and AG. 5.12 
GNIINI-BIC NISC Statistic for selecting moment conditions in the Quoted-Spread 
Model Equation, Decile 10, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Tables AG. 5.11 and AG. 5.12 present the GMM-BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) Moment Selection 
Criterion Statistic (MSC) reported in Andrews (1999) when one of the moment conditions used in the initial 
Generalized Method of Moments estimation is excluded from the set used to estimate the Quoted Spread 
Model described by equation (5.11 b). For each exogenous variable omitted, which corresponds to a particular 
moment condition, entries in the table represent in the first line the J-statistic of over-identifying restrictions 
of Hansen, from the GMM estimation when the particular variable is excluded and in the second line the 
value of the MSC13jc statistic, based on the same estimation, of the sample of NYSE and NASDAQ stocks 
respectively of October 1994. The MSCBIC statistic is given by 
MSC 
BIC,, 
(C) 
=J,, (c) - 
ýcj 
-p 
)log n 
Where 
J., (c) is the value of the Hansen J-Test statistic of over-identifying restrictions 
estimated using the moment vector c and a sample of size n. 
ICI is the number of moments used in the momcnt-selection vector c. 
C moment-selection vector (selects only certain moments) 
P is the dimension (number) of the parameter vector, 0, to be estimated by GMM 
n is number of data in the sample 
The J. (C) statistic is distributed as chi-square with ýcj - miný, 
Jcj)] degrees of freedom 
under the null hypothesis that all moment conditions in c are correct. Since four moments are used to 
estimate three parameters there is one degree of freedom. Thus the confidence limits of this distribution 
are: 
Pr (2 > 2.70554) = 0.100 
Pr > 3.84146) = 0.050 
Pr > 6.63490) = 0.0 10 
The definitions of the variables in this table are given in tables AG. 5.3. and AG. 5.4 
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Tables AG. 5.13 and AG. 5.14 
Likelihood Ratio (1,11) Statistic for the parameter vector of the Quoted-Spread Model 
Equation, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Tables AG. 5.13 and AG. 5.14 present the Likelihood Ratio (LR) Statistic for the joint hypothesis that all 
parameters in the Quoted Spread Model described by equation (5.11 b) are equal to zero for the NYSE and 
NASDAQ sub-samples of common stock data of October 1994 respectively. The LR statistic is given by 
LRT = T[QT(lýr)- QT(OT 
)] 
where 
QT 
is the value of the objective function 
A 
Or is the unrestricted estimator of the parameter vector 
r: 
is the restricted estimator of the parameter vector , and 
is the number of observations 
Under the null hypothesis that all restrictions arc valid the LR statistic is distributed as a chi-square with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions imposed. For the Quoted Spread Model which 
involves three variables there are three degrees of freedom when the null hypothesis assumes that all 
parameters are equal to zero. Thus the confidence limits of this distribution are: 
Pr (Xý > 6.2513 9) = 0.100 
Pr > 7.81473) = 0.050 
Pr > 11.3449) = 0.0 10 
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Tables AG. 5.15 and AG. 5.16 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) Statistic for the parameter vector of the Offer-Change and Bid- 
Change Model Equations, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Table AG. 5.15 and AG. 5.16 present the Likelihood Ratio (LR) Statistic for the joint hypothesis that all 
parameters in the Offer-Change and Bid-Changc Models (described by equations (5.9b) and (5.10b) 
respectively) are equal to zero for the NYSE and NASDAQ sub-samples of common stock data for October 
1994 respectively. The LR statistic is given by 
LR 
T= 
T[QT(jT) - QT(ýT)] 
where 
Qr : is the value of the objective function 
Or : is the unrestricted estimator of the parameter vector 
Or is the restricted estimator of the parameter vector , and 
is the number of observations 
Under the null hypothesis that all restrictions are valid the LR statistic is distributed as a chi-square with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions imposed. For the Quoted Spread Model which 
involves three variables there are three degrees of freedom when the null hypothesis assumes that all 
parameters are equal to zero. Thus the confidence limits of this distribution are: 
Pr ()? > 6.2513 9) = 0.100 
Pr > 7.81473) = 0.050 
Pr > 11.3449) = 0.0 10 
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G. 5 Summary Statistics of the Variables of the Price-Change Model 
Tables AGAI and AG. 6.2 
Summary Statistics of the Variables of the Price-Change Model, NYSE and 
NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Tables AG. 6.1 and AG. 6.2 present Summary Statistics of the Variables of the Price-Change Model 
described by equations (6.5b) for the random samples of NYSE and NASDAQ Common Stock data 
respectively in October 1994. 
Where 
Apt Change in the transaction prices between times t and t-1, expressed as a 
fraction of the quoted spread at time t-1. 
SQ Spread quoted at time t 
t 
Average Realized spread for a decile expressed as a percentage of the average 
R quoted spread for the same decile. 
vt-I : Volume of shares traded at time t- I 
Tt-I : Time (seconds) elapsed between trades at times t- I and t-2 
Vt a: Volume (number) of shares offered at time t 
Vb : Volume (number) of shares bid at time t t 
V: Average number of shares per transaction in a day 
Trade Indicator Variable at time t: equal to +1 when the trade is buyer-initiated 
equal to -I when the trade is seller-initiated 
la, jb : Indicator Variables: equalto+1(0) when the trade attime t 
tt is buyer-initiated and 0(l) otherwise 
First-order autocorrelation Coefficient of the trade indicator variable, q, 
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G. 6 Results from the GMIVI Estimations of the Price-Change Model 
Tables AG. 6.3 and AG. 6.4 
Generalized Method of Moments Estimates of the Parameters of the Price Change 
Model, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Tables AG. 6.3 and AG. 6.4 present the Generalized Method of Moments estimates of the Price Change 
Model described by equation (6.5b) for the NYSE and NASDAQ samples of data respectively in October 
1994. 
A P, - Bq Cq Op V q, _, 
where 
Ba. +p PT, -, +y2' 
(V, * + Vb +q, 
(V, ' - Vb +0pV, 
CL + OPT, _3 
+ 
L-(V, ', + V', + q, _, 
(V, *, Vbp0 V-8 V, 
- p21 1- p 
APt: change in the transaction price between times t and t-1, expressed as a fraction 
of the spread at time t- I (proportional change in price). 
Vt-I volume of shares (in thousands) traded at time t-I 
Tt-I 
-I and t-2 time (hours) elapsed between trades at t 
Vt a Volume (thousands) of shares offered at time t 
Vtb Volume (thousands) of shares bid at time t 
Average number (in thousands) of shares per transaction in a day 
Trade Indicator Variable : equal to +1 when the trade is buyer-initiated 
equal to -I when the trade is seller-initiated 
(XP Fixed Order Processing Cost parameter for a single transaction expressed as a 
fraction of the spread at time t- I 
OP Adverse-Selection cost parameter expressed as a fraction of the spread at time t- I 
8P Inventory-holding cost parameter expressed as a fraction of the spread at time t- I 
PP Waiting time parameter expressed as a fraction of the spread at time W. 
Quoted-Volume parameter expressed as a fraction of the spread at 7P time t- I 
P Coefficient of Correlation of the trade indicator variable 
Kt Random error term at time t assumed to be independently, identically distributed. 
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A total number of 200 common stocks for the NYSE and 600 common stocks for the NASDAQ sub- 
samples respectively are randomly selected from the TAQ database and grouped under deciles of trading 
activity based on the total number of shares traded in October. Trades for each decile are matched with 
preceding quotes and the above variables are calculated. The five parameters of the model, ap, Op, 5p, Pp, 
and yp are estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments. Standard errors, followed by probability 
values appear in parentheses. The table also shows Hansen's J-Test of Over-identifying Restrictions which 
is distributed as chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the degree by which the number of 
parameters estimated is exceeded (over-identif led) by the number of moments used in the estimation. For 
the Price-Change Model this value is five. The confidence limits of this distribution are: 
Pr ()? > 9.23 63 5) = 0.100 
Pr (Xý > 11.0705) = 0.050 
Pr ()? > 15.0863) = 0.0 10 
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G. 7 Results from the Specification Tests of the Price-Change Models 
Tables AG. 6.5 and AG. 6.6 
Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988) CT Statistic for testing the validity of 
moment conditions in the Price-Change Model Equation, 
NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Tables AG. 6.5 and AG. 6.6 present the Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988) CT Statistic 
which tests the null hypothesis that fractions of the set of moment conditions used to estimate the 
Price-Change Model described by equation (6.5b) and estimated by the Generalized Method of 
Moments are true. Table AG. 6.5 is for the NYSE and table AG. 6.6 for the NASDAQ sub-sample. For 
each exogenous variable omitted, which corresponds to a particular moment condition, entries in the 
table represent in the first line the J-statistic of over-identifying restrictions of Hansen, from the GMM 
estimation when the particular variable is excluded and in the second line the value of the CT statistic, 
based on the same estimation, for the samples of NYSE and NASDAQ stocks of October 1994 
respectively. The CT statistic is given by 
C= TtQT 
(A )_ 
QIT - T OT 
(OIT 
Where 
QT is the value of the objective function minimized during GMM based 
on the full set of moment conditions and a sample of size T 
QIT is the value of the objective function minimized during GMM based 
on the set of moment conditions which are held to be true and on a sample of 
size T 
0 is the full parameter vector which minimizes the objective function through T GMM estimation using the full set of moment conditions and a sample of size T 
is the part of the parameter vector which minimizes the objective function 
IT through GMM estimation using only that set of moment conditions which 
are held to be true based on a sample of size T 
The statistic is distributed as chi-square with Vi degrees of freedom which is equal to the degree 
by which the number of parameters estimated is exceeded (over-identified) by the number of moments 
omitted. For the Price - Change Model when one of the moments is omitted this value is four. The 
confidence limits of this distribution are: 
Pr ()? > 7.77944) = 0.100 
Pt > 9.48773) = 0.050 
Pr > 13.2767) = 0.0 10 
The J-statistic shown on the table is Hansen's J-Statistic for Over-identifying restrictions estimated 
using the full set of moment conditions, also shown in tables AG. 6.3 and AG. 6.4 together with the 
definitions of the pertinent variables in the tables. 
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Tables AG. 6.7 and AG. 6.8 
GNINI-BIC NISC Statistic for selecting moment conditions in the Price-Change 
Model Equation, Decile 10, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Tables AG. 6.7 and AG. 6.8 present the GMM-BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) Moment 
Selection Criterion Statistic, reported in Andrews (1999), when two of the moment conditions used in 
the initial Generalized Method of Moments estimation are excluded from the set used to estimate the 
Price-Change Model described by equation (6.5b). Entries in tables AG. 6.7 and AG. 6.8 represent the 
MSCBjc statistic when the two particular moment conditions are omitted for decile 10 of the samples of 
NYSE and NASDAQ stocks of October 1994 respectively. The MSCBIC statistic is given by 
MSC Bjc, 
(c) = J,, 
(c) 
- 
ýc I-p )log n 
Where 
J. (c) : is the value of the Hansen J-Test statistic of over-identifying restrictions 
estimated using the moment vector c and a sample of size n. 
ICI : is the number of moments used in the moment vector c. 
C: moment-selection vector (selects only certain moments) 
P: is the dimension (number) of the parameter vector, 0, to be estimated by GMM 
n: is number of data in the sample 
The J. (c) statistic is distributed as chi-square with ýcj-miný, Jcj)] degrees of freedom 
under the null hypothesis that all moment conditions in c are correct. Since eight moments are used 
(two omitted from the initial vector) to estimate five parameters there are three degrees of freedom. 
Thus the confidence limits of this distribution are: 
Pr > 6.25139) = 0.100 
Pr > 7.81473) = 0.050 
Pr > 11.3449) = 0.0 10 
The definitions of the variables in this table are shown in tables AG. 6.3 and AG. 6.4, 
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Table AG. 6.7 - NYSE 
Ist 
Moment 
Avb AVb Omitted Vt-l Tt-I Tt-2 AVa t Avta-I 't-I q, 
14.466000 13.562000 13.852000 13.019200 6.244800 11.344500 7.433100 13.822000 8.254700 
0.851033 -0.052967 0.237033 -0.595767 -7.37017 -Z270467 -6.181867 0.207033 -5.360267 
13.528000 13.719000 13.952000 4.950000 12-651000 7.763200 14.044000 8.947100 
-0.08697 0.104033 0.337033 -&66497 -0.963967 -5.851767 0.429033 -4.667867 
13.301000 22.708000 22.304000 26.230000 6.329000 25.730000 34.308000 
-0.313967 9.093033 8.689033 IZ615033 -7.285967 IZ115033 20.693033 
11-968000 11.102000 13.746000 2.589900 30.168000 32.404000 
-1.646967 -Z51297 0.131033 -11.02507 16.553033 M789033 
21.215000 1.760900 1.795000 28.075000 36.833000 
7.600033 -11.85407 -11.81997 14.460033 23.218033 
23.002000 5.996400 19.862000 32.782000 
9.387033 -7.618567 6.247033 19.167033 
1.826900 24.302000 34.290000 
-11.78807 10.687033 20.675033 
7.090000 7.055100 
-6.524967 -6.559867 
3,354900 
-10,26007 
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Table AG. 6.8 - NASDAO 
Ist 
Moment 
Omitted 
v 
t-I t-I 
Tt 
-2 AV, - AVb t AVA -1 
AVtb q, q, 
2nd 
Moment 
Omitted 
Vt 
4.863100 9.350700 6.508300 5.175000 5.557800 8.783900 8.457200 5.593500 7.573700 
Msc -4.64504 -0.15744 -2.99984 -4.33314 -3.95034 -0.72424 -1.05094 -3.91464 -1.93444 
Vt-, 
1 6.324200 4.078400 4.910900 6.062200 7.247100 7.100500 7.062200 8.306900 
Msc -3.18394 -5.42974 -4.59724 -3.44594 -2.26104 -2.40764 -2.44594 -1.20124 
Tt-I 
1 1.663600 3.683400 4.344800 8.895700 9.656400 4.116400 5.590100 
Msc -7.84454 -5.82474 -5-16334 -0.61244 0.148259 -5.39174 -3.91804 
t-2 
1 2.909500 3.833900 5.628100 6.220300 2.933000 3.898300 
Msc -6.59864 -5.67424 -3.88004 -3.28784 -6.57514 -5.60984 
AV, - 
1 6.495400 5.974600 4.207100 5.372000 5.990200 
Msc . 3.01274 -3.53354 -5.30104 . 4.13614 . 3.51794 
Avtl 
6.867000 8.142600 6.584500 7.760300 
Msc -2.64114 -1.36554 -2.92364 -1.74784 
Avta- I 
1 9.235000 6.317500 8.294900 
Msc . 0.27314 . 3.19064 -1.21324 
&V b 
, t 
6.375100 8.166900 
Msc -3.13304 -1.34124 
q, 
6.909700 
WISC -2.59844 
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Tables AG. 6.9 and AG. 6.10 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) Statistic for the parameter vector of the Price-Change 
Model Equation, NYSE and NASDAQ TAQ data: October 1994. 
Tables AG. 6.9 and AG. 6.10 present the Lagrange Multiplier (LR) Statistic for the joint hypothesis 
that all parameters in the Price-Change Model described by equation (6.5b) are equal to zero for the 
NYSE and NASDAQ samples of common stock data respectively. The LR statistic is given by 
LR T= T[QT(gv) - QT(Or 
)] 
where 
Qr is the value of the objective function 
or is the unrestricted estimator of the parameter vector 
ýýr : is the restricted estimator of the parameter vector , and 
is the number of observations 
Under the null hypothesis that all restrictions are valid the LR statistic is distributed as a chi- 
square with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions imposed. For the Price-Change 
Model which involves five parameters there are five degrees of freedom when the null hypothesis 
assumes that all parameters are equal to zero. Thus the confidence limits of this distribution are: 
Pr (2 > 9.23635) = 0.100 
Pr > 11.0705) = 0.050 
Pr > 15.0863) = 0.0 10 
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Nomenclature 
English Symbols 
A: Event where investor buys at the ask price 
At : Adverse-selection cost component at time t 
A. Adverse-selection cost component in the ask price (buyer-initiated 
trade) 
Ab Adverse-selection cost component in the bid price (seller-initiated 
trade) 
AO Intercept of the linear adverse selection spread component equation in 
the Glosten and Harris (1988) model, equation (3.12) 
A, Slope of the linear adverse selection spread component equation in in 
the Glosten and Harris (1988) model, equation (3.12) 
at : Ask price quoted at time t 
Aat : Change in ask prices quoted between times t and t- I 
Aat Change in the ask prices quoted between times t and t-1, expressed as a 
fraction of the spread at time t-1 (proportional change in the quoted 
ask). 
B: Event where investor sells at the bid price 
bt : Bid price quoted at time t 
Abt : Change in bid prices quoted between times t and t- I 
Change in the bid prices quoted between times t and t-1, expressed as a Abt fraction of the spread at time t- I (proportional change in the quoted 
bid). 
C, : Cost of trading amount Qj (Stoll (1978) model). 
Ct : Gross-profit component at time t 
Cý : Gross-profit component at the ask price (buyer-initiated trade) 
Cb : Gross-profit component at the bid price (seller-initiated trade) 
CO Intercept of the linear gross-profit (or transitory) spread component in 
the Glosten and Harris (1988) model, equation (3.12) 
C, Slope of the linear gross-profit (or transitory) spread component in 
the Glosten and Harris (1988) model, equation (3.12) 
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ICI Number of moments selected in the moment- selection vector c in the 
GMM-BIC statistic of Andrews(1999), section 5.6.2 
c Moment-selection vector c, in the GMM-BIC statistic of Andrews 
(1999), section 5.6.2 
C1 Percentage cost that the dealer requires in order that he takes 
position Q, in stock i, (Stoll (1978) model) 
cc : Current consumption of dealer (Glosten and Milgrorn (1985) model) 
cov : Covariance 
DT(O) : Matrix of partial derivatives in the first-order condition in the 
minimization of the objective function (GMM estimation) 
et Error term in the vector function of population moments in the GMM 
estimation of the Quoted-Spread Model Equation (5.11 b) 
Error term in the vector function of population moments in the GMM 
estimation of the Offer-Change Model Equation (5.9b) 
b 
et Error term in the vector function of population moments in the GMM 
estimation of the Bid-Change Model Equation (5.1 Ob) 
P e, Error term in the vector function of population moments in the GMM 
estimation of the Price-Change Model Equation (6.5b) 
F Informed trader's total information set (Glosten and Milgrom. 1 (1985) model) 
g(O, yT) : Vector (r x 1) valued function denoting the sample average of h(O, wt) 
(GMM estimation) 
h(O, wt) : Vector (r x 1) valued function of instruments selected for GMM 
estimation 
Ht : Public information set (Glosten and Milgrorn (1985) model) 
IVt : Inventory-holding cost component at time t 
In lb : Indicator Variables : equal to +1 (0) when the trade at time t is buyer- t initiated and 0(l) otherwise 
Ijz, 
ýA ): Indicator variable on whether event Z)A has occurred (Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) model). 
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J. (c) : Hansen J-Test statistic of over-identifying restrictions estimated using 
the moment vector c and a sample of size n. 
it Informed trader's private information set (Glosten and Milgrorn 
(1985) model) 
MI : Mid-point between the bid and ask prices at time t 
Mt : True (common information) price of a stock at time t 
Number of data in the sample 
Nf : Number of orthogonality conditions used in GMM estimation 
Np : Number of parameters to be estimated by GMM estimation 
Ot : Order-processing cost component at the ask 
ob 
t: Ordcr-processing cost component at the bid 
P: Common (public information) value of a stock 
p Number of parameters estimated by GMM (GMM-BIC statistic of 
Andrews (1999), section 5.6.2) 
Full-information value of a stock 
P, *: True price of stock i before the transaction (Stoll (1978) model) 
P, : Observed transaction price at time t 
Ask price 
R: Bid Price b 
Apt : Change in the observed transaction prices between times t and t- I 
Apt : Change in the observed transaction prices between times t and t-1, 
expressed as a fraction of the spread at time t- I 
Trade Indicator Variable : equal to +1 when the trade is buyer- 
initiated; equal to -I when the trade is seller-initiated 
Qj : True value of trade on asset i (Stoll (1978) model) 
Qia : True value of a sale of asset i to the dealer (Stoll (1978) model) 
Qia True value of a purchase of asset i from the dealer 
(Stoll (1978) model) 
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QT The value of the objective function minimized during GMM based 
on the full set of moment conditions and a sample of size T 
(Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988) statistic). 
QIT The value of the objective function minimized during GMM based 
on the set of moment conditions which are held to be true and on a 
sample of size T (Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988) 
statistic). 
Q(O; YT) : The value of the objective function tobe minimized in GMM 
estimation based on parameter 0 and vector of T observations of 
observed variables (GMM estimation) 
rt Round-off error (drift between observed discrete price and 
unobserved price when no discrete prices are used), assumed to be 
a zero mean, asymptotically uniformly distributed random variable 
(Glosten and Harris (1988) model) 
Rate of return on the dealer's initial portfolio (Stoll (1978) model) 
R, Rate of return on stock i (Stoll (1978) model) 
Rf Risk-free rate for borrowing and financing (Stoll (1978) model) 
S: Realized spread (Roll (1984) Model) 
SR : Average realized spread as a percentage of quoted spread 
SP : proportional spread in the Glosten (1987) model 
SQ : Quoted spread assumed to be constant (Stoll (1979) model) 
SQ Quoted spread at time t t 
ASQ Change in the quoted spread between times t and t- I t 
Q 
A 
Change in the quoted spread at time t, expressed as a fraction of the 
spread at time t- I 
st : Specialist's information set (Glosten and Milgrorn (1985) model) 
T: Number of observations (GMM estimation) 
Tt Time elapsed between trades at times t and t-1 (Glosten and Harris 
(1988) model) 
Average number of shares per transaction 
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V" Volume (number) of shares offered prior to the trade at time t 
V, b Volume (number) of shares bid prior to the trade at time t 
V, Volume of shares traded at time t 
AV, 'a Change in the number of shares offered between times t and t- I 
AVt b Change in the number of shares bid between times t and t- I 
ut Indicator variable signifying information event (Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) model). 
TV Terminal wealth of the dealer (Stoll (1987) model). 
JVO Initial wealth of the dealer (Stoll (1987) model). 
WT Weighting matrix in the objective function (GMM estimation) 
wt Vector (h x 1) of variables observed at time t (GMM estimation) 
(WTIT-1 
Sequence of (r x r) positive definite weighting matrices in the 
minimization of the objective function (GMM estimation) 
V., Variance - covariance matrix of the parameters in (GMM 
estimation) 
V Random value of asset (Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model) 
x Number of shares of stock (Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model) 
z Dealer's coefficient of relative risk aversion (Stoll (1978) model) 
ZI Effective spread for trade at time t (Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) 
model). 
ZI : Decision rule of investor (Glosten and Milgrorn (1985) model) 
Greek Symbols 
cc Fixed Order-Processing Cost parameter for a single transaction 
ap Fixed Order-Processing Cost parameter for a single transaction, 
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expressed as a fraction of the spread at time t- I 
I-a Order-processing component in the George, Kaul and 
Nimalendran (199 1) model 
P Waiting-time-between-trades parameter 
PP Waiting-time-between-trades parameter expressed as a fraction 
of the spread at time t- I 
7 Quoted-Volume parameter 
Y, Order-processing cost component of the effective spread (Lin, 
Sanger and Booth (1995) model). 
7P Quoted-Volume parameter expressed as a fraction of the spread 
at time t- I 
8 Inventory-holding cost parameter 
The magnitude of a price continuation as a proportion of the 
quoted spread (Stoll (1979) model) 
Inventory-holding cost parameter expressed as a fraction of the 
spread at time t- I 
Random error term, asymptotically, uniformly distributed with 
zero mean 
Ail, Random error term, asymptotically, uniformly distributed with 
zero mean 
Av, Random error term, asymptotically, uniforrnly distributed with 
zero mean 
Random error term, asymptotically, uniformly distributed with 
zero mean 
Ct Public information innovation (represents the innovation in 
beliefs regarding the true price of the stock ) between trades at 
times t and t-1, assumed to be an independently, identically 
distributed, zero mean normal random variable. 
Random error term, asymptotically, uniformly distributed with 
zero mean 
Random error term, asymptotically, uniformly distributed with 
zero mean 
Adverse-S election parameter 
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OP Adverse-S election parameter expressed as a fraction of the 
spread at time t- I 
at : Random error term, independently, identically distributed 
A 
0: 
The full parameter vector which minimizes the objective 
T function through GMM estimation using the full set of moment 
conditions and a sample of size T (Eichenbaum, Hansen and 
Singleton (1988) statistic); unrestricted estimator of the 
parameter vector (Lagrange Multiplier Statistic section 5.6) 
0 
IT The part of the parameter vector which minimizes the 
objective function through GMM estimation using only that set 
of moment conditions which are held to be true based on a 
sample of size T (Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988) 
statistic). 
OT Restricted estimator of the parameter vector (Lagrange 
Multiplier Statistic section 5.6) 
Kt : Random error term, independently, identically distributed 
2, : Adverse-selection cost component of the effective spread 
(Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) model). 
AXt Error term at time t, uniformly distributed zero mean random 
variable 
vt Random error term, asymptotically, uniformly 
distributed with 
zero mean 
Independently, identically distributed random variable with zero 
mean models the effect of rounding errors due to price 
discreteness or time-varying returns (Madhavan, Richardson 
and Roomans (1997) model) 
Error term at time t, independently, identically distributed 
random variable 
7rg The proportion of the spread due to factors other than 
adverse selection (gross profit, Glosten (1987) model) 
n: The probability of a price reversal (Stoll (1979) model) 
p The first-order autocorrelation coefficient of the trade 
indicator variable 
IP, : 
Liquidity parameter (Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model) 
333 
O-, P 
Correlation between the rate of return of stock i and that of the 
optimal efficient portfolio (Stoll (1978) model) 
0-, 
2 Variance of the return of stock i (Stoll (1978) model) 
Tt-I Time (seconds) elapsed between trades at t- I and t-2 
ATt-I : Difference in times (seconds) elapsed between trades at t-1 
and t-2 and between times t-2 and 0 (Tt., - Tt-2) 
Aut : Error term at time t, independently, identically distributed 
random variable 
9 Transitory effect per share which covers the dealer's 
compensation for providing liquidity, the inventory holding cost 
and risk bearing (Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans 
(1997) model) 
AX, Error term at time t, uniformly distributed, zero mean random 
variable 
tat Error term at time t, independently, identically distributed 
random variable 
fl Common information set relating to the stock 
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